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
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## THE FACTS OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES<sup>1</sup>

F. A. HAYEK

THERE exists today no commonly accepted term to describe the group of disciplines with which we shall be concerned in this paper. The term "moral sciences," in the sense in which John Stuart Mill used it, did approximately cover the field, but it has long been out of fashion and would now carry inappropriate connotations to most readers. While it is for that reason necessary to use the familiar "social sciences" in the title, we must begin by emphasizing that by no means all the disciplines concerned with the phenomena of social life present the particular problems we shall discuss. Vital statistics, for example, or the study of the spreading of contagious diseases, undoubtedly deal with social phenomena but raise none of the specific questions to be considered here. They are, if I may call them so, true natural sciences of society and differ in no important respect from the other natural sciences. But it is different with the study of language or the market, of law and most other human institutions. It is this group of disciplines which alone I propose to consider and for which I am compelled to use the somewhat misleading term "social sciences."

Since I shall contend that the role of

experience in these fields of knowledge is fundamentally different from that which it plays in the natural sciences, I had, perhaps, better explain that I myself originally approached my own subject, economics, thoroughly imbued with a belief in the universal validity of the methods of the natural sciences. Not only was my first technical training largely scientific in the narrow sense of the word but also what little training I had in philosophy or scientific method was entirely in the school of Ernst Mach and later of the logical positivists. Yet all this had the effect only of creating an awareness, which became more and more definite as time went on, that, certainly in economics, all the people who are universally regarded as talking sense are constantly infringing the accepted canons of scientific method evolved from the practice of the natural sciences; that even the natural scientists, when they begin to discuss social phenomena, as a rule—at least in so far as they preserve any common sense—do the same; but that, in the not infrequent instances when a natural scientist seriously tries to apply his professional habits of thought to social problems, the result has almost invariably been disastrous—that is, of a sort which to all professional students of these fields seems utter non-

<sup>1</sup> Read before the Cambridge University Moral Science Club, November 19, 1942.

sense. But, while it is easy to show the absurdity of most concrete attempts to make the social sciences "scientific," it is much less easy to put up a convincing defense of our own methods, which, though satisfying to most people in particular applications, are, if looked at with a critical eye, suspiciously similar to what is popularly known as "medieval scholasticism."

# I

But enough of introduction. Let me plunge directly to the middle of my subject and ask with what kind of facts we have to deal in the social sciences. This question immediately raises another which is in many ways crucial for my problem: What do we mean when we speak of "a certain *kind* of facts"? Are they given to us as facts of a certain kind, or do we make them such by looking at them in a certain way? Of course all our knowledge of the external world is in a sense derived from sense perception and therefore from our knowledge of physical facts. But does this mean that all our knowledge is of physical facts only? This depends on what we mean by "a kind of facts."

An analogy from the physical sciences will make the position clear. All levers or pendulums which we can conceive have chemical and optical properties. But, when we talk about levers or pendulums, we do not talk about chemical or optical facts. What makes a number of individual things facts of a kind are the attributes which we select in order to treat them as members of a class. This is, of course, commonplace. But it means that, though all the social phenomena with which we can possibly deal may have physical attributes, they need not be physical facts for our purpose. That depends on how we shall find it conven-

ient to classify them for the discussion of our problems. Are the human actions which we observe, and the objects of these actions, things of the same or a different kind because they appear as physically the same or different to us, the observers—or for some other reason?

Now the social sciences are without exception concerned with the way in which men behave toward their environment—other men or things—or I should say rather that these are the elements from which the social sciences build patterns of relationships between many men. How must we define or classify the objects of their activity if we want to explain or understand their actions? Is it the physical attributes of the objects—what *we* can find out about these objects by studying them—or is it by something else that we must classify the objects when we attempt to explain what men do about them? Let me first consider a few examples.

Take such things as tools, food, medicine, weapons, words, sentences, communications, and acts of production—or any one particular instance of any of these. I believe these to be fair samples of the kind of objects of human activity which constantly occur in the social sciences. It is easily seen that all these concepts (and the same is true of more concrete instances) refer not to some objective properties possessed by the things, or which the observer can find out about them, but to views which some other person holds about the things. These objects cannot even be defined in physical terms, because there is no single physical property which any one member of a class must possess. These concepts are not just abstractions of the kind we use in all physical sciences, but they abstract from all the physical properties of the things themselves. They are all instances

of what are sometimes called "teleological concepts," that is, they can be defined only by indicating relations between three terms: a purpose, somebody who holds that purpose, and an object which that person thinks to be a suitable means for that purpose. If we wish, we could say that all these objects are defined not in terms of their "real" properties but in terms of opinions people hold about them. In short, in the social sciences the things are what people think they are. Money is money, a word is a word, a cosmetic is a cosmetic, if and because somebody thinks they are.

That this is not more obvious is due to the historical accident that in the world in which we live the knowledge of most people is approximately similar to our own. It stands out much more strongly when we think of men with a knowledge different from our own, for example, people who believe in magic. That a charm believed to protect the wearer's life, or a ritual destined to secure good harvests, can be defined only in terms of people's beliefs about them is obvious. But the logical character of the concepts we have to use in attempts to interpret people's actions is the same whether our beliefs coincide with theirs or not. Whether a medicine is a medicine, for the purpose of understanding a person's actions, depends solely on whether that person believes it to be one, irrespective of whether we, the observers, agree or not. Sometimes it is somewhat difficult to keep this distinction clearly in mind. We are likely, for example, to think of the relationship between parent and child as an "objective" fact. But, when we use this concept in studying family life, what is relevant is not that  $x$  is the natural offspring of  $y$  but that either or both believe this to be the case. The relevant character is no dif-

ferent from the case where  $x$  and  $y$  believe some spiritual tie to exist between them in the existence of which we do not believe. Perhaps the relevant distinction comes out most clearly in the general and obvious statement that no superior knowledge the observer may possess about the object, but which is not possessed by the acting person, can help us in understanding the action in question.

The objects of human activity, then, for the purposes of the social sciences are of the same or of a different kind, or belong to the same or different classes, not according to what we, the observers, know about the objects but according to what we think the observed person knows about it. We somehow, and for reasons which I shall presently consider, impute knowledge to the observed person. Before I go on to ask on what grounds such an imputation to the acting person of knowledge about the object is based, what this means, and what follows from the fact that we define the objects of human action in such a way, I must turn for a moment to consider the second kind of elements with which we have to deal in the social sciences: not the environment toward which the human beings behave but human action itself. When we examine the classification of different kinds of actions which we must use when we discuss intelligible human behavior, we meet precisely the same situation as we did in analyzing the classification of objects of human actions. Of the examples I have given before, the last four fall into this category: words, sentences, communications, and acts of production are instances of human actions of this kind. Now, what makes two instances of the same word or the same act of production actions of the same kind, in the sense that is relevant when we discuss intelligible behavior? Surely

not any physical properties they have in common. It is not because I know explicitly what physical properties the sound of the word "sycamore" pronounced at different times by different people has in common but because I know that  $x$  or  $y$  mean all these different sounds or signs to mean the same word, or that they understand them all as the same word, that I treat them as instances of the same class. And it is not because of any objective or physical similarity but because of the (imputed) intention of the acting person that I regard the various ways in which in different circumstances he may make, say, a spindle, as instances of the same act of production.

Please note that neither with respect to the objects of human activity nor with respect to the different kinds of human activity themselves do I argue that their physical properties do not come into the process of classification. What I am arguing is that no physical properties can enter into the explicit definition of any of these classes, because the elements of these classes need not possess common physical attributes, and we do not even consciously or explicitly know which are the various physical properties of which an object would have to possess at least one to be a member of a class. The situation may be described schematically by saying that we know that the objects  $a, b, c, \dots$ , which may be physically completely dissimilar and which we can never exhaustively enumerate, are objects of the same kind because the attitude of  $X$  toward them all is similar. But the fact that  $X$ 's attitude toward them is similar can again be defined only by saying that he will react toward them by any one of the actions  $\alpha, \beta, \gamma, \dots$ , which again may be physically dissimilar and which we will not be able to

enumerate exhaustively, but which we just know to "mean" the same thing.

This result of reflecting about what we are actually doing is no doubt a little disturbing. Yet there seems to me no possible doubt that this not only is precisely what we are doing, in ordinary life as well as in the social sciences, when we talk about other people's intelligible action, but that it is the *only* way in which we can ever "understand" what other people do; and that, therefore, we *must* rely on this sort of reasoning whenever we discuss what we all know as specifically human or intelligible activities. We all know what we mean when we say that we see a person "playing" or "working," a man doing this or that "deliberately," or when we say that a face looks "friendly" or a man "frightened." But, though we might be able to explain how we recognize any one of these things in a particular case, I am certain none of us can enumerate, and no science can—at least as yet—tell us all the different physical symptoms by which we recognize the presence of these things. The common attributes which the elements of any of these classes possess are not physical attributes but must be something else.

From the fact that whenever we interpret human action as in any sense purposive or meaningful, whether we do so in ordinary life or for the purposes of the social sciences, we have to define both the objects of human activity and the different kinds of actions themselves, not in physical terms but in terms of the opinions or intentions of the acting persons, there follow some very important consequences; namely, nothing less than that we can, from the concepts of the objects, analytically conclude something about what the actions will be. If we define an object in terms of a person's

attitude toward it, it follows, of course, that the definition of the object implies a statement about the attitude of the person toward the thing. When we say that a person possesses food or money, or that he utters a word, we imply that he knows that the first can be eaten, that the second can be used to buy something with, and that the third can be understood—and perhaps many other things. Whether this implication is in any way significant, that is, whether to make it explicit adds in any way to our knowledge, depends on whether when we say to a person that this or that thing is food or money we state thereby merely the observed facts from which we derive this knowledge, or whether we imply more than that.

How can we ever know that a person holds certain beliefs about his environment? And what do we mean when we say that we know he holds certain beliefs—when we say that we know that he uses this thing as a tool or that gesture or sound as a means of communication? Do we merely mean what we actually observe in the particular case, for example, that we see him chewing and swallowing his food, swinging a hammer, or making noises? Or do we not always when we say we “understand” a person’s action, when we talk about “why” he is doing this or that, impute to him something beyond what we can observe—at least beyond what we can observe in the particular case?

If we consider for a moment the simplest kinds of actions where this problem arises, it becomes, of course, rapidly obvious that, in discussing what we regard as other people’s conscious actions, we invariably interpret their action on the analogy of our own mind: that is, that we group their actions, and the objects of their actions, into classes or cate-

gories which we know solely from the knowledge of our own mind. We assume that the idea of a purpose or a tool, a weapon or food, is common to them with us just as we assume that they can see the difference between different colors or shapes as well as we. We thus always supplement what we actually see of another person’s action by projecting into that person a system of classification of objects which we know, not from observing other people, but because it is in terms of these classes that we think ourselves. If, for example, we watch a person cross a square full of traffic, dodging some cars and pausing to let others pass, we know (or we believe we know) much more than we actually perceive with our eyes. And this would be equally true if we saw a man behave in a physical environment quite unlike anything we have ever seen before. If I see for the first time a big boulder or an avalanche coming down the side of a mountain toward a man and see him run for his life, I know the meaning of this action because I know what I would or might have done in similar circumstances.

There can be no doubt that we all constantly act on the assumption that we can in this way interpret other people’s actions on the analogy of our own mind and that in the great majority of instances this procedure *works*. The trouble is that we can never be sure. On watching a few movements or hearing a few words of a man, we decide that he is sane and not a lunatic and thereby exclude the possibility of his behaving in an infinite number of “odd” ways which none of us could ever enumerate and which just do not fit into what we know to be reasonable behavior—which means nothing else than that those actions cannot be interpreted by analogy of our own

mind. We can neither explain precisely how, for practical purposes, we know that a man is sane and not a lunatic, nor can we exclude the possibility that in one case in a thousand we may be wrong. Similarly, I shall, from a few observations, be able rapidly to conclude that a man is signaling or hunting, making love to or punishing another person, though I may never have seen these things done in this particular way; and yet my conclusion will be sufficiently certain for all practical purposes.

The important question which arises is whether it is legitimate to employ in scientific analysis such concepts as these, which refer to a state of affairs which we all recognize "intuitively" and which we not only unhesitatingly use in daily life but on the use of which all social intercourse, all communication between men, is based, or whether we should be precluded from doing so because we cannot state any physical conditions from which we can derive with certainty that the postulated conditions are really present in any particular case, and because we can therefore never be certain whether any particular instance is really a member of the class about which we talk—although we all agree that in the great majority of cases our diagnosis will be correct. The hesitation which we all at first feel about this is probably due to the fact that the retention of such a procedure in the social sciences would be in conflict with the most marked tendency of the development of scientific thought in modern times. But is there really such a conflict? The tendency to which I refer has been correctly described as one toward the progressive elimination of all "anthropomorphic" explanations from the physical sciences. Does this really mean that we must refrain from treating man "anthropomorphically"—or is it

not rather obvious, as soon as we put it in this way, that such an extrapolation of past tendencies is absurd?

I do not wish, of course, in this connection to raise all the problems connected with the behaviorist program, though a more systematic survey of my subject could hardly avoid doing so. Indeed, the question with which we are here concerned is nothing else than whether the social sciences could possibly discuss the kind of problems with which they are concerned in purely behavioristic terms—or even whether consistent behaviorism is possible.

Perhaps the relation between the strictly empirical factor and the part which we add from the knowledge of our own mind in interpreting another person's action can be stated with the help of a (somewhat questionable) use of the distinction between the denotation and the connotation of a concept. What I shall in particular circumstances recognize as a "friendly face," the denotation of the concept, is largely a matter of experience. But what I mean when I say that this is a "friendly" face, no experience in the ordinary sense of the term can tell me. What I mean by a "friendly face" does not depend on the physical properties of different concrete instances, which may conceivably have nothing in common. Yet I learn to recognize them as members of the same class—and what makes them members of the same class is not physical properties but an imputed meaning.

The importance of this distinction grows as we move outside the familiar surroundings. As long as I move among my own kind of people, it is probably the physical properties of a bank note or a revolver from which I conclude that they are money or a weapon to the person holding them. When I see a savage

holding cowrie shells or a long thin tube, the physical properties of the thing will probably tell me nothing. But the observations which suggest to me that the cowrie shells are money to him and the blowpipe a weapon will throw much light on the object—much more light than these same observations could possibly give if I were not familiar with the conception of money or a weapon. In recognizing the things as such, I begin to understand the people's behavior. I am able to fit into a scheme of actions which "make sense," just because I have come to regard it not as a thing with certain physical properties, but as the kind of thing which fits into the pattern of my own purposive action.

If what we do when we speak about understanding a person's action is that we fit what we actually observe into patterns we find ready in our own mind, it follows, of course, that we can understand less and less as we turn to beings more and more different from ourselves. But it also follows that it is not only impossible to recognize, but meaningless to speak of, a mind different from our own. What we mean when we speak of another mind is that we can connect what we observe because the things we observe fit into the way of our own thinking. But where this possibility of interpreting in terms of analogies from our own mind ceases, where we can no longer "understand"—there is no sense in speaking of mind at all; there are then only physical facts which we can group and classify solely according to the physical properties which we observe.

An interesting point in this connection is that, as we go from interpreting the actions of men very much like ourselves to men who live in a very different environment, it is the most concrete concepts which first lose their usefulness

for interpreting the people's actions and the most general or abstract which remain helpful longest. My knowledge of the everyday things around me, of the particular ways in which we express ideas or emotions, will be of little use in interpreting the behavior of the inhabitants of Tierra del Fuego. But my understanding of what I mean by a means to an end, by food or a weapon, a word or a sign, and probably even an exchange or a gift, will still be useful and even essential in my attempt to understand what they do.

## II

So far the discussion has been limited to the question of how we classify individual actions and their objects in the discussion of social phenomena. I must now turn to the question of the purpose for which we use this classification. Even though concern with classifications takes up a great deal of our energies in the social sciences—so much, indeed, in economics, for example, that one of the best-known modern critics of the discipline has described it as a purely "taxonomic" science—this is not our ultimate purpose. Like all classifications, it is merely a convenient way of arranging our facts for whatever we want to explain. But before I can turn to this, I must, first, clear a common misunderstanding from our way, and, second, explain a claim frequently made on behalf of this process of classification—a claim which to anyone brought up in the natural sciences sounds highly suspicious but which nevertheless follows merely from the nature of our object.

The misunderstanding is that the social sciences aim at *explaining* individual behavior and particularly that the elaborate process of classification which we use either is, or serves, such an explanation. The social sciences do in fact nothing

of the sort. If conscious action can be "explained," this is a task for psychology but not for economics or linguistics, jurisprudence or any other social science. What we do is merely to classify types of individual behavior which we can understand, to develop their classification—in short, to provide an orderly arrangement of the material which we have to use in our further task. Economists, and the same is probably also true in the other social sciences, are usually a little ashamed to admit that this part of their task is "only" a kind of special logic. I think they would be wise frankly to recognize and to face this fact.

The claim to which I have referred follows directly from this character of the first part of our task as a branch of applied logic. But it sounds startling enough at first. It is that we can derive from the knowledge of our own mind in an "a priori" or "deductive" or "analytic" fashion, an (at least in principle) *exhaustive* classification of all the possible forms of intelligible behavior. It is against this claim, rarely openly made, but always implied, that all the taunts are directed, particularly against the economists, when we are accused of spinning knowledge out of our inner consciousness and what other similar abusive epithets there are. Yet when we reflect that, whenever we discuss intelligible behavior, this means that we discuss actions which we can interpret in terms of our own mind, the claim loses its startling character and in fact becomes no more than a truism. If we can understand only what is similar to our own mind, it necessarily follows that we must be able to find all that we can understand in our own mind. Of course, when I said that we can *in principle* achieve an exhaustive classification of all possible forms of intelligible behavior, this does

not mean that we may not discover that, in interpreting human actions, we do use processes of thought which we have not yet analyzed or made explicit. We constantly do. What I meant is that when we discuss any particular class of intelligible action which we have defined as actions of one kind, in the sense in which I have used that term, then we can, within that field, provide a completely exhaustive classification of the forms of action which fall within it. If, for example, we define as economic actions all acts of choice which are made necessary by the scarcity of means available for our ends, we can then, step by step, subdivide the possible situations into alternatives so that at each step there is no third possibility: a given means may be useful only for one or for many ends, a given end can be achieved by one or by several different means, different means may be wanted for a given end either alternatively or cumulatively, etc.

But I must leave what I have called the first part of my task and turn to the question of the use we make of all these elaborate classifications in the social sciences. The answer is, briefly, that we use the different kinds of individual behavior thus classified as elements from which we construct hypothetical models in an attempt to reproduce the patterns of social relationships which we know in the world around us. But this still leaves us with the question whether this is the right way to study social phenomena. Have we not in these social structures at last definite tangible social facts which we ought to observe and measure, as we observe and measure physical facts? Should we not here at least derive all our knowledge from observation and experience, instead of by "constructing models" from the elements found in our own thought?



The belief that, when we turn from the action of the individual to the observation of social collectivities, we move from the realm of vague and subjective speculation to the realm of objective fact is very widespread. It is the belief held by all who think that they may make the social sciences more "scientific" by imitating the model of the natural sciences. Its intellectual basis has been most clearly expressed by the founder of "sociology," Auguste Comte, when in a famous statement he asserted that in the field of social phenomena, as in biology, "the whole of the object is certainly much better known and more immediately accessible" than the constituent parts.<sup>2</sup> And most of the science he attempted to create is still based on this or similar beliefs.

I believe that this view which regards social collectivities such as "society" or the "state," or any particular social institution or phenomenon, as in any sense more objective than the intelligible actions of the individuals is sheer illusion. I shall argue that what we call social facts are no more facts in the specific sense in which this term is used in the physical sciences than are individual actions or their objects; that these so-called "facts" are rather precisely the same kind of mental models constructed by us from elements which we find in our own minds as those which we construct in the theoretical social sciences; so that what we do in those sciences is in a logical sense precisely the same thing as what we always do when we talk about a state or a community, a language or a market, only that we make explicit what in everyday speech is concealed and vague.

I cannot attempt here to explain this in connection with any one of the theoretical social disciplines—or, rather, in

connection with the only one among them where I should be competent to do this, economics. To do so, I should have to spend far more time than I have on technicalities. But it will perhaps be even more helpful if I attempt to do so with respect to the pre-eminently descriptive and, in a sense, pre-eminently empirical discipline in the social field, namely, history. To consider the nature of "historical facts" will be particularly appropriate, since the social scientists are constantly advised, by those who want to make the social sciences more "scientific," to turn to history for their facts and to use the "historical method" as a substitute for the experimental. Indeed, outside the social sciences themselves (and, it seems, particularly among logicians)<sup>3</sup> it appears to have become almost accepted doctrine that the historical method is the legitimate path toward generalizations about social phenomena.<sup>4</sup>

What do we mean by a "fact" of history? Are the facts with which human history is concerned significant to us as physical facts or in some other sense? What sort of things are the Battle of Waterloo, the French government under Louis XIV, or the feudal system? Perhaps we shall get further if, instead of tackling this question directly, we ask how we decide whether any particular bit of information we have constitutes

<sup>3</sup> Cf., e.g., L. S. Stebbing, *A Modern Introduction to Logic* (2d ed., 1933), p. 383.

<sup>4</sup> I am sure that I need not here especially guard myself against the misunderstanding that what I shall have to say about the relation between history and theory is meant in any sense to diminish the importance of history. I should like even to emphasize that the whole purpose of theory is to help our understanding of historical phenomena and that the most perfect knowledge of theory will be of very little use indeed without a most extensive knowledge of a historical character. But this has really nothing to do with my present subject, which is the nature of "historical facts" and the respective roles which history and theory play in their discussion.

<sup>2</sup> *Cours*, IV, 258.

part of the "fact" "Battle of Waterloo." Was the man plowing his field just beyond the extreme wing of Napoleon's guards part of the Battle of Waterloo? Or the chevalier who dropped his snuff-box on hearing the news of the storming of the Bastille part of the "French Revolution"? To follow up this kind of question will at least show one thing: that we cannot define a historical fact in terms of spatiotemporal co-ordinates. Neither is everything which takes place at one time and in one place part of the same historical fact, nor must all parts of the same historical fact belong to the same time and place. The classical Greek language or the organization of the Roman legions, the Baltic trade of the eighteenth century or the evolution of common law, or any move of any army, are all historical facts where no physical criterion can tell us what are the parts of the fact and how they hang together. Any attempt to define them must take the form of a mental reconstruction, of a model, in which intelligible individual attitudes form the elements. In most instances, no doubt, the model will be so simple that the interconnection of its parts are readily visible; and there will consequently be little justification for dignifying the model with the name of a "theory." But, if our historical fact is such a complex as a language or a market, a social system or a method of land cultivation, what we call a fact is either a recurrent process or a complex pattern of persistent relationships which is not "given" to our observation but which we can only laboriously reconstruct—and which we can reconstruct only because the parts (the relations from which we build up the structure) are familiar and intelligible to us. To put it paradoxically: what we call historical facts are really theories which, in a methodological sense,

are of precisely the same character as the more abstract or general models which the theoretical sciences of society construct. The situation is not that we first study the "given" historical facts and then perhaps can generalize about them. We rather use a theory when we select from the knowledge we have about a period certain parts as intelligibly connected and forming part of the same historical fact. We never observe states or governments, battles or commercial activities, of a people as a whole. When we use any of these terms, we always refer to a scheme which connects individual activities by intelligible relations; that is, we use a theory which tells us what is and what is not part of our subject. It does not alter the position that the theorizing is usually done for us by our informant or source who, in reporting the fact, will use terms like "state" or "town" which cannot be defined in physical terms but which refer to a complex of relationships which, made explicit, constitute a "theory" of the subject.

Social theory, in the sense in which I use the term, is, then, logically prior to history. It explains the terms which history must use. This is, of course, not inconsistent with historical study frequently forcing the theorist to revise the constructions or to provide new ones in terms of which he can arrange the information which he finds. But in so far as the historian talks, not merely about the individual actions of particular people but about what, in some sense, we can call social phenomena, his facts can be explained as facts of a certain kind only in terms of a theory about how its elements hang together. The social complexes, the social wholes which the historian discusses, are never found ready given as are the persistent structures in the organic (animal or vegetable) world.

They are created by him by a work of construction or interpretation—a construction which for most purposes is done spontaneously and without any elaborate apparatus. But in some connections where, for example, we deal with such things as languages, economic systems, or bodies of law, these structures are so complicated that they can no longer be reconstructed without the help of an elaborate technique without the danger of going wrong and being led into contradictions. This is all the theories of the social sciences aim to do. They are not *about* the social wholes as wholes; they do not pretend to discover by empirical observation laws of behavior or change of these wholes. Their task is rather, if I may so call it, to *constitute* these wholes, to provide schemes of structural relationships which the historian can use when he has to attempt to fit together into a meaningful whole the elements which he actually finds. The historian cannot avoid constantly using social theories in this sense. He may do so unconsciously, and in fields where the relationships are not too complex his instinct may guide him aright. When he turns to more complex phenomena such as those of language, law, or economics, and still disdains to make use of the models worked out for him by the theorists, he is almost certain to come to grief. And this “coming to grief” will significantly show itself by the theoretician either demonstrating to him that he has involved himself in contradictions or showing him that in his explanations he has asserted a sequence of “causation” which, as soon as his assumptions are made explicit, he will have to admit does not follow from his assumptions.

There are two important consequences which follow from this and which can here be only briefly stated. The first is

that the theories of the social sciences do not consist of “laws” in the sense of empirical rules about the behavior of objects definable in physical terms. All that the theory of the social sciences attempts is to provide a technique of reasoning which assists us in connecting individual facts, but which, like logic or mathematics, is not about the facts. It can, therefore, and this is the second point, never be verified or falsified by reference to facts. All that we can and must verify is the presence of our assumptions in the particular case. We have already referred to the special problems and difficulties which this raises. In this connection a genuine “question of fact” arises—though one it will often not be possible to answer with the same certainty as is the case in the natural sciences. But the theory itself, the mental scheme for the interpretation, can never be “verified” but only tested for its consistency. It may be irrelevant because the conditions to which it refers never occur; or it may prove inadequate because it does not take account of a sufficient number of conditions. But it can no more be disproved by facts than logic or mathematics.

There still remains, however, the question whether this kind of “compositive” theory, as I like to call it, which “constitutes” the social “wholes” by constructing models from intelligible elements, is the *only* kind of social theory, or whether we might not also aim at empirical generalizations about the behavior of these wholes as wholes, at laws of the changes of languages or institutions—the kind of laws which are the aim of “historical method.”

I shall not enlarge here on the curious contradiction into which the defendants of this method usually involve themselves when they first emphasize that all

historical phenomena are unique or singular and then proceed to claim that their study can arrive at generalizations. The point I wish to make is rather that if, of the infinite variety of phenomena which we can find in any concrete situation, only those can be regarded as part of one object which we can connect by means of our mental models, the object can possess no attributes beyond those which can be derived from our model. Of course, we can go on constructing models which fit concrete situations more and more closely—concepts of states or languages which possess an ever richer connotation. But as members of a class, as similar units about which we can make generalizations, these models can never possess any properties which we have not given to them or which do not derive deductively from the assumptions on which we have built them. Experience can never teach us that any particular kind of structure has properties which do not follow from the definition (or the way we construct it). The reason for this is simply that these wholes or social structures are never given to us as natural units, are not definite objects given to observation, that we never deal with the whole of reality but always only with a selection made with the help of our models.<sup>5</sup>

I have not space to discuss more fully the nature of "historical facts" or the objects of history, but I should like

<sup>5</sup> Incidentally, I am not convinced that this last point really constitutes a difference between the social and the natural sciences. But, if it does not, I think it is the natural scientists who are mistaken in believing that they ever deal with the *whole* of reality and not merely with selected "aspects" of it. But this whole problem whether we can ever talk about, or perceive, an object which is indicated to us in a purely demonstrative manner, and which in this sense is an individual as distinguished from a "unit class" (which is really concrete and not an abstraction), would lead too far beyond my present subject.

briefly to refer to one question which, though not strictly germane to my subject, is yet not quite irrelevant. It is the very fashionable doctrine of "historical relativism," the belief that different generations or ages must of necessity hold different views about the same historical facts. It seems to me that this doctrine is the result of the same illusion that historical facts are definitely given to us and not the result of a deliberate selection of what we regard as a connected set of events relevant to the answer of a particular question—an illusion which seems to me to be due to the belief that we can define a historical fact in physical terms by its spatiotemporal co-ordinates. But a thing so defined, say, "Germany between 1618 and 1648," just is not *one* historical object. Within the space-time continuum thus defined we can find any number of interesting social phenomena which to the historian are altogether different objects: the history of Family X, the development of printing, the change of legal institutions, etc., which may or may not be connected but which are no more part of one social fact than any other two events in human history. This particular period, or any other period, is, as such, no definite "historical fact," no single historical object. According to our interests we can ask any number of different questions referring to this period and accordingly shall have to give different answers and shall have to construct different models of connected events. And this is what historians *do* at different times because they are interested in different questions. But as it is only the question that we ask which singles out, from the infinite variety of social events which we can find at any given time and place, a definite set of connected events which can be termed one historical fact, the experience that

people give different answers to different questions does, of course, not prove that they hold different views about the same historical fact. There is no reason whatever, on the other hand, why historians at different times, but possessing the same information, should answer the same question differently. This alone, however, would justify the thesis about an inevitable relativity or "perspective" of historical knowledge.

I mention this because this historical relativism is a typical product of that so-called "historism" which is, in fact, a product of the misapplication of the scientific prejudice to historical phenomena—of the belief that social phenomena are ever given to us as the facts of nature are given to us. They are, in fact, accessible to us only because we can understand what other people tell us, and can be understood only by interpreting other people's intentions and plans. They are not physical facts, but the elements from which we reproduce them are always familiar categories of our own mind. Where we could no longer interpret what we know about other people by the analogy of our own mind, history would cease to be human history; it would then, indeed, have to

run in purely behavioristic terms such as the history we might write of an ant heap or the history an observer from Mars might write of the human race.

If this account of what the social sciences are actually doing appears to you as a description of a topsy-turvy world in which everything is in the wrong place, I beg you to remember that these disciplines deal with a world at which from our position we necessarily look in a different manner from that in which we look at the world of nature. To employ a useful metaphor: while at the world of nature we look from the outside, we look at the world of society from the inside, while as far as nature is concerned, our concepts are about the facts and have to be adapted to the facts, in the world of society at least some of the most familiar concepts are the stuff from which it is made. Just as the existence of a common structure of thought is the condition of the possibility of our communicating with one another, of your understanding what I say, so it is also the basis on which we all interpret such complicated social structures as those which we find in economic life or law, in language, and in customs.

LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS

## THE SCIENTIST AND ETHICS

S. A. NOCK

### I

WHEN Stephen Leacock recently gave scientists such a vigorous horsing,<sup>1</sup> he was perhaps only giving them what they have long had coming. It is true that Mr. Leacock was wrong from beginning to end; but it is also true that the scientists are much to blame for such ignorance as he showed. Mr. Leacock presented a popular misconception of the scientist at which it is fairly easy to throw stones, either gems of wit or the cold bricks of dogmatic disapproval. That such a misconception is popular is in good part due to the apathy with which scientists have regarded the opinions of others.

The scientist as he is popularly misconceived is a mass of incongruities. He is, we are told, a man who spends his time in the investigation of abstruse and highly specialized problems, and yet he is at the same time a man who has invented and perfected all the machines that we can operate with buttons and handles. He is a man whose work is only by chance of value to his fellows, and yet he is the man who is responsible for all the technical advance we have made over the very dark ages of the not very remote past. He is a man who devotes himself to the exhaustive investigation of a mere trifle and is therefore unable to comprehend or even participate in the affairs of the world, and yet he is the one who is responsible for the shape of the world as we find it.

The popular notion of the scientist condemns the scientist as a mere technician,

yet at the same time exalts him as the *fons et origo* of almost everything that ails us. It removes him from the life of mankind and yet makes him responsible for that life as it is lived. It condemns him as a dabbler and yet sets him up as the force that must be subdued if we are ever to get back to the peace and happiness of the golden age. It turns an unimaginative reader of scales into a sort of bogey man.

According to many critics, the scientist has no time for the beauty of flowers: he is interested only in their anatomy. He does not look at the stars in their courses but only at photographic plates and spectral lines. He juggles atoms but cares nothing for the poetical arrangement of words. He checks hormones and vitamins but forgets men and women. He charts electrons; he explores interstellar space; but he forgets God.

More than anyone else, this so-called "scientist" is responsible, say those who denounce him, for the notion that the material world is all we have and that it only is worth serious consideration. The scientist, say preachers and radio orators alike, is responsible for the present low standard of morals, for the disrespect that the church meets, for the cynicism of humanity, for communism, and for the rule of violence. Just how he accomplishes so much evil without paying attention to anything but trifles is something of a mystery, but a mystery does not discourage those who thrive on mysteries. The scientist as popularly conceived flatters not the powers of observation of those who conceive him but

<sup>1</sup> *Atlantic Monthly*, May, 1942.

rather their powers of invention. Invention comes easy to most people. Yen Yüan remarked several centuries ago that it is easy to paint a goblin but hard to paint a horse. Perhaps the popular conception of the scientist is a hang-over from the fairy tale age of alchemy and astrology, or perhaps it is merely a handy whipping boy. In any case, it is not applicable to the scientist who is responsible for a revolution in human thought.

Yet an unconscionable number of workers in laboratories and lecturers in classrooms and writers of manuals are what many critics decry: they are workers among trifles who show contempt for a breadth of view that will include more than what is before the nose. Such myopia may be responsible for some of our bewilderment today, but we must not exaggerate the importance of pedants. Perhaps, after all, the critics of the scientist did not have to invent their bogey: they may have taken a pedant and mislabeled him, and then ascribed to him influence far beyond his powers.

There are innumerable technicians and mechanics, as well as regurgitating pedants and hacks, who live where scientists live, work with the materials of scientists, and look to the lay eye a good deal like scientists, for they have many of the same motions. What, the profane critic may ask, is the difference between P. W. Bridgman, who operates with high pressures, and a thousand other people who devote their lives to pointer readings on boilers? What is the difference between Einstein investigating equations and any other physicist shifting symbols—except that Einstein took popular fancy? Unfortunately, the man who should make perfectly clear that Bridgman and Einstein are scientists, whereas many others are not, will not take the trouble to do so.

The scientist does not educate the people as to what a scientist is.

Partly in consequence of this failure to elucidate, the scientist is lampooned for the shortcomings of technicians, the follies of pedants, and the stupidity of hacks—and even for the sins of the Sunday supplement astonishers and tooth-paste advertisers. He is blamed for the perversion of the results of his labors. He is condemned for the prejudices of metaphysicians. Very much to his credit, he is too busy to bother about his personal annoyances; but, not so much to his credit, he permits the laity to continue in ignorance.

It is not only the layman who is confused by all that is said about and against the scientist. The technicians, for instance, are as confused as the humorists and think that they are scientists. The pedants take unto themselves the condemnation of the clergy. The hacks, feeling themselves involved, take refuge in such statements as that once the dynamo was but a toy. Only the scientist, who has not been hit at all by the barrage of condemnation, holds his peace. He knows that nothing much of what has been said really applies to him; and therefore he does not trouble himself, and take time from his work, to explain the fact that he has not been aimed at.

Here and there a scientist will speak out; now and then some one speaks out for scientists; but the great mass of mankind does not so much as know what a scientist is. Until we all do know what a scientist is, our orators and humorists may very well go on attacking their straw man with a good deal of success and encouragement. The whole uproar does very little to keep the scientist from his work: as far as he is himself concerned, he can at present afford to let the whole business blow over his head, as he

does. On the other hand, it is important for the rest of us that we understand the scientist and his work, for he embodies many of those virtues of which we are likely, in the years to come, to stand in greatest need.

Condemned as the unmoral symbol of an unmoral world, the scientist is, on the contrary, an exemplification of the morality that may lead us out of the horror we are in. He is just the opposite of what he has been condemned as being: he is not our despair, our antichrist, but rather our pillar of fire by night. It is high time that we identify him and insist that he lead us by example, as only he can lead.

We must demand leadership from the scientist; but, before we can do so with any reason, we must understand how he can furnish such leadership. We must have a pretty fair idea of what we will be led out of and into. We must, therefore, not only make clear to ourselves what manner of man the scientist is but also our own position. Even though we have already begun to discuss the scientist, or at least what the scientist is not, we may perhaps get a clearer idea of what he is, and how he can guide us, if we first briefly consider our own position.

## II

It is easy for us to see now that after the last war we left undone those things which we ought to have done, and did those things which we ought not to have done, until there was precious little health left in us. There has been considerable wailing and lamentation about our conduct of the last twenty years, but there is no good in further loud regrets. The way of even moderately rational creatures is to profit by past error and avoid the like in future.

If we are to avoid in the future the follies of the past, we must discover wherein our failure lay. Details of conduct in a coming day will be different from details of a past day, but we can ready ourselves to meet changed conditions with considerably more intelligence and appreciation of values than we have shown. Whatever may come, we can prepare ourselves to hold fast to what is good and to abandon without qualm what is not good. There will be many ways in which we must ready ourselves. In some, only the wisdom of specially trained experts will find the proper methods. In some, however, we can all share; this is especially desirable in the field of morals.

The term "morals" means many things to many men. We must use it from time to time, but we should not do so without trying to define it. Let us say, then, that by "morals" we mean evaluation of social and individual human characteristics, and conduct in accordance with such evaluation. "Morals" is an active appreciation of values.

What we did after the last war is too well known to all of us. The older people who spent their lives in a scramble after illusive wealth, forgetting that paper is not gold and that people with nothing are poor customers; the younger people who made so much noise that sometimes it seemed as though the whole United States was a protracted brawl—details of these performances are familiar. To some extent we participated, whoever we are.

Behind all the imbecility and loudness there was failure to evaluate the affairs of the world and the characteristics of men and women. If we had not so failed, we could hardly have gone to such lengths to be absurd. The failure was partly our own fault, in that we had never bothered



to learn how to evaluate human affairs; and it was partly due to confusion resulting from loud and insistent advocacy of panaceas.

We watched the rise of the state abroad, the dreadful blind monster that was to absorb men and women and children and all their works, the anthropophagous verbal construct that gave new life to tyrants. The Communist state came first and terrified us, leading us to thank God that things like that didn't happen in our country. It made us look with ever more passionate affection on the American life of the past—the life of the America in which everybody could do as he pleased so long as he kept some conventions. The Communists, we heard, had no conventions to keep; but they couldn't do much of anything they wanted to.

Then came the Fascists, who ought to have scared us half to death, but didn't. The reason that they didn't is clear: they talked, to some extent, in our own language and pretended that they were merely trying to eliminate the Communists, whom we feared and hated. Thus simply were we innocents beguiled, and thus easily were we led to believe doubly strong that our way of life was one of God-given propriety. Hitler began to wake us up, but by that time other matters had completely spoiled our little paradise. We were ready to re-evaluate a good many things by the time Hitler showed himself.

The thinking of the European leaders—or, at any rate, the talking of the European speakers—was largely foreign to us, because they centered their attention on the state; and the state was something for which we had no use and little interest. We were all of us individualists (and did not bother to inquire what that phrase might possibly mean)—even rug-

ged individualists. We lived so near to the end of the era of limitless expansion that we did not know that it was a generation past. We did not know that we had our society to whack into shape because there was no more room for it to spread as luck might have it. Besides, everything was going so beautifully on our own assumptions that we could afford to dismiss everything else. We went after what we wanted, and we made a go of it. That is, we made paper fortunes; we developed all kinds of methods for making more and more money without anything to show for it; we followed our own devices and desires and had a wonderful time.

When we could see that Europe, Russia and all, was steadily getting worse and worse off, we congratulated ourselves that we were not as Europeans were. To stop and consider what was likely to happen did not occur to many except the cranks and oddities. The answer to warnings was plain: we had only to say, "Well, look at them and look at us!"

There were a number of people, however—especially among the young, who didn't care what happened—who saw nothing after the war worth making a fuss about, who could find nothing to inspire them to make an honest effort of any sort. They were the hilarious lost generation, about whom so much was written, who were so scathingly denounced, who made so much noise. Of all the symptoms they were perhaps the least important; but because of their obviousness, they were the most alarming. We were much more upset by bathtub gin parties than by the stock market chicanery.

That was perhaps natural, for we had been brought up to regard proprieties and ignore morals. We were used to those who did in their fellow-men while con-

ducting themselves as exemplary churchmen. We were used to regarding ruthlessness in business as part of the game but peccadillos as unforgivable steps toward perdition. We were proud of both stock market and prohibition. We had always condemned those with high, if light, hearts and impulsive actions, who never hurt anyone but who never acted in a solemn and prosperous manner.

Flaming youth troubled us and worked us up to such a pitch that we entirely overlooked the things that in the end really mattered. The young people of the time were more noisy, more blatant, more disrespectful than other young generations had been (we thought); but we did not stop to consider that we had never given them a chance to appreciate the fact that there are values, because we were so busy getting and spending. The older people ignored values; and the younger people followed in their footsteps, shouting and singing.

The worst of it all was that it worked so well. It worked for almost a decade—and that is a long time nowadays! Then everything collapsed at once, and *unco guid* grandsires and flaming granddaughters found themselves together with nothing to go on and no prospect of anything turning up. The life without values and appreciation of values suddenly turned up valueless.

The life of the twenties was not entirely without values and evaluations; but, since so many of them were based on fallacy, they were of little good in meeting the problems and situations of the time of the breaking of nations. Everyone, it seemed, forgot that man is fundamentally an individual in society.

Abroad, where emphasis was put on society, the individual man was reduced to a mere member of a class—political, economic, or social. A person as a person

was negligible: evaluations were based on the welfare of that construct of subtle verbalists, the state. When it became necessary at last to regard men as individuals as well as members of a class, things went badly.

At home we put so much emphasis on the individual—the rugged individual—that we forgot that man is social as well as individual. The only individuals who get along otherwise than as members of society are hermits; and hermits are so few and so uninfluential that they don't matter. When it became necessary at last for us to act as individuals in society, we were as baffled as our contemporaries across the water, but for quite the opposite reason.

All philosophical endeavors to make man something other than an individual in society have failed. Most of them have failed on paper; the rest have failed, sooner or later, in practice. Pioneers can get on without society for a while, and after a fashion; but pioneering is long past. The memory lingers, but the pioneering is gone. Our habits of thought, still influenced by the last centuries of our history and too much unaware of American society, were a handicap.

The fantastic operations of financiers, manufacturers, advertisers, salesmen, and paper magicians of all kinds could only have taken place where the fundamental values of importance to individuals in society had been overlooked. Likewise, the performances of those abroad could only have taken place where those values had been neglected. As a result of our all ignoring such values, most of our society has collapsed about our ears.

Our societies, based on our misconceptions, have failed. This is true not only of our political and economic societies: it is true of most forms of human society. Even country clubs are petering

out, and chambers of commerce have less and less to do. Our military society has had to be reorganized, and so has our ecclesiastical. And so on. Wherever we look we find our society in a bad way, and our individuals along with it. Without a social frame for their activities the individuals of our world are in a helpless state. Likewise, without individuality within the frame societies of our world are helpless. Greed, fanaticism, and unreason in our time may be largely due to our having so little conception of values that work.

For some reason, pragmatism has an evil name. Perhaps this is because it is not a matter of words but a matter of checking, and checking lacks mystery in the popular mind. Possibly this attitude is merely a reflection of the old Christian notion that this is a world of sin and tears and that what really counts is the Other World—whatever that may be. Pragmatism lacks approval of authority, perhaps; yet we cannot deny that what works, works.

### III

One society of individuals in our world works. It has long worked, and it continues, in spite of all kinds of obstacles, to work. Because it works so well and makes so little of itself, because its results are so much more easily understood than itself, this society of individuals has not been generally appreciated for what it is.

It is a society of individuals whose activities contribute to the welfare of the society as a whole and to the welfare of each member of the society. In doing his own chosen work, in living his own life, each member of the society does what he has chosen to do, with considerable success, and at the same time makes the work of every other member of the society easier and more interesting.

This is the society of science. It works because those who constitute it have evolved a system of values that make it work. They have found and they practice those values that contribute to the welfare of the individual in society and to the welfare of the society of individuals.

These values are not abstruse and difficult of comprehension either. We all know about them, by hearsay at any rate; and we all approve them. But we don't practice them, perhaps because we are deafened by the din of talkers or perhaps because we don't think about them. Whatever the reason for our neglect, we may best stop neglecting them. The first step in that direction is to see what they are and why they work for the scientist.

Even before that, however, we must see who the scientist is, because if he is what we have so often been told we shall be wasting time. Whatever may work for fellows like that is of no importance to us. Scientists, however, are not fellows like that. We must eliminate the pedants, the technicians, the hacks, and look at the scientists. Then we shall find that it is not matter but method that makes the scientist. Not what he works with, but how he works with it, determines the status of a man in the society of science. Little or large, living or dead, human or unhuman, materials are there for the scientist. It is his approach to his problem, whatever it may be and whatever it may deal with, that makes the scientist and sets him off from others.

The scientist is one who pursues inquiry in the light of hypothesis, performing symbolic operations as a means to solving his problems, but checking his symbolic operations against nonsymbolic facts before assigning validity to any conclusions.

Exceptions occur to the mind at once.

For instance, the definition is too much for the pure mathematician, who never gets beyond symbols: his checks are wholly symbolic. On the other hand, he claims no validity for his conclusions beyond the symbolic system in which they appear. Limited by definition, the mathematician is rigorous in pursuing his inquiry. Except that his context is negligible, he works like another scientist.

Again we must be on guard against popular misconception, because many people who look as though they were doing what a scientist does are merely following instructions, doing what they are told, or simply piddling around. The person of whom the layman thinks as a scientist is often not a rigorous thinker but rather someone who has his hands in some chemical or physical mess.

Our scientist is one who employs scientific method in his thinking: he pursues inquiry in the light of hypothesis. He doesn't merely fuss with things haphazardly, nor does he work out the problems of the universe in his armchair. He operates symbolically but never considers the logic of symbols alone sufficient to establish nonsymbolic validity. He states his assumptions as far as he is able to recognize them, and he is ever on the lookout for assumptions that have escaped his scrutiny. He states his postulates and states them as postulates. He attempts to give meaning to such terms as he uses by making clear the operations required to arrive at such terms: the meaning of his terms is the operations required to arrive at them. His propositions, as far as he can make them, are investigable beyond the language in which they are stated.

It is perhaps true that most men who make use of the scientific method, the method of operation, are busy with physical and biological facts of the world.

This does not mean that the scientist spends his time, for instance, on infinitesimal trifles of electric charge and is therefore a dabbler in inconsequentialities. He may study galactic motions, which involve a world a good deal bigger than most mystagogues can conceive, who think that size is a reasonable basis for judging the importance of human affairs. He may be investigating to the best of his ability exactly those human "mysteries" that so impress his critics. If he has not perfected his techniques in this latter field, if he can do no more than approach his subject, we need not be too hard on him, for, after all, his critics themselves have hardly approached the standard set two thousand years ago by Socrates. The scientist has made at least as much progress in his inquiry as others have in theirs.

There is much that the scientist has not uncovered or explained, which is to say that the world is a pretty big and complicated affair. The scientist has, however, found out how to continue investigation of whatever he decides to investigate. Those who say that his method is invalid here or there are simply saying that what they are talking about is incapable of investigation.

To assert that any thing, any activity, any phenomenon is not investigable is to claim omniscience. If one makes such an assertion without attempting all methods of inquiry, one is merely talking—unless one has been directly inspired. If one makes such an assertion after exhausting all known means of inquiry, one is simply saying that the nut isn't yet cracked, or else that there has been failure in method.

In spite of superstition to the contrary, the scientist is willing to consider any method of inquiry that will help him to find out what he wants to know. He insists only that there be some way of

checking the method to make sure that it is a method of inquiry.

There is, for instance, no method of checking purely verbal logic against anything else. One may build up a magnificent and very moving system of verbal thinking, but no one can check Plato's doctrine of the Idea or the existence of the Germanic Absolute. If you postulate separation from the world of the senses, you automatically eliminate possibility of checking the results of your manipulation of symbols. The mathematician does this and accepts the consequences.

Whether or not purely verbal constructs are useful depends not on whether they have meaning but on whether they stir to action. If they do so stir, then they are to that extent investigable by one using scientific method: a scientist may investigate the phenomenon of action following words. Yet if he tries to do so, he is often cried down as a sordid grubber, making a dirty laboratory specimen of the highest exaltation of mankind. Since the scientist cannot see that this talk means anything much, he can only go on with what he is trying to do. He can only pursue his inquiry to the best of his ability. He may fall far short of explanation and elucidation. Yet we must remember that he has made fairly clear what goes on in revival meetings, even if he has failed to expound saintliness. We need not, however, object if he tries to find out what makes saints, for we could use many more than we are customarily blessed with.

To investigate human phenomena takes courage. Once it took courage to investigate stars, and then to investigate other physical facts. Then biological facts were a danger to the inquiring individual, and then it was dangerous to investigate contagious diseases. It still takes courage to investigate human con-

duct that has got talked about in a different and solemn tone of voice.

Here the scientist makes his first contribution to an ethics for our day: he has courage. He does not and he cannot parade it, but he has it and modestly exercises it. Occasionally one of the world's great inquiring minds is put to extreme suffering, as were Socrates and Galileo; but as a rule nowadays the scientist is condemned rather than persecuted. It is seldom that Bertrand Russell is given the ecclesiastical works, as he was in New York. Yet it is no mean disposition that can be indifferent to mere contempt.

Contempt and vituperation are heaped on the scientist today, as we have observed. He is denounced by pulpit and humorous page alike. Yet he goes on trying to find out how the world moves, and all that in it is. He has the courage to continue in his work to the best of his ability.

He does not talk of courage. The scientists who escaped with their lives and nothing else from Germany probably do not spend a great deal of time thinking of themselves as brave men: they have business to attend to. Like other brave men, the scientist lives bravely and gives us knowledge of bravery by example. We need the inspiration of such bravery, and it does inspire us. The old figures of Socrates and Galileo and the new ones of exiled Europeans stir us to new respect for ourselves. Here is stuff to make our youngsters lift up their heads.

It is also stuff to make them use their heads. We have shown very little intellectual courage of late years. Old and young, after the last war, we ignored what was before us: we looked to Cloud-Cuckoo-Land and finally fell sprawling. Whatever his failings, the scientist cannot ignore facts; he either faces them or ceases to be a scientist. It may not be

what we want to know; but we might as well find out now that, in order to be members of a reasonable human society, we must face facts. Here they are, and there is nothing we can do to avoid them. If we see them, accept them for what they are, and shape our conduct accordingly, then we shall contribute to our own welfare and to that of society.

It may be objected that the scientist spends most of his time ignoring facts: his experiments rigidly exclude much material. That is true; but the exclusion takes cognizance of the facts, and the conclusions are valid only in so far as the exclusion permits. We may do the same sort of thing in our own lives: we may voluntarily relegate certain temporarily irrelevant material to the boneyard, but we must acknowledge that we do so. A woman may consider color blindness in a man an irrelevant matter if she wishes to marry him; but she can't let him pick out carpets and wallpaper.

The scientist may deal with facts in various ways, but he cannot ignore them. He cannot fail to consider everything relevant to what he is doing, even if his consideration is only exclusion. He cannot let his desires and feelings interfere with observation, nor can he evade what he does not like by employing verbal logic. As a member of his society, he must accept observable facts. Sometimes such acceptance is difficult, and sometimes it is disturbing, but there can be no question about the acceptance.

The courage to think and act in accordance with the scientific method would obviate the ignoring of brute facts in our daily lives. No one who has learned to think scientifically can pretend that facts are not present—can pretend, for instance, that innumerable wars all over the world do not interfere with universal peace, as so many of us pretended for

twenty years. A little of the scientist's courage in accepting what may be unpleasant or unflattering or painful, but is actually *there*, would eliminate much turmoil and folly from our lives. Likewise, the courage of the scientist in casting off preconceptions if they don't fit what he finds on observation would keep us from repeating the blind absurdities of the last two decades and before.

Acceptance of fact is often enough an indication of courage, but it is always an indication of honesty. The scientist is incorruptibly honest, for the perfectly practical reason that, unless he is, he ceases to function as a member of the society of science. His honesty is not a mere avoidance of doing dishonest things. It is rather a way of living. Yet one may doubt that the scientist thinks about the practicality of honesty at all: it probably never enters his head that he is an honest man, for the good reason that honesty is part and parcel of all that he does. He lives honestly because honesty is not only the best policy but the only policy. A scientist would as soon praise himself for being alive as for being honest.

The dishonest man is impossible in the society of science. Neither as an individual nor as a member of the society can he live a satisfactory life. Other individuals in our broader society might consider the point of view of the scientist here—for instance, students who live in school societies that exist on a basis of cheating. It has long been considered ungentlemanly to cheat; but for those who do not care to be gentlemen, the taboo is not strong. If it is clear that the cheat cannot prosper in a scientific society, although he may be able to do so in a less reasonable one, perhaps some more students will come to look on cheating as not worth the price. That is one example only of how young people might learn of the scientist. Older

people might have learned it before 1929; they might still learn it. The best place, though, to establish the validity of honest conduct is in the school. Here the scientist can be a great help.

One trouble with older people is that they are intellectually dishonest. Such dishonesty is the hardest to come at, because those who are in that way dishonest do not know it and can hardly be shown. You can teach things to young people in school, and show them things, that their elders simply cannot comprehend. Such a thing is the validity of ordinary, workaday intellectual honesty.

Intellectual honesty would eliminate a good many of the absurdities of our civilization. For instance, consider how many people there are who live impeccable lives and devote honorably won fortunes to the alleviation of human suffering and who have yet passionately upheld an anachronistic scheme of society that makes such human suffering inevitable. They are the ones whose comprehension lags behind the physical advance of the world they live in. They are neither clear nor courageous nor honest in their thinking, for they do not examine their postulates and they do not want to examine them. Perhaps they fear to find that much charity is penance for bad thinking.

There are those who are willing to destroy, or at least to hamstring, someone who is useful to society, even to themselves, because that person has ideas of personal conduct that are different from theirs. Perhaps the personal conduct is utterly irrelevant to anything under consideration, is socially of no consequence whatever, and may not even be reprehensible. I have known one good Quaker who announced flatly that he would never employ a Roman Catholic. I know one man who would not vote for a man who had got a divorce.

Many people distrust Churchill because he drinks brandy. Such irrelevancies keep appearing in bad thinking, letting prejudice, preconception, or sheer laziness prevent consideration. The scientist, trained to avoid irrelevancies and accustomed to straight thinking, gives an example of a highly desirable virtue for the individual in society, that of insistence on relevancy.

Perhaps "insistence on relevancy" sounds like a trivial virtue at best. Yet, when we consider that we elect our politicians on their ability to go about with bands, that we have appointed far too many officers in the armed forces on the basis of something besides demonstrated ability, and that we make many judgments in public and in private affairs on the basis of something that has nothing in particular to do with the judgment to be made, then we may appreciate the value of habitual insistence on relevancy. Demand for relevancy might eliminate some of the self-appointed guardians of human behavior, who seem at times to be qualified by ignorance of human nature, lack of charity, unpleasantness, and stupidity.

#### IV

The scientist is no paragon, no angel walking the earth in the guise of man. He is not necessarily free from all kinds and manners of vice. He is a man among men, in no way inhuman. As a person, an individual, he may do or be almost anything at all. As an individual in his society, however, he is a member of a group, a participant in a discipline which is utterly dependent on certain ways of doing things and on the exemplification of certain evaluations. If the scientist does not act in accordance with certain ethical values, he simply shuts up shop and stops being a scientist.

This is why he is a particularly good guide for the rest of us: he evaluates as he does (and his evaluations are successful in the common meaning of the term) not from a mystical urge to be better than others but because such evaluation is the only reasonable way to proceed. One of the earliest men to apply something of the scientific method, Socrates, advocated the reasonableness of certain virtues and exemplified his theory. Today, according to Leopold Infeld, Einstein is the cordially sympathetic, generous man he is because he considers such conduct reasonable.

In attempting to act reasonably, the scientist shows an appreciation of values not common among those occupied in other fields. In the first place, the scientist often knows what he has accomplished. He therefore has a pretty good idea of what he has not accomplished. Consequently he refrains from extrapolation. He realizes, for instance, that when he has worked out the problem of the indeterminacy of the electron, he has arrived at conclusions valid, as far as his data go, in the context of the indeterminacy of the electron. He stops there, leaving it to others to talk about scientific evidence of the freedom of the will, and so on. He does not transpose his symbols from his own system where they have definite meaning to another system where the meaning is different or questionable. He does not forget that context alters meaning.

Furthermore—and perhaps this is an indication of courage—the scientist acknowledges the limit of his knowledge. He not only admits that he does not know what he does not know; he even admits that, as far as he can see, his methods will never let him know certain things—for example, both position and velocity of an electron. Far from repin-

ing, however, or growing rhapsodic about reality beyond what can be known, or becoming mystical in a *credo quia impossibile*, he simply takes his necessary ignorance into account as a datum; and with it as a brute fact he proceeds with his work.

The scientist does his own job in his own way. He works out the problem he has set himself, and he hopes to publish results that will be of value to his reputation. He works for himself, and often enough by himself. Yet he has at his disposal the whole accomplishment of his colleagues. He is an individual member of a highly co-ordinated society, in which every member has his own way, yet contributes all he does to the social welfare.

Perhaps, as some propagandists insist, jungle life is a constant battle in which only the strongest and fiercest survive. We, however, do not live in the jungle; at least, we do not intend to. Much of what we have accomplished through the millenniums has been done through co-operation. Co-operation is the characteristic behavior that enables man to establish a differentiated society, to pursue such activity as he wishes, and to acquire leisure. The better our social organization—and that means co-operation—the better the opportunity for the individual to follow his particular interest.

Man as a member of a co-operative society has opportunity to be an individual. In another kind of society, as we see, we are all soldiers together or robots. The scientist not only understands this fairly obvious fact but acts on it.

From him, therefore, we can learn the object-lesson of co-operation. He is a much better guide than others—even than the churchman, for the churchman has never learned to be very co-operative. Like churchmen, scientists work



toward a specific end. Yet physical chemists do not condemn theoretical physicists, nor do botanists scorn zoölogists. Geologists or radiologists do not contend that theirs is the only possible technique for pursuing inquiry. Rather, all work as they best can work, and share all results.

Failures are largely for the individual to cope with, though they may be of benefit to society. There are two kinds of failure: one results from bad work; the other, from lack of complete data or imperfection of technique. A man who is well grounded in his discipline may still not know enough to pursue a hitherto unimagined inquiry to a successful conclusion; but, if he does his job capably, his failure is valuable to his society in showing to his colleagues what will not work. So long as the work has been properly done, and still the inquiry results in no conclusion, the failure shows only the limitation of the method employed; the next inquiry will be otherwise attempted.

Failure due to bad work or to irrationality is merely failure. One who does such work is ignored by scientists, although unfortunately not by laymen, who are still victimized by vicious pretenders like cancer-cure quacks or by absurdities like astrologers.

The scientist shows in merely doing his work the difference between what is futile and worthless and what is failure after proper effort, which is of social value. Perhaps it is not so much the individual who is exemplary here as it is the whole society of science, which understands how to evaluate failure.

The scientist welcomes criticism, for he realizes the likelihood of the individual to make mistakes, to overlook possibilities, and to take for granted concealed assumptions. It is to his interest to be

protected from wasting time in proceeding improperly, however good his intentions may be. He wants to be kept from misleading premises, from false reasoning, and from any pitfalls into which he may easily tumble. He hears and exercises criticism because he knows that it is not a matter of personalities but rather one of getting the job done. A job done right is just that much to the advantage of himself and everyone else: his critic may, so to speak, make money for him.

In the same way, the scientist is magnanimous. Magnanimity is elevation above what is low, mean, or ungenerous; it is greatness of mind; it is superiority to trifles, personal or other. That it is an essential virtue in a working society has become clear during the course of this war, at the beginning of which petty jealousy, attention to insignificant and personal affairs, and ungenerous triviality of mind cost us a dismal price. We know now, as we might just as well have realized before, that leaders and followers alike must be free of petty envy if we are to accomplish what we must accomplish.

Yet magnanimity is a virtue that cannot be taught by precept. You can hardly say to a young man: "Go out and act magnanimously." In the first place, unless he realizes what you are talking about, he will not know what to do; and then, even if he does, he will presumably not appreciate that it is to his own advantage to act so. Magnanimity may, however, be encouraged by example.

Fortunately, it is the magnanimous souls of history and literature that appeal to young people. It is not hard to encourage young men and women to emulate those who refused to let little jealousies keep them from doing their task, whether Lincoln or Jesus. More of us remember Sir Philip Sidney with the dy-

ing Frenchman than will ever read his poetry. The overdrawn Sydney Carton moves children as do few other characters; and Lear's faithful Kent is one of the most stirring of Shakespeare's creations. Magnanimity is a virtue esteemed more than practiced.

Perhaps it is so little practiced because people do not realize its practical importance. The scientist welcomes the accomplishments of others, even though they may inconvenience him. For the moment, as he can readily feel, such accomplishments may be expensive for him as an individual; but, since his society will prosper, and he with it, he can only rejoice that one more inquiry is satisfactorily concluded. Perhaps a lifework goes down in apparent ruin when a new discovery or invention is made; but, if that lifework can be destroyed, it was a fallacy. Better—and the scientist knows this—better that a lifework be destroyed than that fallacy flourish.

Yet even when an Einstein upsets a Newton, Newton does not suffer in reputation. All that succeeding and corrective inquiry can do, in the long run, is to add to what has been done. No honest work in the realm of science is lost or contemned or forgotten. To welcome the success of others is the way of the scientist—for the purely practical reason, if for none other, that that is the way the society may prosper and the individual with it. Magnanimity is a long and impressive name for a genial and workaday virtue. And it is the name of a virtue that works.

Even though he be the recipient of the magnanimous commendation of his colleagues for excellent work, the scientist is modest, or perhaps better said, humble. He knows that he, like Newton, is gathering pebbles; but he does not belittle the value of the pebbles. He is proud that he

understands how to do his work, that he knows how to pursue inquiry; but he is at the same time aware of the amount of inquiry yet to be performed before anyone can get a substantial overview of the world. He feels that his society will, in the course of the years, acquire much knowledge that will be good for men and, in the course of that inquiry, attain much wisdom; but he cannot exaggerate his own place in his society and its work: he can see too well for that.

Besides, when he thinks of himself as a member of the society which claims as members Archimedes, Galileo, Einstein, he can only be glad that he too is a member, but he cannot puff himself and praise himself. As one of a great and noble company, he is a man to be respected; but he is only one, and not the greatest. In a day of indispensable men, of men who regard themselves as some sort of saviors, humility is a virtue that cannot be overestimated.

This does not mean that anyone should be abject. It simply means that the scientist knows that he is not the *umbilicus mundi*, as some of his contemporaries do not realize. The lesson is salutary, for the scientist does not let pride interfere with his work; and it is his work that prospers his society and him with it.

Humble as he is, the scientist is yet secure in the knowledge of one fact that many laymen neither understand nor appreciate: he knows that, whatever his failures and shortcomings, he is working according to a method that will sooner or later establish verifiable results or else show that such results are unobtainable. He knows that he is not wasting time, whatever the immediate outcome of his efforts. Even though succeeding generations disclose error in his calculations or add data discoverable only at a later

time that invalidate conclusions, still the method will be valid, and the work done by that method will be valid as far as it goes.

As long as he conscientiously pursues inquiry in the light of hypothesis, acknowledges his assumptions, states his postulates as postulates, and insists on verifying his conclusions—as long as he employs operational method—he is contributing to human enlightenment. As long, also, as he pursues his method, he is furnishing an example to mankind of successful individual life in a successful society.

## V

We may add one virtue more. The generations after the last war, older and younger, lacked an abiding faith in much of anything. Even their faith in Mammon and Belial was a shallow and doubting half-faith, for they could feel that end and means alike called into action precious little of themselves. Generations grew up without either the faith of their fathers or any other.

The unimaginative people who simply adopted what was prescribed and called it "faith" had hardly enough sense, or at least exercised hardly enough sense, to justify by the name of faith their blind acceptance of prescription. Theirs was no active, creative faith.

For years the people of this country were the laughingstock of other peoples who had had a blind faith driven into them. We had no blind faith, said those who scoffed abroad—except that they did not use the word "blind." A faithless, and therefore a useless nation, they said, we must fall before the power of those inspired by faith. All we had, they said, was a tradition that had collapsed. Without faith we must perish.

They then set about causing us to

perish. And suddenly such a living faith inspired the hearts and minds of all Americans that we accomplished the incredible. From a listless and unfaithful nation we grew overnight into a power inspired by faith that can make it possible for all men to live the good life.

It is such a faith as this that the scientist has. He has faith in his method and in his society and in himself. Consequently, when this war is done and all the flags are furled, and we have the job to do of making a clean habitation of this earth, the scientist can keep in us, if he will, a faith in our own abilities. He can, when our courage droops and disillusion sweeps over us, assure us that we ourselves are worth the trouble it takes to make this world a good place, whatever the cost in effort and time. He will, in short, be able to uphold faith in the reasonable life—the life of the intelligent individual in a co-operative society.

But is this not expecting too much of the scientist? Of course it is! Yet we have always expected too much of the scientist, and he has seldom failed us. What we have needed he has, by application of his whole method—and that is a method of living as well as of working, as we have seen—what we have needed, he has given us, usually before we hoped for it.

He has made it possible for us to struggle victorious over the self-assured powers of darkness. Need we suppose that he cannot show us the way to the reasonable life when the great unreason is past? The one is no more beyond expectation than the other.

In the years to come we may, if we will learn of him, find the scientist a leader beyond his own dreams or his own desires. He may not want to lead us; he may not want to leave what he considers his contribution to knowledge for the sake

of assuming an ethical leadership. Yet because he is a scientist and is accustomed to see what is before him, to investigate, and to evaluate, he will understand the necessity of his leadership; and, understanding, he can act. The rest of us, understanding better than before what the scientist is, can gladly accept such leadership.

The scientists will not be alone. All governors, teachers, spiritual pastors, and masters may join. From the scientist they may learn how to consider their problems, and of their own strength they may inspire us to live the good life.

We may gather inspiration from the art of the world and from the example of

great men and women. Our religion may spur us anew to do that which is good for us and for our society. There will be no lack of stirring words to keep our hearts high. At the same time, we must keep our wits clear if we want to get ahead. We must know where we are going and how to work to get there. And we must appreciate and exercise those unassuming virtues that make life vigorous and successful for the individual and his society.

The scientist shows the way of reasonable living. Our poets and our artists, our spiritual leaders and our teachers, may, if they will, inspire us to continue on that way.

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## METHOD IN ETHICS<sup>1</sup>

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PRAGMATIC philosophers have on the whole tended to treat problems of ethics as parallel to problems of knowledge. The object of this paper is, first, to make the parallel perfectly explicit and, second, to show that it is not peculiar to a pragmatic view but is compatible with any one of a wide range of epistemological and ethical positions. Within this range and for a considerable number of problems, at least, the aim is to set up a one-to-one correspondence between ethics and epistemology with the result that any conclusion from one discipline may be carried over to the other.

The method of reaching this conclusion is to consider the relation between pleasure and value. Sharp definitions of neither of these terms can be given, since in part the aim is to provide a method of determining the nature of these entities. The usual injunctions concerning the term "pleasure" are, however, necessary. It is not intended to refer exclusively, or even primarily, to physical pleasures, and there is no assumption that all pleasures, or even any of them, can be ranked on a single linear scale of magnitude.

Pursuant of this plan, too facile relationships of pleasure and value will be discarded in Section I, the parallel to epistemology will be established in Section II, some consideration of the ontology of ethics will be noted in Section III, and the problem of ethical choice will be examined in Section IV.

<sup>1</sup> An earlier version of this paper, under the title "Objects and Ideals," was presented before the philosophy section of the Michigan Academy of Science, Arts, and Letters, March 14, 1942.

### I

In general, this paper is in sympathy with naturalistic conceptions of value, holding that felt pleasures must be ethically important and that any attempt to disregard them leaves an ethical theory perhaps consistent in itself but utterly useless, since it creates an insoluble problem of ethical motivation. To build a whole ethical superstructure without answering the question, "What motive is there for doing good?" is to deprive ethical systems of any efficacy they might have and to reduce them to the status of an empty play of logical definitions and theorems, devoid of application, and not complex enough as logic to make them even interesting. And the only way of avoiding this result is to incorporate the problem of motivation within the theory of good itself in the manner of the ethical naturalists.

This paper, then, begins from a naturalistic position, though I am not at all sure it ends with one, for theories which equate good with a totality of pleasures or satisfactions, such as utilitarianism, are unworkable from two points of view. They answer problems neither of personal nor of social morality.

To consider first the case of personal morality. The answer to an ethical dilemma must be: "Do what will create most pleasure," either individual pleasure in the case of egoistic hedonism or pleasure of society in the case of utilitarianism. But this answer, in the one case as in the other, is likely to leave the problem unsolved, for the alternative which will create the greater pleasure de-

depends on which can be shown to be more worth while. This is to say that pleasure is not an intrinsic characteristic of an activity, nor are pleasures relative merely to the actor, but they seem relative as well to the ideal they further or with which they are in conflict. To take a concrete case, consider the now familiar situation of a student faced with the alternatives of continuing his studies or enlisting in the army. To advise him to do what will cause the most pleasure is only to invite the reply: "If you can show that the paramount necessity is the defense of the country, then enlisting will bring most pleasure; but if you can show that this necessity is not imperative, or if you can show that the intellectual tradition should be continued at any cost, then continuing studies will bring the greater pleasure—but, until you show one or the other, your advice is useless."

Such a case, as well as the foregoing considerations, would seem to indicate that there are at least two components in pleasure, the one which might be termed immediate pleasure, resulting from an experience inherently satisfactory to the person experiencing it. Predominantly of this sort are the pleasures of coming upon an unexpectedly beautiful landscape or of smoking a cigarette. Another aspect of pleasure lies in accomplishing or furthering some purpose considered valuable for its own sake. Satisfactions of writing a book or taking an active part in some civic organization are of this latter sort. Often the two components of satisfaction may be evenly balanced, as in the satisfaction of viewing a landscape for the sake of which one has climbed a mountain or in the satisfaction of smoking after a full day's work. And in no case do we wish to suggest that the two aspects are experienced separately; rather they

interpenetrate, fusing into a unitary experience whose dual character is revealed only in analysis. This is true even in the case in which the two elements have opposed values, as in the case in which the pleasure of a cigarette is tempered by the feeling that time is being wasted or in the case that the dreariness of writing is mitigated by the feeling of the importance of what is being written.

The point of these illustrations, then, is that, while immediate pleasures might conceivably be reckoned by some hedonistic scheme, the second group of pleasures are dependent on the acceptance of some underlying purpose, so that the problem cannot be decided in terms of pleasures alone. For the sake of clarity and in a manner which follows current usage, we shall refer to the second class of pleasures as *satisfactions*.

Again, on the side of social applications, a naturalistic ethics requires the employment of some sort of hedonistic calculus. Now it is generally recognized that such a calculus is very difficult to construct, too difficult for any precise applications; but what is less frequently recognized is that the calculus, even in theory, is impossible. The objection is not merely based on applications—it is no proper objection to contemporary physics, for example, that it would have great difficulty giving an accurate estimate of the number of electrons in this building—but rather that even under ideal conditions the calculus could not be applied. This may be seen from the most cursory attempt to sketch its workings.

A unit of pleasure would be required for this calculus, just as a unit of length is required for any calculus of distances. In the first case, as in the second, the unit must be arbitrary, and we might tentatively choose as our unit the

amount of pleasure obtained from eating a bar of chocolate of specified size and composition. Of course, this pleasure varies with one's hunger, so, just as the meter bar is defined relative to conditions of temperature and pressure, the unit of pleasure must be defined relative to more complex conditions of health, previous taking of nourishment, and exertion since eating last. With the necessary restrictions of this sort we might, appropriately, name our unit of pleasure the "bentham." So far the difficulties have been merely technical, but, in the application of the standard, insuperable difficulties arise. We might list desires as being greater or less than a bentham, but there seems to be no way of giving meaning to the addition of pleasures. Is a pleasure of one bentham, combined with a pleasure of one bentham, a pleasure of two benthams? And, in any case, what might be meant by a pleasure of two benthams? Thus the scale would not be additive, and quantitative determinations become impossible.

Again, there might be people for whom the assimilation of the chocolate bar under the given conditions would provide neither pleasure nor displeasure, only profoundest apathy. Any pleasure measured by this scale would then appear to be infinite, and no comparison of values could be obtained.

Finally, if, in addition to the bentham, some other unit of pleasure were proposed, say the "wimpy," defined as the pleasure of eating a hamburger of specified dimensions and consistency under specified conditions, no transformation formula could be worked out to go from one method of measurement to the other. The conversion formulas would vary from person to person and from moment to moment. Of two courses of action, one

might produce more pleasure measured in one sort of unit and the other measured by the other, so that which course of action were better would depend on which unit were chosen—surely an undesirable condition and a *reductio ad absurdum* of any projected calculus of the sort required.<sup>2</sup>

Both, then, because of the failure to provide any means of reaching individual decisions and because of the theoretical difficulties inherent in any attempt to formulate the hedonistic calculus, the straightforward attempt to identify good with any sum of pleasures must be abandoned, and ethics would seem to be in the position of being able neither to avoid the notion of pleasure nor to dispense with it. In perhaps a different sense than Plato intended, the ethicist is in danger of being overcome by pleasure.

## II

A workable theory of ethics would seem to require some sort of relationship between pleasures and purposes, and the difficulty in ethics lies in determining the nature of this relationship. Faced with this situation, it may be worth while to adopt a procedure similar to that of nineteenth-century physicists who were wont to construct mechanical models to serve as explanations in a variety of fields. In this case, of course, a mechanical model of ethical phenomena will not

<sup>2</sup> E.g., suppose A and B are the only people involved in alternative courses of action, I and II. Suppose the pleasures involved to be the following:

Course I:  $+3b$  for A,  $-2b$  for B;  
 Course II:  $-1b$  for A,  $+3b$  for B;  
 Therefore, Course II is preferable.

Suppose for A,  $1b = 2w$ ; for B,  $1b = \frac{1}{3}w$ .

Course I:  $+6w$  for A,  $-\frac{2}{3}w$  for B;  
 Course II:  $-2w$  for A,  $+1w$  for B;  
 Therefore, Course I is preferable.

do, but an epistemological one may be of service. Epistemology is by no means a settled field, but it seems to me, at least, to be a field in which solutions have been more clearly thought out than in ethics, in which more ingenuity has been expended, and in which more complex structures have been proposed than are to be found in ethics. Hence an analogy between theory of knowledge and ethics may be useful, though I do not think it will solve all problems.

This is not to say that ethics is derivative from epistemology or that theory of knowledge is logically prior to ethics but merely that a technique successful in the one field may advantageously be applied to the other. And this proposal is nothing new. After all, the method of attack in Kant's second *Critique* is a conscious imitation of that employed in the first.

The suggestion to be advanced here is that the relation of pleasures to ethical values is analogous to the relation of sense data to physical objects. It will be objected at once that there is no more disputed ground in epistemology than this relationship. This, of course, must be admitted, but it still may be the case that there is enough basic agreement on many topics to provide a fruitful analogy. That this is the case, we proceed to show by an enumeration of the points of agreement in epistemology.

We may begin by specifying the sense of the term "sense datum" required. The word is sometimes used with the significance of an isolated sound or patch of color; with the significance that Russell attached to the term "particulars" about thirty years ago.<sup>3</sup> It may also be used to indicate a complex of such data having a Gestalt character and interpreted as in-

dicating some object. In this latter sense the term "appearance" might be more apt, except for its connotation of being "merely appearance." The latter sense is the one we shall employ.

At least six relations and distinctions may be indicated as involving sense data and physical objects.

1. The data are given in a sense in which the object itself is not. Depending on one's epistemological theory, the data may be parts of the object, effects of the object, or signs of the object, but in any case they will be given with a kind of immediacy the object lacks. This is not to rule out the possibility of a direct, Bergsonian intuition of objects but merely to insist that this intuition, if it exists, is qualitatively different from the immediacy of sense data.

2. Because of this immediacy, the datum is subjective in a sense in which the object is not. Communication of the sheerly sensuous character of a datum is impossible, and there can be discourse only concerning the relations between data. An example of this is the well-known fact that if green appears to one man as red appears to another, they will agree as to what things are green and will never discover the difference.

3. The datum symbolizes the object. It may symbolize in the way in which an effect symbolizes its cause, or in which a part symbolizes the whole, depending on one's theory; but in any case the reference is there.

4. The datum may be modified by the hypotheses concerning the existence of a given object. Thus a person looking for a friend in a crowd is likely to mistake several people for him before the friend actually arrives. These false recognitions involve data, modified by the hypothesis.

5. By and large data are of little interest on their own account, but only be-

<sup>3</sup> E.g., *Mysticism and Logic* (London, 1918), chap. vii.



cause they are symbolic of, and related to, objects.

6. Finally, the data verify hypotheses concerning the existence of objects. The exact theory of this verification awaits satisfactory explanation, but at least the following factors would seem to be involved: (*a*) some sort of conception of the object, possibly vague; (*b*) expectations of the relation of this object to other objects; (*c*) expectations of the sort of sense data which should occur as a result of (*b*); (*d*) the final occurrence or failure of occurrence of these data. Thus, if I would verify the presence of a cat in the next room, I must know (*a*) something at least of what a cat is in order that (*b*) I may conjecture where the cat is likely to be discovered among the articles of furniture of the room. Otherwise I may fail to discover the cat because I sought it on the ceiling rather than on the floor. (*c*) I must form some expectation of what a cat would look like under these conditions, otherwise I may stare at the cat without recognizing it. Finally, (*d*) the required data may either actually appear or fail to appear.

It should be noted also that the data which are predicted of stage *c* need not be a literal imagination of those which actually appear at stage *d*. As a rule, the expectation is vague and permits of a variety of actual situations. The verification consists not in discovering a qualitative identity between expectations and presentations but rather in the fact that the data fit into an anticipated schema or pattern. The verification then consists in a fulfilment or disappointment of these fairly general expectations.

Other relations between data and objects might be suggested, but they are controversial and would depend upon one's epistemological views. Enough has been suggested, however, to introduce

our parallel which would claim analogous relations between the following sets of entities:

In Epistemology	In Ethics
sense data	pleasures and displeasures
objects	values
hypotheses concerning existence of objects	aims or intentions
verification of hypotheses	realization of aims

In order to make the intended parallel clear, some explanation is required of the sense of the terms "value" and "aim." Sometimes the two are used synonymously, but the distinction intended is between what is aimed at, a certain goal, the value, and the belief that these values are to be found in a certain situation or course of conduct, the aim. The aim thus becomes a program for the realization of the value or a hypothesis concerning the value. There are senses in which the terms "ideal" and "good" are synonymous with "value" as used here, and in this same sense "envisagement of good" corresponds to "aim."

A further distinction is required. In the description of physical objects all affective and value characteristics are omitted. This is not to say that in actual perception the two groups of qualities can be separated, as, for example, it may be impossible for some people to view a snake without feeling disgust. Rather in the description of a snake the feelings accompanying the perception of it are neglected, so that two persons will agree that something is a snake even though one finds it admirable and another repulsive. Similarly, in our discussion of values it is necessary to neglect all except the affective or value characteristics, though, here again, this divorce is possible only in thought. Thus,

if, as Plato suggests, the satisfactions of producing a poem and a child are at least generically similar, then these constitute the same value, or at least similar values.

It may be objected that values as suggested here constitute a highly Platonic realm of supernatural entities. Whether this constitutes an objection is, of course, a matter of debate, but it is sufficient for the present to indicate that no ontological status has been assigned to values and that everything said so far is compatible with a complete nominalism and materialism.

With so much by way of preamble, we may now proceed to make our parallel explicit:

1. Just as we saw that data are present in a sense in which objects are not, so pleasures and displeasures are present in a sense in which values are not. The pleasure may be looked on as a part of the value or as an effect of the value, corresponding to phenomenalist or realist views of the object, or the relation may be conceived in some other way; but in any case the pleasure is given in a way in which the value is not.

In case the value is conceived as some transcendent good, it may permit of direct intuition, but, as in the case of objects, its immediacy will be of a different sort from that of pleasures.

2. Again, pleasures are completely subjective. Whether or not my pleasure on eating a well-cooked meal is qualitatively similar to yours is something which can never be determined, but in so far as they can be compared it is through the values to which they attach. This is less obvious on the ethical side than in the case of objects, because pleasures most often are not discussed directly but by means of the object to which they attach. The point may, however, be

Suppose a book collector has just acquired a first edition of one of his favorite authors and, having exhibited his trophy, is trying to explain to a friend his satisfaction in possessing it. The friend believes that books are merely things to read and has no interest in first editions. The collector will have great difficulty in making his feeling clear unless, perchance, he discovers that the friend also is a collector, say of prints or match covers or autographs. Then it seems a fair inference that the values in the two cases are similar, if not the same, and the pleasure can be explained by showing its function in realizing the value, i.e., by comparing it to the pleasure of acquiring a desirable autograph.

3. The pleasure may symbolize the value, again by being a part of it or an effect of it, as was the case with sense data and objects.

4. Pleasures may be modified by their relations to aims. Thus a task which is in itself unpleasant may be considered pleasant because of its relation to some aim. This modification of pleasures by aims is probably even more widespread than the corresponding modification of data by theories about objects.

5. Again, to some extent at least, we have relatively little interest in pleasures merely as such but are interested in them in relation to aims. This would seem to be the force of the hypothetical example of the youth in the dilemma quoted in the preceding section. This also is the force of the oft-quoted paradox of hedonism.

6. Finally, the realization of a value is closely analogous to the verification of the existence of an object. Like verifications, realizations are never complete but always allow for a continuation of the process.

So far we have not distinguished

treated both as the ethical analogues of sense data. We have seen, however, that in their verificatory function, sense data constitute either fulfilment or disappointment. Hence, analogously, we may distinguish pleasures, as realizing an aim, from displeasures, as marking a failure of realization. The process of realization can be developed in strict parallel to the process of verification. There is required (a) the concept of some value to be realized. This concept, like the corresponding physical concept, may be and usually is vague. (b) There must be some envisagement of the physical conditions under which the value is to be attained; (c) there must be a schematic envisagement of the satisfactions to be attained through the realization of the value; and (d), finally, there is the occurrence of pleasures or displeasures which mark the actual realization. Thus, if the value aimed at be a pious life, it is necessary, as Socrates insisted, to have some conception of what piety is and essential, as Euthyphro pointed out, to know in what ways piety manifests itself in behavior, and equally essential, as neither one of them maintained, to know the satisfactions to be expected from piety. Only when this has been set forth can actual pleasures provide a realization of the value, piety, or displeasures a failure of realization.

As with the case of objects, failure of realization springs principally from two sources: from a failure to judge the circumstances under which the value is to be realized, point (b) above, or from a failure under the specified conditions to obtain the anticipated satisfactions. Conduct which is "idealistic" in the pejorative sense that connotes impracticality suffers from the first defect, and conduct which is "disappointing" suffers from the second—"disappointing" in the sense of having followed through a

charted course of action without receiving the satisfaction expected from it.

Before concluding this parallel, one modification of it may be suggested. Contemporary logic, by its absence of distinction between common nouns and adjectives, has tended to soften the distinction between hypotheses regarding the existence of objects of a certain sort and hypotheses concerning the embodiment of qualities. If qualities are properly conceived, they may be substituted for objects in the epistemological side of the proposed parallel. This required view of qualities holds that they are not immediately given in sensation but that sense data are merely indicative of the presence of qualities. Thus a given sense datum would not be a presentation of the objective characteristic, red, but merely a clue to the presence of the quality.<sup>4</sup> This difference between sense data and qualities is roughly indicated by the difference between "The object looks red" and "This object is red." With such a conception of qualities, values are analogous to qualities; aims, to hypotheses concerning the presence of qualities, etc. I have, however, refrained from couching the analogy in these terms for two reasons: (1) this conception of qualities as transcending immediate sense experience does not have the prevalence it deserves and so might be confusing and (2) it is desirable to avoid even terminological confusion with the views of the British intuitionists that the good is a simple quality, where *quality* is employed in an immanent sense.

### III

Thus far we have studiously avoided any commitment concerning the ontological status of values. By means of the parallel set forth in the preceding sec-

<sup>4</sup> Cf. C. I. Lewis, *Mind and the World Order* (New York, 1929), chap. v.

tion, it is open to us to argue that there may be the same variety of theories concerning the nature of values as there are concerning the nature of objects. To enumerate a complete list would be both tedious and fruitless; a few of the more important varieties might, however, be considered.

We may begin with what might be termed ethical phenomenalism, the counterpart of epistemological phenomenalism. Such a view would hold that values are nothing more than groupings of pleasures and displeasures in much the same sense in which an ordinary phenomenalism would hold that objects are nothing more than groupings of sense data. The argument favoring the position would be the same in the two cases: in each case the more complex and remote entity is a construct out of the more immediately given. In each case any contrary position assumes the existence of entities without providing any means of verifying their existence. Such a view would provide a completely naturalistic theory of ethics, since the only ethical entities would be pleasures and displeasures and values constructed out of them. Such a view, however, would not be equivalent to ordinary hedonism in either its egoistic or its social forms, since the value is not merely an aggregate of quantitatively considered pleasures but a certain organization of them, in the same way that on a phenomenalist view an object is not a mere sum of sense data but the orderly appearance of data under specifiable conditions.

Again, in a manner comparable to a critical realist epistemology, it might be argued that affective states, though not parts of a value, are manifestations of it. On such a theory, the value would transcend pleasures and displeasures and be revealed by them symbolically. The

value might even be taken to be the cause of the pleasures in somewhat the same sense that the object is taken to be the cause of sensations. Platonism in ethics seems to be a view of this kind.

The grounds for belief in such a view might be a claim of direct intuition of a value, similar to a Platonist's intuition of the good, or something which, by analogy to Santayana's terminology, one might call "moral faith," i.e., an instinctive belief that pleasures point beyond themselves and are revelatory of a different order of being. In the case of these ethical positions, the argument would be developed in a fashion parallel to the epistemological.

Again, just as it can be argued that every object requires a subject, so it can be argued that every value is a value for some mind. And just as not every object can be an object for each individual mind, so not every value can be a value for each individual mind, but an absolute valuer as well as an absolute knower must be posited. Just as every hypothesis is true in some degree, so every aim is in some degree realizable, and the most adequate aim, as the most adequate hypothesis, is the most comprehensive. Thus an ethical idealism might be built up, comparable to an epistemological idealism.

But enough of these sketches of ethical ontologies. The chief varieties, phenomenalist, realistic, and idealistic, have been indicated, and the reader may be left to fill in the details or to develop his own epistemology of ethics. The foregoing considerations do not pretend to prove that a person holding a given epistemological view must hold the corresponding ethical view but merely that there is a presumption in favor of the analogue. The parallel drawn does not extend to all details, and there may be

reasons for finding a position convincing in one field and not the other. Still, considerations which are thought to be decisive on the one side, in the absence of a special argument, should be convincing on the other.

#### IV

Thus far no attention has been given to the problem of choice or discrimination between aims, the question of what it means to say that one aim is "right" where another is "wrong."

If our analogy is to be carried out, two problems must be distinguished. First, there is the theoretical problem which is the problem of truth on the epistemological side. Just as there are correspondence, coherence, and pragmatic theories of truth, all involving relationships of hypotheses to objects, so on the ethical side one might speak of the correspondence of an aim with its value, the coherence of aims, and the possibility of realizing an aim. This ethical analogue of truth bears some resemblance to the use of the term "good." Certainly there are ethical theories which say an aim is good if it corresponds to an objectively existing value or that good consists in a synthesis of believed aims (just as truth is on an idealistic view a synthesis of believed hypotheses).

The more important problem, however, is not this problem of the nature of ethical goodness but the problem of making an actual choice. Given alternative aims, as in the case of our student who was undecided whether to enlist or to continue his studies, what criteria can and should influence his decision? Once again our analogy may be of service, and we may seek our answer by means of the parallel problem in epistemology: Given a concrete situation involving perplexity, how can and should one, in advance of

verification, choose between alternative hypotheses? To take a simple illustration, if one is driving along a dark road at night and a small object dashes across it before the headlights, one may wonder just what sort of animal it is. The following considerations are relevant in reaching a decision:

1. The sense data themselves suggest certain hypotheses and rule out others. Thus the perceived data are compatible with the hypothesis of the animal's being a cat or a dog or a rabbit, but they definitely exclude its being a giraffe.

2. One's past experience and the general fund of human experience suggest hypotheses and eliminate others. Thus our knowledge of the habits of cats, dogs, and rabbits makes it probable that one was seen. On the other hand, unless one were driving in Madagascar, it would be exceedingly unlikely that the animal observed were an aye-aye, even though the observed sense data were entirely compatible with its being one.

The point might be stated in somewhat different terms: we project our hypotheses so as to preserve our past verifications. Every verification at the time it is made, of course, is absolute, not in the sense of being a complete verification but in the sense of being unequivocally a verification or not. Still, if subsequent judgments contradict a previous verification, we use these later judgments retroactively and hold that the prior verification was not really a verification at all. Thus if we were to assert that the animal observed were an aye-aye, we should have to sacrifice the verificatory force of all the observations which led to the generalization that aye-ayes are peculiar to Madagascar. Hence we avoid the judgment. The point might be summarized as follows: an experience which was verificatory at the time it occurred need not

be so in retrospect, and we project new hypotheses, as far as possible, so as to conserve the verificatory aspect of these previous experiences.

3. There remains the problem of the choice of categories of classification, the problem of dividing the world into such classes as cats, dogs, and the like. In part at least the choice of such concepts is dictated by their applicability, by the fact that we do find objects which fit into them. It is of course entirely possible that a different set of concepts, making quite different divisions in the world, might have done equally well.<sup>5</sup>

These factors, then, are characteristic of any projection of hypotheses before the process of verification. As a psychological account of the making of judgments, there are no peculiar problems raised, but, largely for its ethical interest, we may raise the epistemological problem: Is there any source of error in these preliminary judgments before the actual verification? To point the problem. Suppose there are two motorists in the car, one of whom thinks a cat has been seen and the other a rabbit. Suppose, as is most probable, that they drive on without attempting to capture the animal. Is there any way in which the judgment of the one can be considered superior to that of the other, or is the question merely one of personal choice and opinion? A brief analysis of the factors enumerated above will show, I believe, that in part these factors admit of an objective evaluation, in part the matter is subjective.

To consider the first, that one man's data suggest a cat to him and the other's a dog to him, admits of no dispute, and neither needs nor is capable of any substantiation. To this extent the judg-

ments are subjective. On the other hand, the powers of discrimination of each man are subject to investigation. How often is either confused in first impressions and, specifically, how often does either confuse cats and dogs? This question permits, ideally at least, of objective settlement.

There is another respect, also, though somewhat more subtle, in which an objectively determinable error might arise. One cannot doubt that what A saw looked to him like a cat, but does A know what a cat looks like under the circumstances? There might be confusion not as to the nature of the presentation but as to whether or not the presentation is a case of looking like a cat. The adolescent who wonders whether or not he is in love is a case in point here. He knows exactly what his feelings are and can describe them in painful detail, but he is in doubt as to whether or not these constitute being in love. Presumably, though by indirect methods, such problems can be settled in an objective fashion.

With regard to the second point, the conservation of verifications: it can be decided on quite objective grounds what effect a new hypothesis would have on past verifications, since all that is at issue is a matter of logic—the consistency of accepted hypotheses with the one proposed.

On the third score, the possibility that different categories are involved, different modes of classification employed, it might be argued that no real difference is involved. If, for example, the problem is one of identifying an herb, and one person makes a conjecture as to its place in a botanical classification and another as to its place in a medicinal classification, there is no real dispute. Either person may be right or wrong independently of the other. If, however, it is proposed

<sup>5</sup> For the development of this view see *ibid.*, Appen. E.

to verify the hypotheses, a clash may arise, since the verification of one may preclude the verification of the other. Thus to verify the place in the medicinal scheme it might be necessary to cut and steep the herb; to verify the botanical, to allow it to grow and flower. If only one specimen were available, the application of the two schemes would be mutually exclusive, and, assuming the two modes of classification to be equally successful, there would be no way of settling the dispute as to which was to be employed. Here would seem to be an irrational element in the procedure of verification.

It would appear, then, that in the tentative choice of hypotheses before verification has progressed there would be certain elements which are quite subjective and which cannot be said to be correct or incorrect. These are the appearance of the data themselves and, in some cases at least, the choice of the categories involved in hypotheses. On the other hand, the remaining factors—the discrimination of data, the knowledge of the appearance to be expected on the basis of some concept, and the probability of the hypotheses in terms of past experience—all are capable of objective determination.

To set up the analogy to ethics, as choices in ordinary knowledge are between hypotheses, so choices in ethics are between aims. As in the former case, we may distinguish the same three elements:

1. In adopting any aim, the present pleasures and displeasures are an index to the sort of values which may or may not be present in the situation. To take a simple illustration, a feeling of lack of accomplishment and of time wasted may be an indication to a man that the aims at the values contained in planting his garden or beginning a major piece of work are realizable but that the aims at

values contained in reading a detective story are not.

2. Parallel to the attempt to preserve previous verifications is the attempt to act in a manner as to preserve one's previous pleasures. This is not to deny that an activity experienced as pleasurable was pleasurable, and nothing can alter that fact. Similarly an activity which was experienced as verificatory was so experienced and nothing can alter the fact. But in retrospect, just as an experience may be remembered to have been verificatory when experienced but now may no longer have probative value, so an experience may be remembered to have been a source of pleasure but now may no longer be so. This is merely to admit the possibility of remorse. Just as we project present hypotheses, on the whole, along the patterns of previous ones to avoid renouncing our past verifications, so we project future aims along the lines of past ones in order to preserve a pleasant memory of past pleasures. It is this reason, presumably, which makes it so much more difficult for an older man to change his set of aims than for a younger. He has so much more to lose. In Section I we distinguished between immediate pleasures and satisfactions derivative from the pursuit and accomplishment of an aim. It is presumably only the satisfactions and not the immediate pleasures which are lost in retrospect.

3. Just as we saw that there are possibilities of using different sets of categories to classify and describe phenomena, so there would appear to be the possibility of the same alternatives in the field of ethics. If we exclude for the moment theoretical ethics, we may consider ethical systems as ways of life, giving injunctions as to practical conduct. From this point of view we may notice the values

which attach to a quiet sort of life given to studiously "cultivating one's own garden"—a life which consists in meticulous obedience to law but involves no wider interest in public affairs and no achievement of fame. From the ancient Epicurean point of view, these values are to be classified along with the values of contemplation of mild pleasures, of relative security, and the like. From Nietzsche's point of view, the value would be classified with the values inherent in slavery, mediocrity, and following the herd. It is entirely possible, of course, that the value has affinities with each of the sets of values in question, and to that extent there is no conflict between Epicurean and Nietzschean morals. When, however, one seeks to realize a given set of values, there the activities to be pursued on the basis of one classification conflict with those of another, and we have the split in morals. This is quite comparable to the conflict over methods of verification mentioned before.

Again, when we come to raise the question of which of these factors are capable of objective determination and which remain subjective, the answers must be the same as before. The sort of aim which is indicated by a given state of pleasure or displeasure must remain subjective. The discrimination among such data is, however, a question and is subject to review. Mob action would seem to be a case in point. The group has some sort of feeling of pleasure or displeasure—indignation, elation, enthusiasm, or the like—but because of the circumstances often does not decide just what feeling it is and may act in a manner which it regrets.

Again, even if a feeling is properly discriminated, its indicative value may be questionable. Just as a youngster may doubt whether or not he is in love, so a student may think mistakenly on the basis of his liking for a given course that the aim of a scholarly life is realizable in his case, while actually he would find it completely unsatisfactory. Ideally, at least, such mistakes could be caught, and objectivity is possible here.

With regard to the second point, the conservation of satisfactions, objectivity is possible. The whole question is one of consistency of aims which in theory is simply a problem of logic. In practice, however, aims are considerably less articulate and well formulated than scientific hypotheses so that the task is a good deal more difficult.

The third factor involving conflicts arising from differences in ethical categories has already been discussed and, as in the epistemological case, appears to be subjective.

If this parallel holds, decisions as to ethical aims, like choices between scientific hypotheses, are in part based on objective grounds and are in part subjective. To the extent that such decisions involve an immediate taking of pleasures and displeasures as indicative of values and to the extent that they reflect classifications of values, they are subjective. To the extent that there is room for evaluating discriminations, for checking the reliability of evaluations, and for investigations of the consistency of aims, they are objective. To the extent that objective factors are involved, they may properly be called "right" and "wrong."



## "PUBLIC" AND "PRIVATE" FACTORS IN VALUATION<sup>1</sup>

PHILIP BLAIR RICE

### I. FUNDAMENTALS OF AN EMPIRICAL THEORY OF VALUE

RECENT theories of value have made a strenuous and praiseworthy effort to get away from subjectivism. The analyses that have been made in our century have shown that a purely or primarily introspective approach to valuation is hopelessly untrustworthy and needlessly self-restricting. They have succeeded in such large measure that we shall never be able to go back to anything closely resembling the seventeenth- and eighteenth-century ethics of moral sentiment or the nineteenth-century varieties of hedonism. There are objective or "public" factors in valuation which the older theories ignored or underestimated, and these are of the greatest importance.

Yet in its zeal this revolution in value theory may, like most revolutions, have repudiated some of the virtues of the old regime along with its vices. I wish to show that there are "private" factors which can and often must be taken into account in valuation and, secondly, to indicate the respective roles of the public and the private data that serve as evidence for value judgments.

To avoid misunderstanding, however, it is necessary first to summarize the chief positive achievements of recent value theory. Many of these tenets have been anticipated by earlier philosophers, from Socrates to Hume; but they will be presented in the form in which they have been developed by such writers as R. B. Perry, Mead, Dewey, and Santayana.

<sup>1</sup> Read at a meeting of the Philosophy of Religion Association, January 10, 1942, in Chicago.

The following five principles will be assumed as fundamental. These principles are still debatable, but their establishment does not fall within the scope of this paper.

1. *Methodological empiricism*.—No a priori approach to values is tenable. Valuational propositions are tentative and hypothetical. They do not possess certainty but at most probability. Our valuations are always subject to modification in the light of experience, and they derive their probability from the observed evidence upon which they rest, whether this evidence be public or private in character. This does not imply "factualism" in ethics, in the ordinary sense of the term. We must take into account the potentialities of man, as well as his past and present actuality. But the only clues to what man can become are to be found in the world in which he lives, in what man has been, what he is now becoming, and what he imagines and aspires to. It is on this basis that a judgment concerning the "ought," in the full ethical sense of the word, must be distinguished from an ordinary judgment concerning the "is."

2. *The rejection of metaphysical dualism*.—The empirical theories of value now current agree in treating mind as a part of nature and valuation as a natural activity. The writers alluded to differ in their ontologies: they may be radical empiricists, upholders of a metaphysics of process, epiphenomenalists, or panpsychists. But all reject the Cartesian dualism of mental substance and material substance.

3. *A psychology which takes the total act*

*as the ultimate unit.*—The psychologies of the last thirty or forty years have been in reaction against a psychology that is exclusively or primarily introspectionist. The new psychologies stress the unitary behavior of the organism in response to the total situation. The environment is conceived to be social as well as physical, and the biological and social functions of the mental act are taken as the bases of its classification and interpretation. This approach does not require us to deny or depreciate the inner or “conscious” aspects of the act, but it treats these as phases of a larger unit.

4. *“Interest” as the focus of attention for theory of value.*—Since valuation is an activity that involves the whole organism, it is best understood through the persisting characteristics of the organism. The persisting and recurrent factors in motivation are “affective-motor”: our “habituations” and “dispositions,” to use Aristotelian language; our *conatus*, in Spinoza’s terminology; our drives, goal-sets, governing propensities, interests, as contemporary psychologists put it. The factors which determine our valuations are often hidden to introspective consciousness; even our dominant motives elude us. The dynamic patterns of our actions are biological and cultural; the psychoanalyst and the anthropologist can often reveal to us the nature of strivings of which we are unaware or which we refuse to acknowledge. And those interests of which we are conscious express themselves in objective tendencies to action as well as in introspectively discoverable feelings.

5. *Reflection as a factor in constituting and modifying valuations.*—Neither our immediate feeling toward an object nor our persisting motor reaction to it determines entirely the valuation that we place upon it. Our attitude can be modi-

fied by the analysis of the probable consequences of an act, its relation to other needs and interests, its compatibility with our total plan of life so far as that is intuitively felt, imaginatively envisaged, and theoretically schematized. This involves, as Professor Dewey has iterated, a consideration of the means necessary to realize the alternative ends-in-view, so that the estimation of means often modifies our ends and suggests new ones. It also involves, as Socrates saw, the clarification of intent by a moral dialectic which looks to the ultimate harmonization of our interests.

With the aid of these principles, contemporary philosophers have constructed their theory of value. In the most primitive and generic sense, value is, in Perry’s inadequate phrase, “any object of any interest.” More precisely, an object is positively valuable if it is capable of arousing an interest, if it can lead a living being to seek it when it is absent or to try to preserve it when it is present. An object has disvalue when it is of such a nature that it can cause someone to avoid it or reject it. At this level, “*x* is good” means that “*x* is such that it can arouse (or satisfy) an interest”; “*x* is bad” means that “*x* is such that it can frustrate a positive interest or arouse a negative one.” This is value in the pre-ethical or subethical sense of the term, which considers interests in isolation from each other.

More developed judgments of value treat interests as related. Our more complex valuations, including moral judgments of certain types, deal with life’s economy, with the need to integrate and harmonize our interests with each other and with the world that thwarts or sustains them. Certain of our primary impulses may conflict with each other; certain of our desires, when implemented,

may have unacceptable consequences. In the dialectical interplay of impulse and reflection which results, the individual and the social group evolve ideals and standards which express a pattern or system of compatible interests. And new and more complex interests may be generated in the process. At this level, " $x$  is good" means that " $x$  will promote the realization of the whole system of my interests (or the interest-pattern of the group) to a greater extent than any alternative."

Still a third level of value must be distinguished, which takes into account the potentialities of change in the interest-system of the individual and the group. This involves a comparison of alternative interest-patterns, so that we conceive something like conversion or a revolutionary transvaluation of existing values. Here is where the ideal is placed in sharpest contrast with the actual. The goodness of an object or an act is then defined not in terms of the realization of a currently dominant pattern but in terms of a new pattern to be achieved through the emergence and triumph of new values hitherto envisioned but dimly. They transform so radically the existing pattern that unforeseen interests also are fostered. Here " $x$  is good" means that " $x$  is such that it will promote the realization of interest-pattern  $B$ , which will result when the currently dominant pattern  $A$  has been transformed by the assertion of hitherto subordinate interests  $c$  and  $d$ ; and pattern  $B$  will be a more satisfying way of life than pattern  $A$  or any other feasible alternative." It is perhaps with respect to this third level—the level of creative ethics—that contemporary value theory is most deficient, and here that the private factors in valuation need more consideration than they generally receive.

Valuation is a process of interaction between a minded organism and its world. But different students of value theory have chosen to emphasize different aspects of the process. Perry has stressed the factors which spring from the persistent characteristics of the organism itself, namely, our "governing propensities" and the expectations which accompany them. Thus the type of evidence which he seeks to analyze is that which concerns the integration of our biological and psychological drives; this leads him to his standards of intensity, preference, and inclusiveness as means of achieving harmony of interests. Dewey, on the other hand, has stressed the objective or environmental factors—what Professor Wieman calls the "sustaining order." The evidence on which a proposed satisfaction of an interest is to be judged consists of data as to the fitness of the material and social environment to support a given interest and to fit it into a system of interest-satisfactions. Dewey is less concerned than Perry with the structural features of the organism itself, tending to embrace them under such general heads as "lacks," "needs," and their co-ordination.

These two approaches are complementary and indispensable to each other. The mutual compatibility of two interests depends in part on the capacity of the world to satisfy both of them; on the other hand, the interest-sustaining possibilities of the world depend in part on the structure of the interest-pattern.

Neither approach, as so far employed, has given special attention to the part that private data, including feelings introspectively studied, play in the process. The following remarks about private data, however, are offered as an extension of the theories just outlined and not as an alternative to them.

## II. MEANING OF "PRIVATE DATA"

There is a sense in which all *data*, as "had" or "enjoyed," are private to the individual who has them. Every datum is given to someone and is directly accessible to him alone. Two people in this room may be looking at what we call the "same" wall. Each man has his own cone of vision and consequently his own visual field, which differs qualitatively in some measure from the other man's visual field. We assume that there is a large measure of correspondence between the perceptual data of the two men; but we cannot verify this directly, for we cannot trade streams of consciousness. If we investigate, we are forced to rely upon such indirect methods as exchanging positions, comparing reports, and tests like those for color blindness. By these means we are able to fit our several perspectives into a common frame of reference. But the visual field of one individual does not literally coincide with the visual field of another, and in this sense is private to him.

On the other hand, as the terms are commonly used, data are distinguished as public and private with respect to the *accessibility of the events or objects about which the data give us information*. Thus a table in this room or a sample of aluminum in the laboratory is equally accessible, or inaccessible, to anyone who will go where it is. Neither you nor I can get inside the aluminum atoms, but both you and I can see and weigh gross samples of the metal. The aluminum is just as available to one qualified observer as to another; hence the *data* obtained in observations of it are called, though not with strict accuracy, public data. Our notebooks in which we record our observations are, of course, public in the same sense as the aluminum itself is public;

the visual and tactile data which are recorded in the notebooks, however, are private in the sense employed above, namely, in that they belong existentially to the perceptual field of some one individual, even though their existence and nature are indirectly verifiable. Suppose, however, that you and I are studying not aluminum but my "feelings." These, too, are accessible to both of us but in different ways and in different degrees. You can test my blood pressure, the adrenaline content of my blood stream, and my motor reactions in the presence of certain objects; and all data so obtained are relevant to "knowledge" of my feelings. However, the immediate quality of my feelings is directly accessible to me but not to you, for I can get inside my stream of experience, whereas you cannot. You can verify statements about the immediate or inner aspects of the affective response only indirectly—for example, by placing yourself in a similar situation and then observing your own inner experience, which you assume to be similar to mine because we belong to the same species and share the same social traditions. Thus, strictly speaking, it is the aluminum, my motor reactions, etc., which are public and the inner aspects of my feelings, thoughts, etc., which are private. Nevertheless, by metonymy, perceptual *data* of shapes, colors, pointer readings, and bodily movements are called public data; and introspective observations of feelings and the like are said to be directed upon private data. These terms will be so used henceforth in this paper, since these seem to be the meanings that underlie their current usage.

Existentially, the two kinds of data are closely associated. Most of the feelings that concern theory of value are of the type which Professor Perry calls "ob-

jective" feelings, in contrast to "substantive" and "attributive" feelings.<sup>2</sup> "Substantive" feelings—for example, a stomach ache or sexual excitement at the level of "lust"—are localized within the body and within a definite region or organ of the body. "Attributive" feelings, such as euphoria or depression, consist in a vague affective tone diffused throughout the whole organism and dissociated from any specific object. In both these types of feeling the feeling itself, whether localized or not, is usually the focus of attention. In "objective" feeling, on the other hand, attention is focused upon a perceptual object or situation, and the affective element is a kind of overtone intimately fused with the percept or surrounding it on the fringe of consciousness. Thus, when we are really listening to music, we are attending to the sounds and not to our emotional responses. When we get goose flesh and attend to it as a "substantive" feeling, we are enjoying our own emotions and not the music; consequently, we are not having an artistic experience. When we love a woman we are attending to her; otherwise we are in love with love, and not with Mary. When we are angry or afraid or bewildered, our emotion is the affective concomitant of a perceived situation; and the emotion is differentiated from other emotions primarily by the nature of the situation.

Consequently, information concerning private data is usually conveyed in large part by describing or re-creating the public data with which they are associated. The poet conveys emotion by evoking the scene that produced his emotion or by imagining one which will produce a similar but more intense emotion. We tell how angry we were by describing how

badly someone mistreated us and what we would have done if we had not controlled ourselves. To a limited extent, however, we can isolate by introspection the affective components from the public data and describe their nature. This is a slippery process, since the elusive feeling component tends to evanesce when we shift our attention from the public data which it accompanies. Nevertheless, we can say, for example, whether the immediate quality of a given experience was "pleasant" or "unpleasant"; and, *since the same perceptual data or objective situation can be accompanied by varying affective tones*, we can indicate these latter with greater or less vividness and precision. Generally the more specific terms to describe the feelings, such as "anger," "fear," and "bewilderment," refer to the unitary act, with an implied reference *both* to the objective nature of the situation and the response *and* to the introspectively seizable aspects of the response.

Now there is considerable confusion on this point in current discussions. Professor Dewey, for example, attributes to those who believe in the importance of private data, and in introspection as a means of discovering them, four assumptions: that introspection reveals a soul-substance, or at least "mental states" which are existentially separable from their physiological concomitants; that the private data supposedly revealed by introspection are nonnatural; that introspection is infallible; and that introspection is the sole or primary mode of access to psychological phenomena. Such assumptions have all too frequently been associated with the practice of introspection in the past, and one even finds them occasionally so associated today. But it is possible to separate a method from the metaphysical uses to which it has been put and from the excessive

<sup>2</sup> *General Theory of Value* (New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1926).

claims that have been made as to its value.

In *Principles of Psychology* James defined introspection as "the looking into our own minds and reporting what we there discover"; he added that "introspection is difficult and fallible; and . . . the difficulty is simply that of all observation of whatever kind." The later development of his metaphysics did not lead him to reject introspection entirely as a method.

Professor Dewey does not deny the existence of private experience; but he asserts that it is ineffable, incommunicable, and unverifiable.<sup>3</sup> Mead does not seem to have been in agreement with Dewey on these points. The private, for Mead, is merely one phase of the total mental act, and it does not supply psychology with its primary units. Nevertheless, it is for him a phase which it is possible and often necessary to isolate for attention. Mead insists that his psychology is "not behavioristic in the sense of ignoring the inner experience of the individual—the inner phase of that process or activity. On the contrary, it is particularly concerned with the rise of such experience within the process as a whole."<sup>4</sup> For his purposes in *Mind, Self,*

*and Society*, Mead says, he is simply working "from the outside to the inside instead of from the inside to the outside."<sup>5</sup> And he acknowledges, as legitimate uses of the term "consciousness," "accessibility to certain contents, and as synonymous with certain contents themselves."<sup>6</sup>

Professor Charles W. Morris also interprets Mead in this way in his Introduction to *Mind, Self, and Society*. Mead, he says, rejected the view that "the private cannot fall within science even if it could be known to exist." On the contrary, "as human animals we do in fact observe aspects of ourselves in our attitudes, our images, our thoughts, our emotions which we do not observe so completely in others; *and that fact is communicable.*"<sup>7</sup>

Of course, that which is private to one person is, by definition, directly accessible only to him, "given" only to him. And it cannot be transferred in its numerical identity from one person's experience to another's.

These characteristics of it, however, would not seem to justify the application to it of such adjectives as "ineffable," "incommunicable," and "unverifiable." Meaningful propositions of a variety of kinds can be asserted about the private. I can refer to my private experience—so much is involved in Dewey's admission that it exists. I can describe it if I am William or Henry James, Proust or Joyce. My description makes use of public instruments, such as language and other signs; but these signs are not identical with that of which they are signs. Frequently I can produce in someone else, either by artistic means or by arranging

<sup>3</sup> The following remarks on Dewey are based on his discussions of mind in *Essays in Experimental Logic* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1916), *Reconstruction in Philosophy* (New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1920), *Experience and Nature* (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1929), *The Quest for Certainty* (New York: Minton, Balch & Co., 1929), and especially *Theory of Valuation* ("International Encyclopedia of Unified Science," Vol. II, No. 4 [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1939]). In some of his other writings, such as *Art as Experience* (New York: Minton, Balch & Co., 1934), there are statements which are difficult to reconcile with the view of private experience that he presents in his theory of knowledge and general theory of value. Within present limits of space, however, it is impossible to deal with these inconsistencies.

<sup>4</sup> *Mind, Self, and Society* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1934).

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 8.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 30.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. xvi, xvii. Italics mine.

experimental conditions, a state of mind that I have reason to believe resembles my own in a number of particulars.

Now the assertion that feelings or private data are ineffable or incommunicable may mean merely that we cannot wholly convey their quality to another person by words and other signs. But here, again, there is at most a distinction of degree. Neither can we altogether adequately formulate in words the quality of so-called public data. Reality is always richer and more various than our modes of expression. *But we can observe the private, then report upon it, just as we can observe the public, then report upon it. In neither case does the report convey the full body, or exact qualitative shading, of the event reported on,* although a skilful writer or painter can approximate this.

Nor is it an insuperable objection against introspection that the stream of experience is always changing; for we likewise have it on good authority that we cannot step twice into the same river. We can, however, correlate the observations that have been made and can repeat observations both of the river and of ourselves under conditions that are similar in the relevant respects. Thus we can verify or confirm observations of our inner experience.

Similarly, we can in many cases verify—indirectly, it is true—the presence, and the nature, of a supposed private condition in someone else by evaluating his reports on his introspection and by observing his actions to be similar to those which we have observed to accompany the same kind of private state in ourselves.

Of course, such confirmation is never infallible. But neither, on empiricist principles, is confirmation of anything else infallible. In respect of verifiability, as of ineffability and communicability,

public and private data are in the same boat.

Nor is it possible to identify the private with the "unique," and the public with the "common" or "social," except in the senses that the private is uniquely observable or directly accessible to one person only, whereas the public is multiply observable or accessible to many. The private need not be qualitatively unique: the emotional responses of an audience to a Grade B Hollywood movie may be as stereotyped as a string of Fords rolling off the assembly line. Furthermore, the private may be social in the sense that it is the product of social factors and that it is describable to others. On the other hand, a public monument may be unique in that there is nothing else like it, and there may not be any other presidential speech (a "public address") besides one of Warren G. Harding's which has as many as thirty-four grammatical errors.

### III. THE ROLE OF "PRIVATE" DATA IN VALUATION

Since statements about private experience have been shown to be meaningful, it remains to ask what roles the private factors play in valuation. It will be argued that inner experience may serve: (a) as a referent in value judgments, (b) as an end, and (c) as evidence.

References to private experience are often necessary in establishing value judgments, even when the private experience does not constitute evidence, in the strict sense, for the person making the valuation.

Professor Dewey, as I read him, denies this. Thus he says that a baby's cry is "a sign that the baby is hungry or that a pin is pricking it," and that the cry leads its nurse to act so as "to change the organic condition inferred to exist by using the

cry as an evidential sign." This statement is unexceptionable, as far as it goes. But Dewey goes on to state that this is all that can be said about the matter. Any interpretation of the baby's cry as expressing "the existence of certain feelings along perhaps with a desire to obtain other feelings," he says, "introduces a totally superfluous not to say unverifiable matter." For

the word "feelings" is . . . either a strictly behavioral term, a name for the total organic state of which the cry or gesture is a part, or it is a word which is introduced entirely gratuitously. The phenomena in question are events in the course of the life of an organic being, not differing from taking food or gaining weight.

If the term "feeling" is used to refer to the inner phase of the baby's experience, in isolation from the organic factors, this term is brought in "from an alleged psychological theory which is couched in mentalistic terms, or in terms of alleged states of an inner consciousness or something of that sort."<sup>8</sup>

Now this view explains everything except why we should be interested in the baby as a "carrier" of value, to use Nicolai Hartmann's phrase. If the phenomena in question did not differ in some important respect from "taking food or gaining weight," there is no reason why we should be more interested in changing the organic conditions of babies than in changing the organic conditions of vegetables. True, if we believe the baby has feelings, we may consider these feelings as merely one phase of a total organic state. But the feelings happen to be the phase of the act which makes us treat the baby as though his presumed experience had some intrinsic value to him and not merely an instrumental value to us, like the welfare of a vegetable. Whether the

baby cries with the *purpose* of expressing his feelings is another matter. But, judging by analogy with my own experience, I should hazard a guess that the baby is at least as aware of his feelings as he is of their "organic conditions."

The conclusion is that, although the baby's feelings are not directly given as data for the value judgment here involved, namely, that I ought to change his diaper, the presumption of their existence is a necessary condition for making a value judgment at all, in so far as the judgment treats the object as a *person* and therefore as possessing the capacity for intrinsic value.

Similarly with a second case mentioned by Professor Dewey:

Take, e.g., the case of a person who assumes the posture appropriate to an ailing person and who utters sounds such as the latter person would ordinarily make. It is then a legitimate subject of inquiry whether the person is genuinely ailing and incapacitated for work or is malingering. . . . The investigation is carried on to determine what is the actual case of things that are empirically observable; it is not about inner "feelings." Physicians have worked out experimental tests that have a high degree of validity.<sup>9</sup>

Now it is an important medical question whether the patient is merely shamming—whether he has no "feeling" of pain at all—or has a genuine neurotic pain, psychically real to him and of obscure organic basis. The pragmatic results are different, for the physician gives different treatments to a malingerer and a neurotic. In the first case, straight talking or moral exhortation may be called for; in the second, consultation with a psychiatrist. In both cases the physician's direct evidence is limited to objective or public data—for neither the stethoscope nor any

<sup>8</sup> *Theory of Valuation*, pp. 8–10.

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 11.



other instrument yet devised will reveal feelings as such. But his diagnosis depends on his *interpretation* of the data—i.e., in part, on whether he interprets them to mean the presence or absence of a psychically real neurotic pain. And both his medical and his moral judgment on the patient will differ accordingly.<sup>10</sup>

In the cases of the baby and the malingerer, private data are *ex hypothesi* unobtainable or unreliable; nevertheless, a reference to the existence or nonexistence of certain private states is indispensable to the value judgment. Logically, it even constitutes evidence, although indirect evidence.

The question whether private data can serve as direct evidence is closely connected with the question whether we can desire the private aspects of experience as ends. For the evidence they give with regard to values is primarily evidence as to the fitness of certain kinds of experience to serve as ends.

Professor E. S. Ames, I take it, holds that feelings, introspectively regarded, can function as evidence but not as ends. "Pleasure and pain," he writes, "are signs of the fulfilment or thwarting of organic needs, and are not themselves the objects sought or avoided."<sup>11</sup> If pleasure and pain are signs, presumably they can be used as evidential signs.

On the other hand, Professor Dewey, in accordance with his more radical behaviorism, appears to deny that feelings can serve either as ends or as evidence rel-

evant to the choice of ends. He admits that "liking" or "enjoyment" occurs and even that it constitutes the value quality of an act. Since he holds, however, that inner experience is ineffable and, in his sense of the term knowledge, unknowable he denies that it is a factor in establishing value judgments. We cannot choose an end because of the positive enjoyment that we anticipate it will bring us; the end, Dewey says, is positive only "in the degree in which it marks the doing-away of the need and conflict that evoked the end-in-view."<sup>12</sup> Thus, valuation is purely remedial. Pleasure, or positive feeling, may result from the achievement of an end, as in Lamb's fable about roast pig which Dewey cites, but it can never be sought or striven for.

Now one of the valid reasons underlying the recent reaction against hedonism would seem to be as follows: Pleasure, as Aristotle saw, accompanies the unimpeded performance of any activity; pain or discomfort results from the thwarting of an activity. Our goals may be set for us by our instinctive nature or by social custom which we adopt and adhere to unreflectingly. Thus, while pleasure results from the activity, it need not be the motive or the goal. Furthermore, in our *reflective* choice of ends, we do not ordinarily seek little discrete units of pleasure *in abstracto*, like beads on a string. We may plan in terms of interests or activities, and the objective means necessary to their attainment. If we organize our interests in harmony with each other and with the world, then a happy or pleasurable life will ordinarily follow.

However, from the falsity of the proposition that we always seek pleasure, it does not follow that we can never seek pleasure. At a crude level of reflection

<sup>10</sup> Malingering without psychically real pain may also be taken, in conjunction with other symptoms, as evidence of a neurosis; but I am informed by qualified persons that the psychiatrist's imputation of genuine neurotic pain is ground for diagnosing a neurosis of a much more acute type.

<sup>11</sup> In the abstract of his paper, "An Empirical Theory of Value," read to the Philosophy of Religion Association as the preceding lecture in this series on "Theory of Value."

<sup>12</sup> *Theory of Valuation*, p. 48.

we can distinguish the affective element in an activity from the other elements, even though we do not hold that it is existentially separable. Thus, although we rarely seek pleasure in the abstract, we can desire things and activities for their pleasurable aspects; and the fact that a thing or activity has been shown by experience to have a pleasurable aspect can serve as a motive for choosing it and as evidence that it is valuable.

Examples of this can be chosen almost at random. There is a kind of "scare" advertising which urges us to buy an article in order to supply a "lack"—i.e., to overcome our unpopularity with the ladies or to keep up with the Joneses. But it is also a maxim of advertising men to create pleasurable associations with the product; hence a source of employment to pretty girls as photographers' models. We can also seek to avoid the painful aspects of experience; this tendency, as well as the convenience of surgeons in performing operations, is a motive for the use of anesthetics.

The excessiveness of the reaction against hedonism may be the result of a cultural neurosis. I am not suggesting that those who hold the position in question are themselves neurotics. Yet it may be that this position gives philosophical expression to the anxiety neurosis which is often asserted to be characteristic of our age and culture. One of the symptoms of this neurosis, according to the psychiatrists of the school of Dr. Karen Horney, is an incapacity for positive enjoyment. The neurotic is a driven creature. He acts compulsively to escape certain "conflicts" and to supply certain "lacks"—the need for prestige, for reassurance through the affection of others, or for the self-sufficiency of withdrawal. And when he gets what he seeks he cannot enjoy it but is hounded by his Furies to

the anxious pursuit of some new "objective" goal.<sup>13</sup>

A less hazardous explanation of the extreme reaction against inner feeling would be based on an awakened social conscience. We are living in a time when many intellectuals not only are becoming aware that a large portion of the human race suffers pitifully from certain lacks and conflicts but are asserting that a modicum of social planning, with the resources at our disposal, would remedy these. Such needs and conflicts are obvious and glaring to all but the most selfish and most insensitive. No great amount of soul-searching is necessary to perceive them; they are, truly, "publicly observable." It is perhaps exclusive attention to the type of situations involved in such problems, which are matters open to public debate, that has led to the theoretical overemphasis on objective factors which I am criticizing.

In conclusion, I should like to suggest the part played by private data in certain types of value judgments. In none of these cases is the evidence asserted to be exclusively private.

1. *Personal valuations.*—Consider the young man who is asking himself: "Should I marry the girl?" There are publicly verifiable matters involved here: the size of the young man's bank account, his ability at his job, the community of interests of the two people concerned, etc. Our friends are often righter than we are in such matters; still, after listening to their advice, we prefer to make our own decisions. For at some phase of deliberation the young man simply "consults his feelings." These feelings are directly accessible to him

<sup>13</sup> Karen Horney, *The Neurotic Personality of Our Time* (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1937) and *New Ways in Psychoanalysis* (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1939).

alone—and he may not have the verbal or histrionic skill to formulate them in words, or otherwise make them public—yet his feelings, as he observes them, are determinants of his judgment and of his action. However fallible they may be, they cannot be omitted from the evidence.

2. *Aesthetic valuations.*—Here, too, there are public factors which recent aesthetic writers have rightly emphasized: the design of the picture, the structure of the sonata, the referents of the poet's metaphors. But a work of art may satisfy all the criteria that we can formulate with regard to such matters and still be frigid or lacking in imaginative freshness and vitality. The affective tone which takes its color from the objective elements is directly accessible only to a person having the aesthetic experience. He may assume a potentially common response in others with the same biological organization and social traditions; yet, if he is honest and not an aesthetic *poseur*, he will not take their reports on their responses as conclusive but will at least suspend judgment.

3. *Political and social valuations.*—Such objective data as statistics on productive capacity and the desires of the people as voiced in Gallup polls and telegrams to their congressmen have their obvious relevance. But people do not always know what they want, and what they want is not always good for them. Hence the statesman, as distinguished from the politician, sometimes has to imagine how they will be affected if a certain measure is passed; and he does so in part by putting himself in the place of the people affected, consulting experimentally his own feelings—and then making allowances for differences in taste. In time of war and social upheaval there may be less need for introspection than

at other times, since the principal needs are patent and unmistakable. However, the most devoted social worker sometimes gives offense by failing to envision the feelings of the people she is trying to help. And the attainment of a juster distribution of economic goods may depend in part upon persuading a certain portion of the educated classes that they will get more inner satisfaction from working for the welfare of others than from pursuit of the wherewithal to obtain prestige, personal power, and gadgets.

4. *The choice between value patterns.*—The key term in current "objective" theories of valuation is "co-ordination" or "integration." Yet co-ordination of interests is possible on several different levels. Even Hitler has his *Gleichschaltung*. One consideration is the quality of the inner experience that accompanies each of the alternative life-patterns. The classic expression of this is in Plato's Vision of Er. The soul about to be reincarnated is offered a choice between "samples" which show the objective status and fortunes possible to him in his next existence. Whether he will choose wisely depends upon his capacity to compare, on the basis of his past observation and reflection, the inner states that accompany the lots of the tyrant and the just man.

It should not be necessary to argue the magnitude of the ethical discovery made by such figures as Jeremiah, Socrates, and Jesus when they pointed to the importance of inner experience. These thinkers, indeed, did not limit themselves to contemplation of their inner experience alone, for they were keenly aware of their objective acts and of those of the persons around them. But whether we consider the blazing fire that Jeremiah felt within his bones as the voice of Je-

hovah or the dawn of introspective consciousness of the "generalized other," and however metaphorically we may interpret Socrates' mission to call men to the "tendance of the soul," here was the most radical transvaluation of values and the source of all subsequent transvaluations.

In our day we are committed to the public methods of scientific verification so far as they will carry us, and that we are formulating this principle explicitly as a requisite of the good life is one of our greatest philosophical achievements and

itself a major transvaluation of values. We could not return, even if we wished, to the soul-searching of the Middle Ages or to the *recherche du moi* of Montaigne's Renaissance as a complete ethos. Yet this does not mean that we must ignore the delicate nuances of inner experience which can be attended to when wars and social crises leave us time for concern with the subtler personal and moral values. It is they which can point us to the kind of life that is worth working and fighting for.

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## DISCUSSION

### REFLECTIONS ON THE STRENGTH AND WEAKNESS OF THOMISM<sup>1</sup>

CHARLES HARTSHORNE

THE familiar contention that the existence of evil contradicts the perfection of God, either as to power or as to benevolence, is refuted or at least shown not to be conclusive—by Maritain's little book and even better by W. R. Thompson's essay on Providence (in *The Maritain Volume of The Thomist*, most of the remaining essays in which will be discussed presently). This essay is also recommended to those who see no force in the argument from design. These authors do not, indeed—and I believe as Thomists could not—make quite as clear as it can be made what is erroneous in the contention referred to; for example, its failure to take account of the *social* nature of "power," the perfect or divine instance of which will involve the most adequate toleration of the power and responsibility appropriate to lesser beings. Still, they do show that any possible created world must as such be limited and contain evils and that if God had avoided such evils as result from creaturely freedom, the greater goods of such freedom would also have been denied existence. The chief difficulty with the traditional doctrine lies elsewhere than in the problem of evil. It lies in the assertion that God is absolutely perfect and complete, not only in power and benevolence but in every respect whatever, including joy or happiness; that he is in every way absolute, necessary, immutable. This doctrine makes creation a self-contradictory idea, regardless of what evils the world may or may not contain. I shall mention some of the many ways in

which this can be shown, since Thomists seem persistently to ignore or give evasive answers to them. (I stand ready to give instances of such ignoring or evasion.)

First, to ascribe *all* possible value, "absolute perfection," in all aspects, to God, while ascribing *some* value, however slight, to the creatures, of whose existence God is wholly independent (as his absoluteness requires), is to contradict one's self. For, if God, taken in abstraction from (or in his independence of) our existence, has all possible value, then to abstract from our existence is to abstract from no possible value—our existence is simply valueless. Reality as consisting of the wholly and absolutely perfect and also of the imperfect is no more (how could it be more?) than reality as consisting of the perfect alone. So the imperfect is just nothing! No matter how little evil or how much good the world contained, it would be evident that *a sheerly absolute being could not increase reality as consisting of itself and therefore could not create.*

Second, according to Thomism (and most traditional theology), God knows as existent things which might not have existed. Now things cannot be truly known to exist unless they do exist. Had we, for example, not existed, God *would not have known us as existent* but only as possible. Therefore, *something in God, his knowledge that we exist, might not have been, and thus God has accidental as well as essential being*, contrary to his supposed pure absoluteness. The only escape, or seeming escape, is to deny that God's knowledge of our actuality is contained in his being. How, then, is it "his" knowledge? Just what step in the argument will Thomists reject? I have tried in

<sup>1</sup> Suggested by Jacques Maritain's *Saint Thomas and the Problem of Evil: The Aquinas Lecture* (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1942), and by *The Maritain Volume of The Thomist*, Vol. V (New York: Sheed & Ward, 1943).

vain to find out. Thomists either merely reject the conclusion or quarrel with some premise which they wrongly imagine the argument involves.

Third, God is said to will the good in the world, and as absolute he must indeed possess the perfection of volition. But sometimes less good than might have been results, as when men disobey God's "will," that is, in this case, his preference. Now, when a preferred result fails to occur, there is (by the very meaning of preferred) less satisfaction to the preferrer than there might be had the preferred result obtained. Hence, to say that God is totally free from dissatisfaction or sorrow, that he always achieves absolute or maximal satisfaction, is to say that he has no wishes, preferences, or purposes toward us. Really he is just *neutral to what we do with our freedom, indifferently full of value, satisfied, perfect, regardless of our acts*. That such a view should ask and be given credit for representing the God of love of the New Testament is a bitter irony of history. To love means to take the joy of another as occasion of one's own joy, his sorrow as occasion of one's own sorrow. The Thomistic God has no sorrow, only joy—and this joy owes nothing to ours. Of course, if God is taken, via the incarnation, as identical with the human Jesus, then he does sorrow, but by definition he is then not the Thomistic God. For either sorrow is in the divine being or it is not: either Jesus *as God* is dissatisfied, and then Thomism is false, or he is dissatisfied only as man, and then the sense in which he is God is irrelevant to the question, "Does God love the creatures?" So when Mr. Osborne tells us that, owing to the incarnation, there is "proportional equality" and so the possibility of friendship, between man and God, we must insist either that the divine being is not purely absolute or that there is no equality, or any relationship at all, between the divine and the human.

I am deeply convinced that no cogent answer to these objections is possible, and, just as long as the objections are ignored or evasively treated, I will see in this fact ad-

ditional evidence that they are unanswerable. I believe we have here a classical case of really hopeless philosophical difficulty.

Does it follow that the rich spiritual values which the authors before us find in Thomism are founded on absurdity and illusion? I answer, "No," but neither are they founded on Thomism as it stands. They are based, and really based, on some of the Thomistic tenets, but these are logically independent of the doctrine of sheer absoluteness. The latter doctrine is never really applied but only certain of its corollaries, which might better be detached and asserted as corollaries of a different doctrine, lacking in the absurdities partly pointed out above. This preferable doctrine is that God is indeed absolute but not in absolutely all respects. To say, for example, that God is completely righteous and understanding toward all that exists does not in the least, as I have shown elsewhere,<sup>2</sup> imply that he is also complete or absolute in the satisfaction with which he views their actions and fortunes. Even if you add that he is absolute in power, an absolute quantum or sheer perfection of satisfaction still does not follow. For, as Thomists rightly insist, the highest level of creative power results in the existence of free beings to whom is left some initiative of action. Just to this extent the outcome of the divine creation must be left indeterminate by omnipotence, and this means that the satisfaction with which divine contemplation views the outcome must be left also indeterminate. Denial that this is so does not derive from the concepts of perfect righteousness or power or wisdom,<sup>3</sup> but from the assumption of all-round absoluteness—absoluteness asserted in every aspect or absolutely, absoluteness

<sup>2</sup> A promise of the demonstration is that perfect knowledge is of things as they are, actualities as actual, potentialities as potential; future events, being (for all one can show from the mere idea of perfect knowledge) nonactual objectively, will be known only as potencies by God. See my *Man's Vision of God and the Logic of Theism* (Chicago: Willett, Clark, 1941), chap. ii.

<sup>3</sup> Unless combined with the doubtful doctrine that future events are actualities.

to the second power so to speak. There is not a paragraph in the books before us, I believe, in which what operates to yield cultural or religious or philosophical values (and they are abundantly to be met with) is absoluteness to the second power, or as exclusive of all relativity. Nor is "absolute satisfaction" a genuine religious conception. No being who loves others can, and therefore no being should, enjoy absolute satisfaction. It is the property or pseudo-property which at most one, and therefore not even one, could have. For existence is essentially social. (A knower as such may be absolute though those he knows are more or less ignorant; but whoever is free of unhappiness while others are not happy is on a low, not a high, level of happiness.)

It may, however, appear logically impossible that a being should be absolute in some respects but less than absolute in others. However, it is not a question of "less than absolute." For we have just seen that in one aspect of value, namely, happiness or satisfaction or joy, an absolute is nonsense, that is, nonentity, and even the smallest degree of happiness is more than nonentity. Moreover, that God's happiness is not absolute does not put it in the same class with ordinary relative happinesses. For relativity is a genus with two radically different species, a truth neglected by nearly all philosophy until recently, and still widely ignored. Relativity (nonmaximality of value) of the ordinary or inferior kind is involved when an individual is in some respect such that it can be surpassed by other individuals, actual or possible, and such that it can itself degenerate, pass to a lower level. The higher type of relativity, which I call reflexive transcendence or transcendent relativity, is possessed in a given respect by an individual which, in that respect, surpasses all other individuals, actual or possible, and can also surpass itself as an individual but can never degenerate to a lower level. Such an individual would not be on the highest level of value possible (a highest level being, in the given respect, nonsense);

but it would be on a higher level than is possible for any individual except itself. And it would be incorruptible though not in every sense unchangeable. Evil change, change for the worse, would be excluded; but good change, change for the better, would not. (There might be suffering, but only as outweighed by happiness, and the net happiness would increase.) That there can be change without corruption is no more illogical than the sound Thomistic doctrine that God has good but never evil purposes. If an exalted form of purpose, incapable of wickedness, is possible, why not an exalted form of change, incapable of decrease in value or of being surpassed except by a later stage of itself? Naturally, a being who changes simply as we change is corruptible, just as a being who purposes simply as we purpose is not infallibly righteous. But that our form of change is the only conceivable one is no more self-evident than that our form of purpose is the only conceivable one. These problems in their full generality seem not, in all these six and a half centuries, to have dawned on the Thomistic mind, in which respect it exhibits the common human tendency to "halt at an arbitrary set of abstractions" or to take a striking generalization for an uttermost one, a first approximation for absolute accuracy. The Thomistic doctrine of analogical rather than univocal concepts can and should be extended to apply to time and relativity.

Similar remarks would be in order concerning the Thomistic idea of substance. Professor Yves Simon has no difficulty in showing that Maritain has made a significant contribution to the philosophy of science. What he has not shown is that this contribution is logically dependent upon the whole Thomistic substance-matter-form doctrine. Only certain elements in this doctrine really function in Maritain's discussion, and these elements would be even more useful in a different total context. Aristotelianism, for example, not only lacked an atomic theory and a cell theory in its science; it lacked also in its philosophy

the categories which can most consistently and powerfully interpret these theories. It not only was not a "cell theory" of reality (Whitehead), it was an anticell theory. You can "reconcile" this with the scientific facts, but you would be better off with a philosophy that required no such *ad hoc* revisions of its first principles. Besides, the cell structure—organism within organism—of reality is no merely scientific or contingent fact but a philosophical and theological first principle, as Plato divined and recent metaphysics has clearly shown (Fechner, Varisco, Whitehead, etc.).

Yet Thomistic writings have high value, because they defend so many indispensable philosophical tenets which have often been omitted from modern systems. In *The Maritain Volume* Thomism is rightly praised because it avoids the inadequacies of positivism, materialism, atheism, idealism (in a sense in which this doctrine is now nearly extinct), hedonism, etc. What is overlooked is that during the last hundred years there has appeared a new type of metaphysics (Fechner, Peirce, Varisco, Montague, Whitehead, Pratt, etc.) which is likewise free of such one-sidednesses but which is also free of certain inoperative and really inconsistent elements of Thomism. Of course, the representatives of this new metaphysics do not wholly agree and are not all equal in the clarity and adequacy with which they expound the various aspects of the new doctrine. But collectively they do furnish an alternative to classical metaphysics, materialism, positivism, and idealism in the usual sense, alike. To ignore this alternative is no longer legitimate.

Professor Mortimer Adler, in a heroic attack upon the problem of proving God, finds no valid traditional proof and admits that his own proof requires a premise whose self-evidence is not clear to him. (I believe he has since satisfied himself on this point.) Since Adler is willing to re-examine the proofs for God, he might be urged to re-examine the concept of God as well. Surely there was less to prevent thinkers from freely and arduously exploring for possible

proofs than for possible concepts or definitions of the religious object, since novelty of concept was much more likely than novelty of proof to be condemned out of hand as heresy or absurdity. It seems likely that the older proofs are about what the older concepts admit of, and that essentially better proofs must be such as lead to better conceptions of the nature as well as of the existence of God.

In some of the essays emphasis is upon ethical and political aspects and applications of Thomism. Professor Francis E. McMahon, with his usual boldness and forthright clarity, establishes the legitimacy of the idea of international justice, the "specific act" of which, he well says, like the specific acts of other forms of social justice, is the formation and reformation of institutions. Professor Gerald B. Phelan discusses justice and friendship, showing how Aristotle denied the possibility of friendship between radical unequals such as God and man, whereas Thomists see in the "proportional equality" grounded in the incarnation the ground of amity between men and God and of a universal proportional amity among men. Related ideas are found in Professor J. C. Osborne's "Theological Ingredients of Peace." (That the complete denial of accidents and relativity to God is compatible with such ideas, still less that it is required by them, is naturally not shown.)

Daniel Sargent gives an interesting account of the affinity between Dante's way of seeing the world and the Thomistic. Three of the essays are by "outsiders" and do not deal with Thomism. President R. M. Hutchins gives a somewhat caustic, but documented, account of Edmund Burke's theory of oligarchy. This essay may surprise those who think of Mr. Hutchins as hostile to democratic ideas. President Louis Finkelstein explains how in Judaism dogma is essentially activist, a command directed toward conduct rather than a verbal picture of reality. Professor John U. Nef, in "Art in France and England, 1540-1640," shows how the industrial revolution hampered the



plastic arts in England and how economic and other factors enabled France to maintain a much higher level in painting and architecture. Professor Nef, when, as in this essay, he avoids venturing into the field of the prophet (or the scold), is a remarkable cultural historian.

As with Russia, so with the Roman church and its philosophy, we cannot safely pretend that it is not there, nor can we deal with it by either mere hostility or the method of flattery. The Romanists are right to be suspicious of "modern thought," for it has been guilty of many absurdities; but it is nonetheless a tragic instance of collective self-flattery when proponents of medieval doctrines imagine that the revolt from those doctrines was due essentially to perversity or to the merely scientific weaknesses of medieval culture. It was due also to basic philosophical and theological errors

in that culture. Let Thomists come forth and face the arguments of twentieth-century metaphysics at its best and thus do their part in overcoming the mutual isolationism which has too long obtained, and from which both sides have suffered harm. It is true, as Professor Middleton says, that there is insufficient metaphysical "meditation" in America. It is another question whether the way to encourage it is to refuse to revise those features in medieval metaphysics which have done so much to discredit metaphysics as such and to which a more intelligible (and in Thomas' time unformulated) alternative is now available. Yet to have held out so long and well against the unintelligible alternatives produced in modern times remains an honor and a service for which the need has not even yet passed.

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

## BOOK REVIEWS

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ONE WORLD. By Wendell Willkie. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1943. Pp. 86. \$1.00 paper; \$2.00 cloth.

Of all the remarks of Thomas Jefferson, none strikes me more forcibly than this, as today we face toward peace from abysmal war: "As members, therefore, of the universal society of mankind, and standing in high and responsible relation with them, it is our sacred duty to suppress passions among ourselves, and not to blast the confidence we have inspired of proof that a government of reason is better than one of force."

### I

Of this saying, and of many another of Jefferson's, I was reminded in reading Mr. Wendell Willkie's *One World*. There is in it the same aspiration for unity, on the basis of reasonableness and equality; there is a similar calmness of faith in the resources of humanity to ameliorate its condition; and there is in both men an identical ego-reliance so deep and unself-conscious as to transcend egotism, to substitute for aggression in the outer attitude, and to constitute for both a sort of personal religion, dependable in action and sufficient for contemplation.

Nor does the analogy end with generalities. Willkie's sole book is a travelogue, praised above peerage by superior reporters of our time. So in its way was Jefferson's only book, *Notes on Virginia*, praised by all observers from his day to ours throughout the earth. Both men have, in form robust and insatiable, the instinct of inquiry, a natural curiosity unterrified and unquenchable. The result is that both of them see *things*, and so can, as Justice Holmes so sagely recommends, "think things." They can both see *persons*, rather than merely themselves reflected from the mirror-like retinas of other eyes. Seeing persons, they can themselves be seen and liked of men. Rarely combining this vision of body and mind (clairvoyance), they can both disclose realities without prejudice and always in the unembarrassed atmosphere of a human living more ideal than any yet achieved. Thus accoutered, they both prophesy without preaching, and both inspire without effervescing. There is a wondrous eloquence issuing from elemental things, and of all eloquent elementals

none is more so than a man modest in his environment but self-sufficient in his essence.

Nor yet does the analogy end with these more concrete similarities. It reaches into the recesses of motivation and emerges as devotion to "the spiritual life," as distinct from any parts thereof, such as religion, philosophy, science, art. Nothing more, nothing less, is the intent of these men than enhancement of the spiritual life of mankind. Liberty was Jefferson's eidolon, not only in the bravest of verbal gestures against "every form of tyranny over the mind of man," but also in complete tolerance for ideological fecundity and at last in an untamed joy in the wildest fruits of freedom. Who knows of a man in our own time that more than Mr. Willkie is transparently a devotee of liberty? It may be true, indeed, that he does not yet know what freedom can mean in content. Neither, for that matter, does any other man, save as he learns it by careful observation of what's possible, what not, as he goes along in responsible participation.

The least, however, that can be asked of a great man is that he should love above life itself the ideal of freedom. That may not prepare his pilgrim feet for the thorny paths of patient participation in progress. But nothing else can, and that often does. Liberty is Mr. Willkie's god. He imbibed it with his mother's milk and from his father's grateful acceptance of this new homeland. Whatever conduces to liberty is an element in the spiritual pilgrimage of mankind. Whatever annuls it or impairs it cancels Willkie's admiration and releases him from obligation. To a famous cleric giving sanctimonious shroud to motives inhumane, thus crucifying the spiritual life upon the cross of religion, Mr. Willkie once bared the breast of the knight-errant he is: he did not have to be president, he said; but he did have to live the rest of his life with himself. Let the votes go elsewhere! That takes courage of inner freedom, or right self-forgetfulness, which is courage seasoned with beauty. To the press who would make him a political farmer for the sake of votes, Mr. Willkie replied that he was, and demanded that he be made, "only a conversational farmer."

A self-respect that does not require or even relish the rewards of a double self is the inner

meaning of a free spirit and the outer guaranty, so far as the inner can ever guarantee the outer, of a freer and juster world. Mr. Willkie may be "the barefooted boy of Wall Street." So, also, was Jefferson the barefooted boy of more than a half-hundred thousand acres of rich Virginia land. But since there is such a grace as freedom, there are bound to be those who will love her. If only those who lack her, love her—then lovers become impotents—if not, indeed, lackeys. When those who love her, love her for the fullness they have found in her, then mankind discovers its leaders, and human progress achieves through them its substantial instrumentalities.

## II

Such leaders, being, as Mr. John Dewey says of Jefferson, "the most universal" as human beings, make cosmopolitanism infectious. By their vitality and their reality-sense, they enter us provincials into the cosmic "double-or-nothing" competition of human insight and generosity.

I have not myself, for instance, been to Russia; but I have now, nevertheless, shyly smiled in the Kremlin to hear Joseph Stalin, your friend and mine, say to Wendell Willkie, my friend and yours: "Mr. Willkie, you know I grew up a Georgian peasant. I am unschooled in pretty talk. All I can say is I like you very much." While that remark might in countries less enlightened than our own prove an epitaph for a very large political tombstone, a free man would not be deterred by that. In our enlightened land it does, as a minimum, furnish atmosphere ideal for swallowing the blunt one-two-three reality of Willkie's subsequent conclusion:

First, Russia is an effective society. It works. It has survival value. . . . Second, Russia is our ally in this war. The Russians, more sorely tested by Hitler's might even than the British, have met the test magnificently. . . . Third, we must work with Russia after the war. At least it seems to me that there can be no continued peace unless we learn to do so.

Again, I have not myself been to China; but I have now, nevertheless, in masculine enchantment with feminine grace early deserted a party-of-state on a lovely lawn in Chungking to go inside and laugh-and-chin-and-kid-and-talk with the Soong Sisters Three until so late that not a one of us knew what o'clock it was or even stopped to care for the clock or apologize for deserting the party. I stood there by Willkie's

side while we together persuaded Mme Chiang to come to America on a mission that has already cut the fat from our hearts and reduced the Pacific Ocean by half. Indeed, after so much friendliness I can swallow the anti-provincial words of bluntness to keep cordiality from turning mean:

We must be prepared to fulfill the obligations of an ally. These obligations will include economic cooperation and present military help. But they will also include the obligations to understand the Chinese and their problems. Chinese faith in noble phrases and protestations is wearing a little thin.

I have myself never been inside the motivation of a capitalist or within the cranium of a dialectical materialist. Nor do I know how the twain shall meet. Yet I have heard Vice-President Wallace say that they must meet or else we will have a third world war. I heard that and almost saw what he meant, but I did not feel it. But when Mr. Willkie took me to see the Soviet factory superintendent who gets, as he would get in America, some \$25,000 a year, but who would not think of investing it to make money off money, which is wrong, I began to feel something which later I fully felt when Willkie's own "capitalist" pilot fired this parting shot:

"Listen, don't let's get away before you explain to that fellow that Mr. Willkie was just trying to get him to talk. Sure, we in America like what money will buy and want to get ahead a bit, but it's not only money that makes us work. This insignia on my shoulder brought me a big raise in pay when I got it. But at the same time I got this piece of ribbon here," pointing to the Distinguished Flying Cross, "and that didn't bring me a cent. You tell him that I'd give the rank and the pay raise back for nothing, but I wouldn't give away the ribbon for a million dollars."

The fact that Mr. Willkie takes me to Russia with him, lets me go into that factory, and permits me to overhear that conversation *without his adding to it a single word of rebuttal, explanation, or exculpation*—this it is which makes provincial me able at last without a shudder to listen to this amazing American "capitalist" declare:

Many among the democracies fear and mistrust Soviet Russia. . . . Such fear is weakness. Russia is neither going to eat us nor seduce us. . . . I don't know the answers to all the questions about Russia, but there's one thing I know: that such a force, such a power, such a people . . . cannot be bypassed in any future world . . . cannot be ignored or disposed of with a high hat or a lifting of the skirt. . . . Russia will be reckoned with. . . . No one could be

more opposed to the Communist doctrine than I am, for I am completely opposed to any system that leads to absolutism. But I have never understood why it should be assumed that in any possible contact between Communism and democracy, democracy should go down. . . . I believe it possible for Russia and America, perhaps the most powerful countries in the world, to work together for the economic welfare and the peace of the world. . . . And so deep is my faith in the fundamental rightness of our free economic and political institutions that I am convinced they will survive any such working together.

### III

It is this faith in himself and this consequent lack of fear for our system that enables Mr. Willkie to do for America from the world what Jefferson did for the world from America. Jefferson made Virginia and its continental environment look so good to peoples everywhere that they once more lifted believing and hopeful eyes to their world. America, thanks to Jefferson and his kind, became first the *hope* of the world and then the hope of the *world*. Jefferson, largely unaware of himself, never doubted that America was the guide of mankind in paths of political reason, but neither did he doubt that mankind is worth guiding and capable of being guided toward, ever toward, "perfectibility."

Across the years, that double faith comes to articulation again in another so robustly self-confident as to be largely unaware of himself in his travels and observations. He goes from America but to return to America and for America, so that where he has been we may through intimate feeling be also. He says:

America is like a beleaguered city that lives within high walls through which there passes only an occasional courier to tell us what is happening outside. I have been outside those walls. And I have found that nothing outside is exactly what it seems to those within.

So he brings us back this warning: *The world is in ferment, and we can no longer safely stand alone or even possibly stand aside.* He brings us back this hope: *The world trusts us, but the sands in the hourglass of patient trust are running out.* He brings us back this faith: *Standing together in war, so that they may be individuals once more in peace, men may yet make of Fate their own fulfilment—fulfilment in the ageless but glorious vocation of what Jefferson has well called the "ilimitable freedom of the human mind."*

T. V. SMITH

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RELIGION, SCIENCE AND SOCIETY IN THE MODERN WORLD. By Alexander D. Lindsay. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1943. Pp. 6+73. \$1.50.

This little volume contains the latest series of Terry Lectures, given at Yale University, by the distinguished author, the master of Balliol. The three "chapters" deal respectively with religion, science, and power in their relation to freedom. They are essentially sermons, or a sermon in three parts—perhaps one should specify "university sermons." As examples of this class, they are so excellent that one feels a sense of impropriety in turning the cold gaze of critical scrutiny upon their factual and logical content. However, since it is probably from this latter point of view that most readers of this journal will be interested in the book, the reviewer feels compelled to say that, although they breathe the spirit of sweetness and light, the amount of actual illumination they shed on the problems suggested by the title seems to him small. This is in spite, further, of the historical erudition to be expected from the author and a due proportion of penetrating observations.

In so far as the book has a theme, in the intellectual sense, it is to be found in the relation between freedom and order, or unity, in society and the bearing of religion and science upon this relationship, which is, of course, troubling everyone who is seriously concerned about our culture. Although at the outset the author views with revulsion the proposal that modern civilization should go back seven centuries, beyond "Cartesian man" to Thomas Aquinas, his own thesis seems to be that our task is to get back three centuries, to the time of Descartes, the age of the "Puritanism of the left," particularly as it was exemplified in the New World. In the familiar religious vein the problem is seen as one of restoration (p. 59):

The great adventure [of modern free society] is at an end unless we can recreate the conditions which first made it possible, can heal the divisions in our industrial society, break down the walls of misunderstanding which divide us and regain that unity of spirit which makes freedom possible.

Only a few pages earlier, in the same lecture (p. 51), it was made clear that the essential condition of the early unity was the existence of the frontier, with abundant "room," physical and sociological. So this is the condition we must get back to! The last lecture, on "Power and Freedom," is particularly disappointing as in-

tellectual analysis. The statement that "freedom needs power" is true enough, rightly interpreted; power must be added to freedom to make it effective. But the interpretation given here, that power is a part of freedom, is mere intellectual confusion—with all due respect to the numerous writers who have harped upon it in recent years, with the best of intentions, of course. At the end, by way of "getting straight this matter of the true relation between power and freedom" (p. 64), we are given a quotation of a page and a half from Kierkegaard on the way God works. And the final word is a quotation from the poetry of William Vaughn Moody. However, these observations are hardly to be taken as criticism, in view of the excellence of the book in the character the author designed it to have.

FRANK H. KNIGHT

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GREEK FOUNDATIONS OF TRADITIONAL LOGIC.  
By Ernst Kapp. New York: Columbia University Press, 1942. Pp. viii+95.

Dr. Kapp undertakes in this book to reconsider "the ancient foundations of traditional logic with respect to the four main topics . . . concepts, judgments, syllogisms, and induction" (p. 84). In the brief compass of five chapters he has examined a number of problems and succeeded in illuminating many obscure points. The first chapter discusses the origin of logic and states the main thesis of the book, namely, that it emerged from a particular kind of "philosophic exercise," which is dialectic as a method of question and answer. Emphasis is laid on the importance of recognizing the priority of the *Topics* as the work in which we can find the beginning of Aristotle's logical theory. The fourth chapter, dealing with syllogisms, continues this argument. The main point which Dr. Kapp makes is that Aristotle started from the Socratic basis, "the new educational invention of syllogistical training," and evolved out of this the formal structure of the syllogism as it appears in the *Analytics*. From this exposition come two interesting results. First, the real object of the syllogistical procedure is to find the premises which are implied in a given judgment, or, in other words, the latent reasons by which a disputant would defend an assertion. In view of the constantly repeated attacks on the syllogism as exhibiting nothing "new" in the conclusion,

it is satisfactory to have this interpretation carefully established. The syllogism belongs primarily to the sphere of debate and clarifies the implications of judgments. The fact that it may have an empirical content and may be a statement of natural causes is secondary and does not convert it into an instrument of discovery. The second result is that there occurs a gap between the earlier conception of the dialectical syllogism and the view of the syllogism as the form of strict logical connection, so abstract that the terms can be represented by letters and "the definition of the syllogism suddenly appears like a mathematical problem, solvable, at least partly, independently of experience."

The final chapter on induction further illustrates the careful manner in which Dr. Kapp interprets the texts. The common tendency to contrast deduction and induction as the way from and the way to universal propositions, respectively, is only partly justified by the Greek origins. The Latin term ("induction") is probably responsible for some distortion of the original conception of this process, which was predominantly, if not exclusively, the process of testing a generic proposition by reference to the specific cases on which it claimed to be based. Certainly the attribution of the inductive process to Socrates by Aristotle establishes this meaning of the term; but it must be admitted that no clear distinction is made between applying the universal to the particulars, extracting the universal from the particulars, and leading the mind up from sense-data to intelligible principles.

It is not possible to do more than draw attention to the chapters in which Dr. Kapp discusses other topics, mainly the traditional themes of logic, such as definitions, ideas, categories, judgments. Even such a large subject as the Platonic doctrine about "ideas" is illuminated by some judicious remarks in which he dismisses the perverse originality of Stenzel's views. Throughout the book there run two thoughts which deserve comment. One is the basic theme of the relation between the logic of the present day (in so far as it is "traditional") and the original Greek doctrine: the other is the variety of the possible approaches to the study of thought—the psychological, the grammatical, the dialectical, and the metaphysical. All these have in diverse ways obtruded themselves into expositions of logic: one of Dr. Kapp's aims is to show how and why Aristotle escaped these snares and "was able to teach surprisingly pure

logic." This is in all respects an admirable study of technical points which call for strict fidelity to evidence, for on the right or wrong determination of their significance depend many later theories and long periods in the history of ideas.

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G. S. BRETT

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A REALISTIC PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION. By A. Campbell Garnett. Chicago, New York: Willett, Clark & Co., 1942. Pp. xii+326. \$3.00.

The writer of a textbook may give either his own ideas or those of other writers. If he gives his own ideas, then either he is a great thinker or his thoughts are mediocre. And, it may be asked, why not offer students the best, since they will seldom read very much more than the amount of material which the textbook—alas seldom brief!—contains? Most teachers cannot be great minds; all the more reason for students to save their reading time for the great authors. If the textbook writer reports on the ideas of others, then he is in danger of trivializing them through summaries too brief to be informative or of saying at length what the original author has already said better. Especially is this likely in philosophy, where the adequate expression of ideas is really the main difficulty, philosophy being the clarification by men of genius of what all men know, or at least obscurely feel, as the pervasive aspects of existence. Of course, in writing a "text," one can employ extensive quotations (and annotated anthologies are probably best of all). Or one may be, if not a great thinker, at least a near-great one. Further, some would argue that the average mediocre student can learn best from a mind which is well above, but not too far above, his own level and which is definitely trying to bridge the gap. These considerations, together with the difficulty of otherwise providing adequate library facilities, may establish a case for philosophy textbooks, though I suspect that most of them had better not have been published.

Garnett's book is either the best type of textbook or something better than a textbook. It reports much work done by others and reports it admirably, and it also presents a coherent and distinctive view of religion in all its main aspects. This view I regard as penetrating and wise, and the author gives careful justification for it. Religion is man's experience of a disinterested will to the good of all, this will being im-

manent in every man but somehow distinct from his own will, which is often far from disinterested. The view that the disinterested will is merely the highest aspect of the human will is rejected on grounds derived from the religious experience itself. Thus the divine transcendence is regarded as an empirically given fact, along with the divine immanence. The "empirical theology" so popular in our time is here excellently represented. Modern anthropological and psychological researches are richly marshaled to illuminate the theme. The ethical bearings of religion, particularly its relations to social problems and social justice, are clarified. Thus it is religion, as concrete and practical, that is made prominent. Yet the metaphysical and cosmological aspects are also indicated, in outline; and no speculative possibilities are cut off except such as have no legitimate basis in religious experience—for example, theological determinism, which contradicts the partial conflict of wills, human versus divine, so conspicuous in religious phenomena. As Garnett points out, Nicolai Hartmann's assumption that religious or theistic teleology must be absolute, deterministic, or nothing is quite erroneous.

The book excels in reasonableness of temper and fairness toward authors critically examined—for example, Dewey and Wieman. Perhaps the liberal optimism, the stress upon human potentialities for good, is not fully balanced by awareness of the tragic depths and unquenchableness of the springs of human evil. (Niebuhr receives only a footnote.) Perhaps, too, the book leaves room for a greater emphasis upon metaphysics (as in Tsanoff's *Religious Crossroads*). Yet for most students today Garnett's approach is probably what is needed. "Religious illiteracy," that dangerous failure of our education, can no longer be excused on the ground that we do not know how to present the content of religion objectively and rationally. As in the best presentations of such subjects as history and sociology, this book neither omits nor craftily insinuates its author's convictions but frankly states and defends them in relation to the principal available alternatives. No book in this field that I know of so combines clarity and relative simplicity with critical fairness, argumentative soundness, and penetrating insight into the main problems of religion. There is an eloquent statement of specifically Christian doctrines in the Epilogue, but elsewhere it is the most universal elements of the higher religions that are chiefly considered. The care with

which this distinction is made is an example of the author's fair-mindedness, his awareness of the variety of doctrines held by intelligent and sincere human beings.

If students are to look to any one book for light upon this subject, I hope it will be to this book; and I am sure that their teachers will profit by reading it. Such books, whatever else they are, may be viewed as reports upon teaching methods. The teaching methods herein exhibited are admirable.

CHARLES HARTSHORNE

*University of Chicago*

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THE GREEK HISTORIANS. Edited by Francis R. B. Godolphin. 2 vols. New York: Random House, 1942. Pp. xxxviii+1001; 964. \$5.00.

Mr. Godolphin has assembled in these two convenient volumes a valuable collection of translations which are otherwise unavailable at the price at which they are offered in this edition. It is one of the best efforts of Random House, in this particular line, up to date—partly, doubtless, because of Mr. Godolphin's pains and industry in selecting good translations and partly, perhaps, because it happens that there is a number of first-class translations of the Greek historians available and with copyrights expired. This has not been so with several other of Random House publications of translations of the classics, notably in the case of their edition of the complete Greek drama. Rawlinson's *Herodotus*, Jowett's *Thucydides*, and Kenyon's *Constitution of Athens* are all standard versions; and, although the classical scholar may, out of individual preference, captiousness, or perversity, dislike this or that aspect of these translations—and which of us does not?—on the whole they represent their authors in English with respectability, at least. Mr. Godolphin is also to be commended for the inclusion of some works, not strictly histories but contributing much to our understanding of various periods of Greek history, which should not go unnoticed in such a study as this publication should stimulate. Such, for instance, are the Behistun inscriptions of Darius, translated by Rawlinson, and the *Ways and Means* of Xenophon and the *Old Oligarch*, both translated by Dakyns. The whole aims at providing the reader not only with some typical Greek historians but with the greater bulk of such historical material as is

available to enable him to know and pass judgment on all the main phases of Greek history from before the Persian Wars down to the time of Alexander. It is an exceedingly well-planned and carefully executed job.

In his Introduction Mr. Godolphin tries to provide some background material for each of his historians and, to a lesser extent, for each of the documents translated. His Prelude includes some discussion of what history meant to the Greeks—or rather to certain Greek historians—in contrast with what it means today—or rather, should we say?—to what it means to some people today. In this section there are very many judgments with which this reviewer would disagree, but perhaps the shortage of space at Mr. Godolphin's disposal and an inevitable cutting of the Gordian knots of doubt and subtlety in a work like this are to blame for a certain feeling of disappointment at seeing so many of the old chestnuts of criticism reappear. For instance, would many of those who have studied Herodotus with care feel happy at a statement like the following, which Mr. Godolphin makes about that historian's account of the meeting of Croesus and Solon?

Even in antiquity it was known that the meeting of the two was chronologically impossible. Herodotus ought to have known this if he had a modern historian's conception of the necessity for an investigation of evidence. . . . Quite possibly he did know it, but this meeting was so well adapted to the reflections he wished to introduce on the subject of the mutability of human life and divine retribution that he felt under no obligation to respect the fact that the meeting was impossible. As a result he has written an interesting passage which cannot qualify as history in the sense that Herodotus intended it to be history despite its importance for other reasons.

I suggest that this is somewhat of a circular argument, since it is assumed that the sense in which Herodotus intended the incident to be history is a certain, now fairly common, pseudo-scientific conception of history, to which Mr. Godolphin himself elsewhere objects. But perhaps the very disregard of chronology involved is itself a mark of a different sort of history, and certainly this is a point of view which should be investigated before it is tacitly assumed that Herodotus' sense of what is history and what is not is the same as ours, with certain unfortunate deviations where the Greek did not measure up to our exact standards. Similarly, the condemnation of much of Herodotus' account as due to "systematic error in a form which today we can

easily isolate and make allowance for" seems a trifle bland and complacent. It is a very obvious point of view and, frankly, seems to disregard the astonishing historical power and, in a deep sense, truth which Herodotus' writing reveals; and this, surely, must be rooted in a philosophy not so easily to be dismissed as Mr. Godolphin

indicates. These two examples are, unfortunately, only two out of very many that could have been selected.

The edition is finely printed and admirably put out.

DAVID GRENE

*University of Chicago*

### SHORTER NOTICES

**CIVILIZATION.** By George P. Adams, William R. Dennes, Stephen C. Pepper. ("University of California Publications in Philosophy," Vol. XXIII.) Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1942. Pp. 190. \$2.00.

*Civilization* is the twenty-third volume of the "University of California Publications in Philosophy." It is composed of essays from the pens of six members of the University of California Department of Philosophy, and one by V. F. Lenzen, a member of the physics department in that institution.

Despite its title, the volume is made up of essays on somewhat disparate topics. Lenzen, the physicist, discusses "Science and Social Context." Pepper treats of "The Conditions of Social Control." Adams concerns himself with "The Idea of Civilization." McKay, in one of the better essays, discusses the question of "Organization and Freedom." Strong, in a somewhat stilted manner, writes on "Civilization in Perspective." Melden, under the title, "Judgments in the Social Sciences," directs some criticisms at Mannheim's Sociology of Knowledge doctrine, and at the alleged relativism of the instrumentalists. The concluding essay, written by Dennes, deals with the question, "Conceptions of Civilization: Descriptive and Normative."

The writer has read a good many of the volumes in this series. In his judgment the present one is not among the best. Several of the papers at least leave the impression of having been got up just for the purpose at hand.

GEORGE GENTRY

**BRADLEY'S DIALECTIC.** By Ralph Withington Church. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1942. Pp. v+189. \$2.50.

In this interpretation of Bradley's thought Professor Church takes his cue from the "neg-

lected" chapter on "Relation and Quality" in *Appearance and Reality*, where Bradley expounds most systematically the theory of "relational identity." As might be surmised from this, the chief purpose in the book is that of elucidating the essential character of the dialectic.

That the author has achieved signal success in carrying out his objective is an easy conclusion. The book is one of the very best discussions of a difficult subject matter the writer is acquainted with. It indicates genuine understanding of Bradley. It is well organized and exceptionally well written for a book of its character. It is obvious that a great deal of thought and care went into it. One might well argue that the job done is not worth doing but should certainly agree that it has been done with unusual skill.

While Professor Church's chief purpose is to elucidate the dialectical method, the book is not entirely expository in character. It contains in addition some critical comments on the dialectic, as well as on related questions. This critical, evaluative phase strikes the writer as mature, balanced, and to the point. To the reader who wishes to attain a critical introduction to Bradley and to the general point of view in philosophy which he represents, Professor Church's book can be highly recommended.

GEORGE GENTRY

**THE LIVING THOUGHTS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON.** Presented by John Dewey. New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1943. Pp. 173. \$1.25.

This is the latest and the littlest of the several books presenting selections from Jefferson's letters and public documents. In amount of material this volume compares unfavorably with Mayo's voluminous (selections) *Jefferson Himself*, unfavorably with Padover's (life and selections) *Jefferson*, and even with Padover's



earlier and smaller (selections) *Democracy by Thomas Jefferson*. In price, however, it compares favorably, most favorably, with them all. Although not as available in price or size as a "Modern Library" volume, this addition to "The Living Thoughts Library" makes Jefferson more accessible to more and more readers. This enhanced accessibility is itself a good which, while it cannot be measured, had best not be deprecated or even depreciated. While Jefferson is great as an object of utility to democracy at any time and place, he is even more precious as an aesthetic object. To contemplate the personage which rises majestically from "the little hill" in Virginia and spreads its wings like a guardian genius over the whole land—indeed, over all the earth—is to experience a deepened faith in man and nature, ennobling any soul that will pause in reverent awe of this aureole of mankind.

As Mr. John Dewey says by way of presenting these selections:

Irrespective of any question of whose political ideas are sound, there is no doubt that Jefferson was the most universal as a human being of all of his American and perhaps European contemporaries. We cannot pride ourselves that he was a typical or representative American. He is too far above the average for that. But we can say that he embodied in himself typical American characteristics that are usually dispersed.

It is as fruitless as it is easy to quarrel over the selections that go into a small book like this. Suffice it to say that there are none here that men will not be both wiser and better from understanding. What we have is, in miniature, John Dewey's Jefferson. That is both appropriate and useful. The more so of both because Dewey tries here, as always, to be honest with others about his biases. He explains:

I have been guided chiefly by a desire to combine the more theoretical statements with passages recording his own observations, and illustrate thereby that union of principle and practice which seems to me to constitute the greatness of Jefferson.

Practicing thus what pragmatism preaches, Jefferson emerges as a presence very satisfactory to Mr. Dewey, America's revered instrumentalist. Thus, indeed, does Jefferson lend his benign presence to us all.

The other principle of selection, also honestly avowed but no less satisfactory to an empiricist because avowed, is Jefferson's concern with local government. Mr. Dewey thinks that the

usual assimilation of Jefferson to the cause of "states' rights" fails to do justice to the bent which the assimilation is meant to advertise. Jefferson was not so much interested in defending the states against the national government as he was in providing life and sinews to every larger unit of government by keeping healthy and growing the "grass roots" of human accord. "As Cato concluded every speech with the words '*Carthago delenda est*' so do I every opinion," writes Jefferson in his old age, "with the injunction, 'Divide the counties into wards.'"

While the primary justification of this purpose was, as Dewey suggests, "the establishment and care of popular elementary schools," the purpose, as Dewey rightly concludes, "extended, in the mind of Jefferson, far beyond that function." Local responsibility was, in Jefferson's abiding opinion, "the keystone of the arch of our government." "The elementary republics of the wards, the county republics, the state republics and the Republic of the Union would form a gradation of authorities."

These principles of selection avowed, Mr. Dewey does not ride them disproportionately, as the main divisions of the volume will attest: "Political Philosophy," "Economic Philosophy," "Morals and Religion," "Intellectual Freedom and Progress," "Education," "Internal Affairs," "Foreign Relations, War and Peace," "History and the Contemporary World." The reader will find in this volume most of the sayings of Jefferson which time and reverence have together christened "great." He will find also, as a free-will offering, one of the least pretentious but also one of the most substantial essays upon Jefferson's life, character, and significance, by a true Jeffersonian philosopher of our time, John Dewey.

T. V. S.

THE LAW OF CIVILIZATION AND DECAY. By Brooks Adams. With an Introduction by Charles A. Beard. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1943. Pp. 349+xi. \$3.50.

For purposes of this notice the Introduction here, which is new, is more important than what is introduced, a book published first in 1895. The general place in our social literature of Brooks Adams is well enough known not to require comment. What Charles A. Beard thinks about anything is interesting, and what he thinks about this type of treatise is impor-

tant. He adjudges that "on four counts" this volume is worthy of inclusion "among the outstanding documents of intellectual history in the United States and, in a way, the Western World": (1) "a prime place among the writings of the Adams family on the nature and course of social politics"; (2) "a distinct position in the long line of American protests against plutocratic tendencies"; (3) its significance "in the development of thought about 'the philosophy of history'"; and (4) "the first extended attempt on the part of an American thinker to reduce universal history or at least Western history to a single formula or body of formulas conceived in the spirit of modern science."

The genesis of the thesis of growth and decay is here sketched. Especially investigated is the relation of Brooks Adams' cyclical theory of history to Marxism (more similarity than relation), its influence upon Theodore Roosevelt, who reviewed the American edition at length and with great thoughtfulness, and the contributions made to the thesis of Brooks by his better-known brother, Henry Adams. The latter relation is particularly well done, with some new evidence (letters) to suggest that the influence flowed more from Brooks to Henry than from Henry to Brooks. Professor Beard has done another of his many services to American scholarship in so introducing to a new generation the American forerunner of Spengler, Brooks Adams.

T. V. S.

SCIENCE AND ETHICS. By C. H. Waddington. London: Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1942. Pp. 144. 7s. 6d.

This little book is in the form of a debate. The author, C. H. Waddington, Doctor of Science and Fellow of Christ's College, contributed the title essay to the science journal *Nature*. It was the subject of considerable comment and criticism by a number of scientists, psychologists, philosophers, and churchmen. These comments and replies to them are reprinted in this volume. Among those who confirm or repudiate Dr. Waddington's thesis are the Bishop of Birmingham, the Dean of St. Paul's, Professor Susan Stebbing, Professor Julian Huxley, Dr. Joseph Needham, Dr. Herbert Dingle, Professor J. D. Bernal, Dr. Karin Stephen, and Mrs. Melanie Klein.

In the ten-page article which introduces the book, Dr. Waddington indicates his belief that

the ideas of the psychoanalysts, of the Marxists, of the Logical Positivists, and the relativist method of the anthropologists are all relevant to the subject matter of ethics. It is his thesis that moral judgments are scientific statements and that Freudian psychology, Marxist sociology, and anthropology give them their probability. Ethical principles are "psychological compulsions derived from the experience of the nature of society." And "good" is to be defined as harmony with the evolutionary direction of society. Since science reveals the direction of the evolutionary process, ethics is based on the facts of science.

The comments are largely corrections of Dr. Waddington's conceptions of psychology, Marxism, and biology with some criticism by moralists and theologians of his basic assumptions about the nature of ethics.

Although the thesis and the criticisms of it were presented so briefly as to make depth of discussion almost impossible, there seems to be real value in this type of dialectical approach to ethics. However, the chief feature of the book is not so much its contribution to ethical literature as its rather interesting demonstration of how the various cross-currents of modern thought can be brought to bear on a philosophical problem.

ALBERT WILLIAM LEVI

DEVELOPMENT OF COLLECTIVE ENTERPRISE. By Seba Eldridge and Associates. Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1943. Pp. viii + 577. \$4.50.

Five years ago a group of social scientists, in the main associated with the University of Kansas but also recruited from other universities and from government service, undertook an investigation of collective enterprise under the general supervision of Seba Eldridge. This book is the fruit of the thirty collaborators' labors in this investigation.

The group set up two general objectives: (1) determination, through an inductive study, of the basic factors in the growth of collective undertakings, particularly in the United States; and (2) an exposition of these undertakings as going concerns, including the underlying controls, administrative patterns, financial policies, personnel conditions, and, so far as possible, their operational efficiencies. The book is divided in accordance with these objectives. Part I, written by Seba Eldridge, introduces the

problem of socialization and clarifies its meaning. Part II is a study of fields already collectivized, such as postal services, roads and streets, and protection of persons and property. Part III is a study of fields now undergoing collectivization, such as electric power, housing, and public health. Part IV deals with special problems of collectivization, such as the role of organized labor, the effect of public opinion, and the financial aspects of collective development. Part V, also written by Seba Eldridge, summarizes the findings of the preceding parts and presents those generalizations growing out of the study as a whole which constitute a theory of collective enterprise.

The central hypothesis of the study was this:

In a "capitalistic democracy" (where capital is owned mainly by individuals, and where ultimate political power is exercised—in some measure—by the "masses") extensions of collective enterprise (in which capital is owned by groups, not by individuals) are effected *mainly* and *primarily* through the pressure of consumer and/or general public needs or interests. . . .

For this generalization the study presents an impressive quantity of evidence. From this point of view the book should be of interest both to social scientists and to social philosophers. For it is, in effect, a denial both of the Marxian thesis that socialization is the result of pressures originating primarily from the working classes as a productive group and of the Burnham thesis that such changes are primarily under the control of a managerial élite. The political theory of our time has been disproportionately oriented about the proletariat, on the one hand, and the élite, on the other. This study, while largely economic in emphasis, reinforces the type of political theory of the middle classes urged by Merriam, Holcombe, and others.

It is true that the study did not give detailed analysis of some of the critical points at which political and economic theory intersect, such as the way in which interest groups operate as political units or the effect which newspapers or other media of group communication have upon the process of socialization. Nonetheless, this study will be of the greatest interest to social scientists interested in collectivization as a going concern and to social philosophers interested in the dynamics of an emergent economy.

ALBERT WILLIAM LEVI

SCIENCE, PHILOSOPHY, AND RELIGION: THIRD SYMPOSIUM. New York: Conference on Science, Philosophy and Religion in Their Relation to the Democratic Way of Life, Inc., 1943. Pp. xix+438. \$3.00.

The twenty-five papers and the comments upon them which make up this book were read and discussed at the Third Conference on Science, Philosophy, and Religion held at Columbia University in August of 1942. The conference was, in the words of the Foreword to this volume, "an affirmation of faith by American scholars and men of letters in the durability and future of our civilization." It was founded on the premise that the war and economic dislocations of our time are based on intellectual and spiritual errors and confusions. It was the purpose of the conference that various representatives of a pluralistic civilization should attempt an integration for the various fields of creative thought. It was hoped that scientists, philosophers, theologians, and critics and practitioners of the arts might at this perilous moment speak a common language and perhaps underwrite a common system of values.

A careful reading of the book leaves one with mixed feelings. On the one hand is a profound sympathy with the purpose of the enterprise. And on the other is an equally profound regret that this purpose has been so inadequately realized. Perhaps there is actually a greater unanimity of conviction and of good will among these men than appears on the surface. But this surface, at least, conveys the impression of confusion, ambiguity, and irrelevance. The papers are grouped under five chief headings: "The Problem of Objective Basis for Value Judgments," "The Relation of General Objectives of the Conference to the Problems of Education and Public Administration," "The Meaning of Human Dignity and Human Civilization in Terms of Various Disciplines," "The Historical Process in Its Effect on Art, Music and Letters," and "The Significance of History for the Current Intellectual, Economic and Political Crisis."

On the credit side the conference provided an opportunity for some shrewd analyses of the meaning of democracy, some penetrating accounts of the relation of democracy to education and economics, and one or two critical appraisals of the role of the arts in contemporary civilization. On the debit side was some rather cheap stalking of the bogymen of "rela-

tivism," a few semihysterical attempts to equate democracy with the spirit of Christian theology, and some reactionary attacks upon all traces of "modernism" in the arts.

Moralists will be interested in Philipp Frank's paper on "The Relativity of Truth and the Objectivity of Values" and in James B. Pratt's "The Nature of Value." Social philosophers will find illuminating "After the Price of War, the Price of Peace," the simple but sane article of Robert M. MacIver; J. M. Clark's excellent "The Democratic Concept in the Economic Realm"; and the solid economic paper of Michael A. Heilperin, "Economic Policy and Democracy." Few of the papers have the brevity, intelligence, and good sense of Lyman Bryson's "What Is a Good Society?" Interesting for comparison are Allardyce Nicoll's trite and even reactionary attitude toward the arts and Arnold M. Walter's more liberal and understanding presentation of a similar thesis with particular reference to the field of music. The volume concludes with a paper by John U. Nef, "The Industrial Revolution Reconsidered," which is interesting and worthy of attention although its length and scholarly apparatus are somewhat out of place in the company of its fellows.

The Conference on Science, Philosophy, and Religion is indeed a worthy enterprise. And yet I suppose it is inevitable that this summary of its third symposium should call to mind Kenneth Burke's unforgettable phrase about men "huddling together, nervously loquacious, at the edge of an abyss." War and catastrophe are upon us; and, unless we can achieve greater simplicity, greater like-mindedness and greater like-heartedness than is here displayed, we shall be engulfed!

ALBERT WILLIAM LEVI

TABOO: A SOCIOLOGICAL STUDY. By Hutton Webster. California: Stanford University Press, 1942. Pp. xii+393. \$4.00.

Hutton Webster was for over twenty years professor of social anthropology at the University of Nebraska and later lecturer in sociology at Stanford University. In this book he attempts a comprehensive sociological account of the idea of taboo in primitive and preliterate societies. The author is careful to distinguish his own usage of the term "taboo" from the customary meaning of any socially prohibited behavior. For him taboos are "prohibitions which, when

violated, produce automatically in the offender a state of ritual disability—'taboo sickness'—only relieved, when relief is possible, by a ceremony of purification."

It has long been known that primitive peoples, contrary to the romantic picture of the eighteenth century, are almost completely fettered by the customs of their community. Of these, taboos form an extremely large part. Webster's account is interesting in the way in which it demonstrates how taboos cluster about the dominant areas of social life. Thus he describes the taboos of the reproductive life (pregnancy, menstruation, puberty), the separation of the sexes, sexual intercourse, the dead, strangers and strange phenomena of nature, sacred persons and objects. Two concluding chapters deal respectively with economic and social aspects of taboo.

The book contains no evidence of new anthropological researches or of any field researches of the author. Instead, the author draws heavily upon the standard works of Frazier, Malinowski, Howitt, Rivers, Spencer and Gillen, Radcliffe-Brown, and others. Much more serious in terms of the book's avowed purpose is the omission of systematic sociological generalization and psychological analysis. Both the weakness and the virtues of the book lie in its essentially descriptive character. Systematic sociologists and anthropologists will be disappointed by the merely descriptive procedure. On the other hand, the value of the work lies in the great mass of material gathered from diverse and often obscure sources and placed within the covers of a single volume.

ALBERT WILLIAM LEVI

AN INTRODUCTION TO MODERN PHILOSOPHY. By Alburey Castell. New York: Macmillan Co., 1943. Pp. x+562. \$3.50.

In this *Introduction to Modern Philosophy* it is as if the author had become weary of the customary options of the textbook writer in philosophy (historical approach or problems approach? straight text or selections? etc.) and decided to mix them in a delightful hash. There are problems here. In fact, the book consists of six topics or problems—respectively, a theological problem, a metaphysical problem, an epistemological problem, an ethical problem, a political problem, and a historical problem, presented in the order named.

There is history here. On each of the problems five philosophers speak. And with the exception of St. Thomas Aquinas, who seems to have wandered in by mistake, they are *modern* philosophers. Nothing prior to the vintage of Descartes and Pascal. And when these five philosophers speak to their problem, they do so consecutively and in polite chronological order. On a theological problem we have (1) Aquinas, who, as I say, wandered in from some near-by introduction to medieval philosophy; (2) Pascal and his wager; (3) Hume and his skepticism; (4) John Stuart Mill and his limited theism; and (5) William James and his pragmatic approach.

On a metaphysical problem it appears that the more things change, the more they stay the same thing. We have certainly passed through this tunnel before! We listen again to (1) Descartes and his dualism, (2) Hobbes and his materialism, (3) Berkeley and his idealism, (4) Schopenhauer and his voluntarism, and (5) our friend James refreshed after his tussle with theology and back with some metaphysics this time.

On an epistemological problem there are (1) Locke, (2) Hume, (3) Kant, (4) Comte, and (5) Vaihinger. On an ethical problem there are (1) Paley, (2) Kant, (3) Mill, (4) Nietzsche, and (5) . . . . Don't look. Can this really be . . . . ? Yes! It's William James back for the third time. What a small world!

On a political problem there are (1) James I, (2) Hobbes, (3) Rousseau, (4) Burke, and (5) John Stuart Mill. And on a historical problem there are (1) the medieval interpretation (paraphrases from Santayana's *Reason in Religion*), (2) Kant, (3) Hegel, (4) Marx, and (5) Spengler.

It is impossible to give a clear idea as to how each of these authors is treated. There is usually a short paragraph making the transition from one author to another. The section on Mill in a political problem, for example, will be introduced by a paragraph "From Burke to Mill." There follows a biographical paragraph, generally too short to be other than pretty confusing; and then begins what is somewhat mysteriously called "Argument of the Citations." The "argument of the citations" sometimes contains selections from the philosopher's own words, but more frequently paraphrases of what the philosopher said; and the whole is often interlarded with exegesis, commentary, and occasionally little side thoughts or insights into these matters by Pro-

fessor Castell. Each section closes with "reading references" and a series of "reading questions." But even after a good night's sleep it was still impossible to banish the indescribable confusions of some of those "arguments of the citations."

"There is little doubt," says Professor Castell, "that the first result of working through this large body of analyses and speculations will be profound confusion." With this no one can argue. He further says:

To turn over in one's mind the sequences of thoughts brought together in this book is an intellectual experience of the first order. It is permissible for the present writer [Professor Castell] to say this because his own part in the book has been largely that of wielding the scissors and paste pot.

But here one can argue, indeed, for this raises the basic question: Can one raise one's eyes from a scrapbook to the stars? Can one nourish the passion to philosophize on predigested gruel? We are living in an age of rationing. The tea is watery, and the coffee second-made. But philosophy need not be so. As for the student's Hume and Mill and Marx—let him drink it black and strong and rich!

ALBERT WILLIAM LEVI

METAPHYSICS AND THE NEW LOGIC. By Warner Arms Wick. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1942. Pp. xiv + 202. \$2.00.

"That a great deal of historical metaphysics is unaffected by contemporary logical 'refutations' of metaphysics in general, and that logical empiricism's problems and methods may be assimilated to those of the Platonic tradition, is the thesis of this book"—a thesis, one may observe, the second part of which probably appears about as startling to logical positivists as it must to all good Platonists. As if the establishment of this thesis were hardly enough to fill the pages of one small book, however, Dr. Wick also undertakes to show, for good measure, "that the problems of metaphysics as conceived by Aristotelians can be restated as problems of logic or semiotic as conceived by at least some logical empiricists."

In barest outline, which necessarily fails to do justice to the author's very considerable gifts as a persuasive writer, these feats of what some critics will be sure to regard as not too refined intellectual and verbal legerdemain, are

performed in three stages, which may be distinguished as follows: First in logical order comes a rather elaborate critique of, or gloss on, Carnap, as if it were in anticipation of clearer recognition by that logician of some of the implicit complexities and ramifications of the problems with which he concerns himself, and with a view to bringing his doctrines more into line with Morris' general theory of signs, or semiotic. Next, by means of a characterization suggested by McKeon, in terms of this theory of signs, Dr. Wick defines two divergent points of view, from either of which, apparently, a most truly empirical analysis of meaning might be carried out, namely, (a) the "holoscopic" or contextual, which "takes contexts as wholes to be the fundamental unit of signification," and (b) the "meroscopic," which "takes the sign elements to be primitive" (p. 48). Methodologically, then, the author hereupon submits, Aristotelianism, with its emphasis on self-evident metaphysical first-principles, may be described as meroscopic; while Platonism, characterized by its discursive, "quasi-metaphysical," reflexive dialectic, is just as plainly holoscopic. Finally, by taking advantage of the acknowledged fact that logical empiricism, especially when enriched and expanded with these new insights, is also holoscopic in method, the way may be made clear, so Dr. Wick fondly imagines, to complete the task he so bravely set himself at the beginning. The reader can readily see, however, that, even so, the actual "assimilation" is bound to take a great deal of doing, and can hardly be effected without the laying of a very heavy hand, if not on Carnap and Morris, at least on Plato and Aristotle. Even with the aid of Dewey, whom Dr. Wick invokes as a mediator at this point, the operation is a little difficult to follow.

Here, nevertheless, is a brief sample of how the trick is done (cf. p. 138). "In Plato's idiom," Dr. Wick observes, "degrees of 'truth' depend on the extent to which the idea of good is grasped." Practically speaking, however, for Plato as for Dewey, goods are infinitely various, so that "it is obviously but a step" from the doctrines of the one thinker to those of the other. And "it requires but a slightly longer step to assimilate all this" to the view that "semiosis is always subject to conventional rules determining a context of discourse" (Carnap); for "conventions must always serve an end" (Morris).

So great, oh Allah! are the newly discovered

virtues and powers of assimilation as a solvent of the disagreements and contentions of the philosophers!

H. R. SMART

Cornell University

THE FORGOTTEN HUME: LE BON DAVID. By Ernest Campbell Mossner. New York: Columbia University Press, 1943. Pp. xv + 251. \$3.00.

Mr. Mossner has given an account, at once painstaking and entertaining, of some of Hume's activities as leading Scottish man of letters: his patronage of Blacklock, John Home, Wilkie, and Macpherson, his controversies with Wallace and Rousseau, and his rivalry with Johnson. Its avowed purpose is "to revitalize the most stimulating of modern philosophers by observing him as friend and as foe, as critic and as patron, as man and as Scot." As a matter of fact, what Mr. Mossner's story chiefly "vitalizes" for the present reviewer is the zeal of Hume and his Scottish contemporaries for the literary supremacy of their nation—that bit of British *Kulturgeschichte* is depicted most vividly and with the wit appropriate to a scholar as expert in the period as Mr. Mossner. With respect to the *bon David* of the subtitle, however, this reviewer was disappointed on three scores. Mr. Mossner's extensive researches in Hume manuscripts on both sides of the Atlantic have enabled him to add some new material to data already published; and he has supplied informative detail on Blacklock, Home, and others which Hume's letters alone do not provide; but the essential impression of Hume's character is conveyed with at least equal force by Adam Smith's classic imitation of the *Phaedo* and by the collective effect of Grieg's edition of the letters. What one might have hoped for from such a book, moreover, Mr. Mossner has put off for a later work; i.e., an account of the relation between Hume's character and his philosophy. And his suggestion for such a treatment, finally, hints at conflicts to be discovered between Hume the kindly friend and patron and Hume the radical inquirer after truth, whereas one might at least as plausibly infer from Hume's philosophic writings agreement rather than contrast of character and doctrine. His peculiar brand of skepticism may be the outcome, not the opposite, of his chronic good nature.

MARJORIE GRENE

**HUMAN NATURE AND UTILITY IN HUME'S SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY.** By William Gordon Ross. Garden City, N.Y.: The author, 1942. Pp. xiii+107.

Hume's philosophy is analyzed in this Columbia dissertation in the light of two principal factors: his search for certainty through an investigation of origins, on the one hand, and his discovery of a criterion of value closely connected with the concept of utility, on the other. It is matter for speculation (about Hume, science, or religion?) that since scientific empiricists have dropped that excellent infidel, professional religionists like the present author (a graduate of Union Theological Seminary and Fellow of the National Council on Religion in Higher Education) should be flocking to his standard.

MARJORIE GRENE

**THE CHURCH IN THE SOCIAL ORDER: A STUDY OF ANGLICAN SOCIAL THEORY FROM COLERIDGE TO MAURICE.** By Cyril K. Gloyn. Pacific University. \$1.50.

Mr. Gloyn is here concerned with the social theories voiced by leading English churchmen mainly in the second quarter of the nineteenth century. Many of the historians of that era of controversy in Anglicanism have shared its partisan antipathies. Our author suffers under no such disadvantage. He points out at the outset that the problems faced by the Oxford World Conference of 1937 were not essentially different from those to which church leaders turned their attention a hundred years earlier, viz., secularism, tension between church and state, industrial strife, and the spirit of nationalism. The method he adopts is to present in separate studies four of the leading theories then advanced—those of Coleridge, the Tractarians, Thomas Arnold, and Frederick Denison Maurice. Probably no better selection could have been made, and by it the author avoids all pretense of writing a complete history of the Christian social and political theories of the era.

Professor Gloyn explains the attempt of Coleridge to establish an equilibrium between church and state, to assert against the "overbalance of the commercial spirit" the correctives of ethics and religion, to restore to their proper social function the "clerisy" (the learned class including the clergy), to reclaim the state for the ethical sphere, and to have it assume not, in-

deed, a democratic structure but a benevolent policy in the interests of all classes. But Coleridge is criticized for his willingness to leave undisturbed the established institutions. Gloyn's critical evaluation of the social outlook of the Tractarians is discerning and suggestive. Beginning with an unqualified assertion of the authority of the church, they rejected nationalism as imperiling that authority and dallied with the idea of disestablishment as a means of placing the church in a better position to give spiritual guidance to the state. They made more of private holiness than of public morality; and, while they consistently championed the cause of the poor against their exploiters, they piously discouraged all efforts of the laboring class to improve their own worldly status. Arnold's conception of the church as "the great society for the putting down of moral evil" is at the opposite pole from that of the Anglo-Catholics and represents a development of the position of Coleridge. He was strongly opposed to sacerdotalism and looked for the ultimate union of church and state. Of these writers, Maurice alone realized the need of economic and social reconstruction. The view that competition is the law of the universe he branded as a lie. In his thought the metaphysics of Coleridge was replaced by a distinctive theology which stressed God's infinite charity as revealed by the Cross. Our author shows how this doctrine of God formed the basis for Maurice's theory of society as a universal brotherhood and made him the foe of "competitive selfishness." Mr. Gloyn has written a highly useful chapter in the history of Christian social ethics.

JOHN T. McNEILL

**TWO CURRENTS IN THE THOUGHT STREAM OF EUROPE.** By Elmer G. Suhr. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1942. Pp. 469.

This volume, for which the author claims that the preparation has occupied a good share of his spare time for the last ten years, purports to be a contribution to the history of ideas. It undertakes to trace from ancient to modern times the occurrence of two dominant philosophical points of view which "oppose" each other—the point of view of "the absolutist" and the point of view of "the broad intellectual." The absolutist is "one who extracts a segment from his experience and builds air castles within its limitations in terms of himself and his desires without for the most part realizing it." The

broad intellectual "makes an attempt to view his world more objectively, to look at his environment in all its relationships as it is." These philosophical alternatives are viewed as the possible outcomes of "the conflict between human nature and nature at large."

It is almost impossible to determine what the author means by his basic distinction except perhaps in a confused and impressionistic manner. Sometimes it seems to be the dualism between rationalism and empiricism, at others between mysticism and naturalism, and at still others between Platonism and Aristotelianism, although the author is generally unclear and contradictory. But within this vague framework he manages to discuss the ancients, the medievals, and the moderns and the art forms which each has produced. In a penultimate chapter on "The Nation" are discussed the differences between the English, the French, and the Germans. This chapter is completely uncritical and irresponsible and contains such generalizations as: "The most natural art form for the German with the exception of music is wood-carving," "The Englishman is the most objective creature in Europe," "The most typical composer of the most distinctive French melody was Leo Delibes," "The Englishman is very much the male in everything he does"—all presented without the slightest supporting evidence.

It is clear that the author has a preference for the broad intellectual point of view and that he believes it to have had its finest culmination in the culture of ancient Greece and Rome. It is also clear that the book provides him with an opportunity to discuss and compare the greater figures in the history of culture and historical epochs. Unfortunately, this is done unimaginatively and in a style that is dull and heavy. This book will present little of novelty, originality, or creative scholarship. But it is one man's attempt to make sense of a broad stream of intellectual and cultural history. Who shall deny the right to attempt such an enterprise?

ALBERT WILLIAM LEVI

PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS IN HONOR OF EDGAR ARTHUR SINGER, JR. Edited by F. P. Clarke and M. C. Nahm. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1942. Pp. x+377.

The function of this volume is to celebrate the influence of Professor Edgar Arthur Singer, Jr., for many years associated with the University of Pennsylvania. The essayists represented

in the book in their own papers reflect "two integrated aspects of a life devoted to science: Professor Singer's long continuing contribution to technical philosophy in this country and his presentation of the historical 'dialectic of the schools' and of systematic thought to generations of students."

In addition to contributions by Professor Singer's students and colleagues at the University of Pennsylvania are two papers: "On the Criteria and Limits of Meaning," by Arthur O. Lovejoy, and "Newton's Natural Philosophy: Its Problems and Consequences," by John Herman Randall, Jr. Following the divisions of Professor Singer's own philosophy, the book is divided into four sections: "Methodology and Science," "Ethics and Religion," "Esthetics," "History of Philosophy." The first section, which is perhaps twice the size of any of the others, contains, in addition to Professor Lovejoy's article, two papers on empirical method, one technical paper on mathematical logic, two papers on the logic of biology, and three papers in the field of psychology. The second section contains one technical paper, "Toward an Experimental Definition of Criminal Mind," and two less so by clergymen. The third section contains four rather interesting papers on aesthetics, ranging from the theoretical to the experimental. Part IV, in addition to John Herman Randall's paper, contains "Kant and Thomas Aquinas on the Proofs for the Existence of God," two highly technical papers on Plotinus and the *Categories* of Aristotle, and finally Wilson D. Wallis' "David Hume's Contribution to Social Science."

From the contents of the volume one gains the impression of extreme heterogeneity. But this is perhaps inevitable in any *Festschrift* of this character. The book is beautifully printed and contains, in addition, a portrait and bibliography of Professor Singer.

ALBERT WILLIAM LEVI

PUBLIC RELIEF, 1929-1939. By Josephine Chapin Brown. New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1940. Pp. xvii+524. \$3.50.

Perhaps we are too close to the decade 1929-39 for anyone to be able to analyze and evaluate to our full satisfaction the momentous experience in public relief which the United States underwent during that period. In her book on the subject, however, Josephine Brown has succeeded in bringing together an impressive storehouse of



data, theories, and conclusions concerning those harassing days. She does this from the point of view of one who, in the main, agrees with the policies and aims of the New Deal. Her outlook is essentially practical; she is governed by the desire to formulate and carry out an efficient program of relief for those who are rightly entitled to it. In that vein her tendency is to dismiss with little critical consideration the objections to the general program of relief with regard both to fundamental aims and to methods of procedure. Thus her treatment results in vagueness as to the theoretical implications of relief and social service in our economic and social order. She glosses over the possible effects of the relief program on the federal system, political parties and pressure groups, public finance and taxation, and methods of administration. Be that as it may, the book is a highly valuable reference book for an accurate, readable, carefully documented account of the subject and contains excellent charts, tables, and graphs and a very full, classified bibliography.

The volume consists of four parts. The short introduction tells the story of relief in the United States up until 1929 and discusses the theory of public responsibility for relief. In Part II is described the economic and social crisis of 1929, the piecemeal ineffective attempts of local, state, and federal governments to meet the new burden, the administration of loans under the Emergency Relief and Construction Act of 1932, and the groundwork laid for federal grants of relief preceding the inauguration of President Roosevelt. Part III covers the period of 1933-35, describing and analyzing the work of the Federal Emergency Relief Administration. It takes up such issues as direct relief versus work relief, relief in cash or in kind, standards of relief, help for transients, and problems of training social work personnel. Part IV revolves around the Social Security Act and the assuming of responsibility by the federal and state governments, conceived of as "The Beginnings of a Permanent Program." It is hardly possible in the scope of this review to delineate the useful contribution which the author has made in preparing this work that speaks of an era in American history that may perhaps be the forerunner of a new social order. For public relief during the decade 1929-39 will be looked upon as a saga of suffering and social action.

SAMUEL M. STRONG

MARRIAGE. By Ernest R. Groves. Rev. ed. New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1941. Pp. xv+671. \$3.50.

Within recent years the university curriculum yielded to increasing requests from various sources for instruction in problems of the family. Numerous texts appeared which attacked these issues from a variety of perspectives. It is estimated that, between the academic years 1937 and 1939, over one hundred new courses on the family were introduced. Since 1939, additional courses and texts have taken up this general topic. Interesting, however, are the ever widening campus debates and requests on the part of students for a "marriage course." Some of those in charge of the already existing courses on marriage and the family fail to understand the meaning of this demand by youth and are questioning indignantly, "Are we not giving well-organized courses on the family based on scientifically valid data?" Apparently the status quo treatment of family courses does not answer adequately the questions which present-day college students are persistently asking. The book under review also falls short in this respect.

This is a revised edition of the author's early work published in 1933, when "only one American University was giving credit courses in preparation for marriage." The author presents in this volume carefully selected case materials gathered during his many years of teaching and counseling. The thirty chapters of this text, supplemented with valuable bibliographical annotations, cover an enormous amount of material. The author attempts an inclusive treatment and discusses a wide range of topics irrespective of how remotely some may be linked with marriage. The numerous subjects contained in each chapter are dealt with in a crisp, condensed fashion, proposing to give the student a bird's-eye view of the most complex aspects of sex, marriage, the family, and the child from the following standpoints: social, psychological, psychiatric, pathological, hygienic, legal, economic, eugenic, historical, philosophical, religious, etc. The volume is thus a compendium of highly valuable points of information, but it does not address itself to the subtle motivations of youth in their quest for a "marriage course." The nature of these motivations may perhaps be understood through an analysis of the interplay of the dynamic forces in our present-day culture as they affect developing personalities of youth.

At the outset of this volume the author is

concerned with the developing of a "scientific interest" on the part of the reader, but he fails to carry that through in such assertions as: "Marriage does not become spiritual; it is spiritual. It is not the exceptional, aristocratic type of marriage that gathers such quality, but every union of a man and a woman becomes, in some measure, small or great, an expression of cravings and achievements that are essentially spiritual" (p. 636). The questioning student may not be very much edified by the statement that "the motives that lead into marriage are distinctly concrete" (p. 19) but that the difficult task is to bring them to the "surface without rationalization."

Since the author promises "to bring out soon an additional collection of personal experiences" related to his present work, would it not be worth while to present the subject in keeping with the *Zeitgeist*?

SAMUEL M. STRONG

**FROM RELIEF TO SOCIAL SECURITY: THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE NEW PUBLIC WELFARE SERVICES AND THEIR ADMINISTRATION.** By Grace Abbott. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1941. Pp. viii+388. \$2.50.

This volume is a collection of significant papers, speeches, and testimonies before congressional committees by the late Grace Abbott, whose thought and activity were dynamic factors in impressing upon the American public its collective responsibility for existing social problems and for the welfare of its citizens. Assembled posthumously by her sister, Edith Abbott, the papers, with the exception of her presidential address delivered at the National Conference of Social Work in 1924, were written during the "depression decade" of 1929-39. They reflect the development of proposals for meeting the crisis and the public welfare statutes enacted into law during this difficult period when severe economic and social maladjustment gripped the country. Although concerned particularly with furthering the welfare of children, as indicated by her thirteen years of service as chief of the United States Children's Bureau and her recent work on *The Child and the State*, Professor Abbott wrestled also with the broader problems of unemployment, the relationships between various units of government, and general problems of administration.

In this book of essays and hearings before

legislative committees of Congress, Miss Abbott's approach to such crucial national issues reveals her visionary thinking, deep sympathy for those in need, realistic ability for attaining what was politically possible, and her administrative skill. She combines the social idealism of a Jane Addams and the intense zeal for applying social knowledge to practical problems of a Mary Richmond. Some of Miss Abbott's proposed programs have been put into practice, while others are still seeds of unfulfilled hopes which may some day come to fruition.

The volume under review consists of two parts. Part I, "Toward an Adequate Public Assistance Program," deals with a number of pertinent topics, some of which are the social services as a public responsibility, the tragedy of transients, children and the depression, the Social Security Act and relief, and economic security against illness. Part II, "Some Administrative Problems of the Public Welfare Services," includes discussions of developing and protecting professional standards in public welfare work, the public welfare administrator and civil service in state and local services, and the county versus the community as an administrative unit. The student of social work, of public administration, and all those conscious of the significance of social action in our time will profit a great deal from retracing with the author the precipitous road *From Relief to Social Security*.

SAMUEL M. STRONG

**IS MODERN CULTURE DOOMED?** By Andrew J. Krzesinski. Foreword by Msgr. G. Barry O'Toole. New York: Devin-Adair Co., 1942. Pp. xiv+158. \$2.00.

With the supreme confidence of an evangelist, a priest-professor from the ancient Jagellonian University of Cracow answers that there are two cultures in the Western world—the traditional Catholic and the antitraditional, anti-Christian, materialistic culture of all nonbelievers—and that one of them is doomed. The former, encompassing all the spiritual values, "never suffers impairment nor does it decay," in complete contrast to the latter, which is depicted as devoid of anything truly praiseworthy and is loaded with blame for all the world's woes. Like Sorokin's *The Crisis of Our Age*—which, save for its vocabulary, it greatly resembles—this book adds one more to the number of black-and-

white catalogues of what the Catholic church has condemned and praised. It represents the Catholic church as having done, in the past, "everything in her power to change" social and economic injustices in Europe; but, "not being free to use the means and methods of Socialism," she has proved "no match for the latter." Now that "materialistic culture" is deservedly in dire distress, the author even indulges in some gloating over human misery. He sees the church as surrounded by enemies and yet finds "no reasons for pessimism . . . but rather special reasons for optimism." All will come out right in the end. "Far from obstructing the victory of Christian culture, materialistic culture itself is paving the way for it."

In the course of his preachments the author is very critical of non-Catholic education and the cult of money and bodily comfort. This puzzles the observer who sees the American Catholic universities with their disproportionately elaborate athletic plants, their highly developed schools of commerce and business administration, and their evening vocational courses directly designed for the worldly advancement of their pupils. Then, too, the earnest admonitions to fight unceasingly against all forms of materialism are difficult to interpret in a world which finds Russia and Italy on opposite sides in a titanic struggle. This is no time to preach the finicky choosing of partners for survival on hair-splitting religious grounds which would prevent a Catholic from fighting lest he might bring victory to some despised materialists along with himself any more than it is a time for materialists to withdraw from battle just because they are averse to winning along with Catholics. The two cultures are inextricably intermingled in the present struggle; their fates are tied in the same package; and any contrasting of the two in terms of absolute good and absolute evil is not only bogus intellectually but dangerous spiritually as well as physically. The Sorokins and the Krzesinskis, well intentioned though they are, appear as bringers of moral confusion at a time when the latter may doom both cultures. The watchword of all men of good will should be not backward to a single institution but forward to the creation of a world more worthy of the human spirit than any orthodoxy has ever envisaged.

HAROLD A. LARRABEE

Union College

THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC IDEAS OF BENOY SARKAR. Edited by Banerjee Dass. Calcutta: Chatterjee & Co., 1940. Pp. xix+664. 12 rupees.

Knowledge of India is increasingly becoming a *sine qua non* for the understanding of the concept of the United Nations and the role of Asia in the post-war world. Such knowledge is all the more valuable when presented by one of the foremost intellectuals of India, whose encyclopedic writings bespeak a wide versatility and familiarity with both the East and the West. For Sarkar is equally facile in Italian, French, German, English, and Sanskrit. His writings and ideas are viewed by Indian scholars as an "institution" and are referred to as "Sarkarism."

The volume under review is a symposium by a number of Indian professors and scientists who attempt to present summaries of Benoy Sarkar's works which deal with different branches of learning. He is first and foremost an advocate of "Young Asia," in general, and India, in particular. Influenced by the Hindu renaissance of the Ramakrishna-Vivekananda era, he gave impetus to the Bengali-Swadeshi movement, turning his attention to national education. Sarkarism is thus referred to by some as the philosophy of the Bengali-Swadeshi revolution, which is akin to the all-round humanism of the European Renaissance. In education Sarkar is opposed to Gandhi's monistic approach, which advocates that education be centered around a handicraft. As a pluralist, Sarkar opposes such a scheme as inadequate for the diverse demands of personality and creativity. According to him, the object of education is to develop originality and independent thinking, and the inductive method of teaching should be employed in modern languages and in the sciences. The pupil must develop intellectually so that he may be an organizer of institutions. He is against the textbook system and stresses that students should be taught subjects rather than books. In addition, he points out that Western thought has ignored the practical, energistic, worldly, and rationalistic achievements of Asian thought and work throughout the ages.

In his economic theory Sarkar develops equations of comparative industrialism and cultural history, demonstrating that between Young Asia and the modern world there is a difference only in chronological distance. He regards India

as being behind the first-class powers of the West by not more than a generation and a half or two. In historical statistics India (1925) = Germany (between 1850 and 1860) or = Italy (between 1860 and 1870). For instance, few realize that India is one of the greatest railway regions in the world. It was the Industrial Revolution which created a gulf between the East and the West, giving rise to culture, race, and color conflict. He is emphatic in his opposition to race, class, and caste superiority. Young Asia faces the problem of getting rid of medievalism.

The political views of Sarkar are synthesized in his analogy between the "Balkan complex" and India. Eastern Europe, Latin America, and India approximate the same technicoeconomic and sociocultural development. The modernization of these regions depends on industrialization through the aid of the Western powers. He delineates clearly that "New Asia" is born through (1) contact with modern Western progress, (2) industrialization, however slow, and (3) dislike of foreign domination. One cannot fail to note a fundamental paradox in Sarkar, who, despite his positivism and pragmatism, nevertheless brings into his sociological formulations the mysticism of the "leadership of youth," a nationalism rooted in romanticism.

SAMUEL M. STRONG

*University of Minnesota*

VILLAGES AND TOWNS AS SOCIAL PATTERNS: A STUDY IN THE PROCESSES AND FORMS OF SOCIETAL TRANSFORMATION AND PROGRESS. By Benoy Kumar Sarkar. Calcutta: Chatterjee & Co., 1941. Pp. xvi+685. 15 rupees.

The writings of Sarkar are of an encyclopedic character, and the volume under review is in some respects cosmic in scope. Here erudition and rich stores of information are interspersed with brilliant insights which the student in the social sciences may profitably explore. The five parts of this book deal successively with social patterns and transformations, the sociology of general urbanization, the sociology of hyperurbanization, an analysis of social forces in the rural configurations, and the theory of social progress as creative disequilibrium. The factual

illustrations and statistical data are from India and the concrete examples from the American, English, French, German, Italian, Japanese, and Russian scene. The author shows how societal transformation takes place through municipalization which remakes interhuman relations. Personality change, under the influence of municipalization, is an objective phenomenon which must be considered in any study of social metabolism. It should be noted here that American sociologists have long since recognized and dealt with the problem of urbanization from diverse perspectives. In discussing the differential of Indo-Russian municipalization, Sarkar concludes that these two countries should exchange notes with each other and "not with the countries of 'adult' urbanism and super municipalism." Of special interest are his discussions of caste and class in India and of feminism.

In order to deal with the problem of colonial sociology, the author draws analogies between the "Balkan complex" and India. Referring to the prospect of social, political, and economic independence for the Balkan countries from the hegemony of the Western powers, he states the following: "If in spite of the backwardness in culture, standard of living, etc., and the multiplicity of races, religions and languages these territories deserve to be endowed with political sovereignty, social science would demand the same status for India, Burma, Indo-China, Sumatra, Java and other islands of Indonesia" (p. 72).

The author's thesis, which he claims to have "systematically established in the present work," is that the human psyche as well as the interhuman *Gestalt* (patterns of social interrelationships) have always been amalgams of good and evil, love and hatred, right and wrong, peace and war. Yet, in dealing with the *Sozialpolitik* of Nazi Germany, Sarkar does not follow his polar conception of values in that he emphasizes only what he considers to be the social blessings which the Hitler regime bestowed on the Germans. He fails to grasp the real dimensions of the Axis' *Geopolitik*. It is ominous that he concludes his treatise with a "homage to youth" in which there is the glorification of almost mystical powers of leadership in youth.

SAMUEL M. STRONG

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## NOTE

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To the Editors of "*Ethics*"

GENTLEMEN:

In connection with the articles of Messrs. Bowers and Schneider in the current issue of *Ethics*, bearing largely on the subject of the religious views of Thomas Jefferson, I thought the writers and readers of those articles might be interested in the accompanying letter which the retired President Jefferson addressed to my grandfather, Jared Sparks, who was at the time of its composition a Unitarian minister in Baltimore. The original letter, which I inherited, is now in the archives of the Harvard University Library, and I possess a photostat copy of it.

The letter reveals a rather ludicrous admission of failure to understand metaphysical subtleties (or, as he calls them, "metaphysical insanities"). Like many so-called "liberals" in religious matters, Jefferson's intolerance for beliefs he did not understand shines out through this letter, as well as in many quotations found in the *Ethics* articles—note especially his confusion between polytheism and tritheism and Trinitarianism, and his unholy charge that "the clergy" "crucified their Saviour"! In my copy of the letter I have preserved the original spelling, punctuation, etc.

Very truly yours,

JARED SPARKS MOORE

COPY OF A LETTER OF THOMAS  
JEFFERSON ADDRESSED TO  
JARED SPARKS

MONTICELLO, Nov. 4, 20

SIR:

Your favor of Sep. 18 is just recieved, with the book accompanying it. it's delay

was owing to that of the box of books from Mr. Guegan, in which it was packed. being just setting out on a journey I have time only to look over the summary of contents. in this I see nothing in which I am likely to differ materially from you. I hold the precepts of Jesus, as delivered by himself, to be the most pure, benevolent, and sublime which have ever been preached to man. I adhere to the principles of the first age; and consider all subsequent innovations as corruptions of his religion, having no foundation in what came from him. the metaphysical insanities of Athanasius, of Loyola, & of Calvin, are to my understanding, mere relapses into polytheism, differing from paganism only by being more unintelligible. the religion of Jesus is founded on the Unity of God, and this principle chiefly, gave it triumph over the rabble of heathen gods then acknoleged. thinking men of all nations rallied readily to the doctrine of one only god, and embraced it with the pure morals which Jesus inculcated. if the freedom of religion, guaranteed to us by law *in theory*, can ever *rise in practice* under the overbearing inquisition of public opinion, truth will prevail over fanaticism, and the genuine doctrines of Jesus, so long perverted by his pseudo-priests, will again be restored to their original purity. this reformation will advance with the other improvements of the human mind but too late for me to witness it. Accept my thanks for your book, in which I shall read with pleasure your developements of the subject, and with them the assurance of my high respect.

TH. JEFFERSON

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